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Preface
This dissertation consists of three contributions which analyse non-standard behaviour in
organisational economics and individual decision making. Every chapter corresponds to
one essay and can be read independently of each other.
Non-standard behaviour of individuals in economic situations has been documented over
the last two decades in various laboratory and increasingly many field experiments.1 Var-
ious scholars acknowledge that a non-negligible fraction of individuals seems to system-
atically deviate from rational behaviour as predicted under standard assumptions – a
finding which applies to several dimensions of human behaviour. Two important areas of
behavioural research, preferences for fairness and erroneous predictions of future utility,
play a central role in this dissertation.
Despite several advances over the last years, the fundamental question of how to evalu-
ate the impact of behavioural economics on other fields of economics remains: Should we
amend our standard models in favour of more realism at the potential expense of providing
clear-cut statements and policy implications? Indirectly Camerer et al. (2011) agree on
that question and propose to “gradually replace simplified models based on stricter ratio-
nality” (p. 42) with behavioural models and to view results under standard assumptions
as a special case of a “more general, behaviorally grounded theory” (p. 42). Following
this approach, however, it is inevitable to develop an understanding for the relevance of
any of the behavioural biases which were established in the laboratory.
A first, tentative avenue to qualify the importance of various biases is to move away
from the laboratory and test whether behaviour observed under artificial conditions can
also be identified in market situations. This proceeding can provide evidence on the
robustness and the quantitative importance of non-standard behaviour. Results may act
as a guideline to gain confidence whether behavioural aspects can “survive markets” and
may even influence general equilibrium outcomes.
This methodological approach will be applied in the following thesis: The focus of each
essay lies in the exploitation of field data, implying that empirical evidence presented
1See for early laboratory contributions for example Güth et al. (1982) or Thaler (1988).
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in this dissertation entirely relies on real-world observations. This comes along with
econometric challenges because the scope to control for external influences using field
data is truly limited. The lack of control is addressed by exploiting exogenous variation,
as done in the first chapter. Here we provide evidence for the existence of erroneous
individual purchase decisions under risk.
However, as already stressed by Stefano DellaVigna, the natural step after documenting
non-standards behaviour is to identify “how [do] markets and institutions respond to these
nonstandard features” (DellaVigna (2009), p. 361). Shedding light on that question is
the aim of the second part of this dissertation which combines two contributions in the
field of personnel economics, exploring the importance of social preferences in intra-firm
interactions between employers and employees.
The first chapter of this dissertation, “Projection Bias under Risk”, is joint effort with
Lukas Buchheim. In this contribution, we empirically show that purchase decisions may
systematically deviate from predictions based on expected utility theory. Standard mod-
els commonly assume that individuals combine all relevant information optimally when
deciding under risk. Contrary to this, Loewenstein et al. (2003) suggest that decision
makers excessively weigh utility at the current state of the world. In its simplest ver-
sion, projection bias assumes that individuals predict future utility by combining utility
at the current state with predictions based on expected utility theory, even though any
informativeness of the current state should already be included in rational expectations.
Depending on the predictive power of the current state for future states, such behaviour
may seriously bias outcomes.
We test for projection bias in the case of an outdoor movie theatre and find that weather
conditions at the purchase day largely drive the number of advance ticket sales. Decisive
for the utility, customers derive from a visit at the cinema, however, is weather at the
day of the screening because moviegoers are fully exposed to unpleasant weather like
rainfall or low temperatures. As weather conditions are highly unstable in the region of
the respective open-air cinema and tickets are non-refundable, buying tickets in advance
and conditioning decisions on the current weather involves (unnecessary) high risk. This
observation is consistent with projection bias as both the weather forecast, i.e. the piece
of information customers under rational expectations make use of, and current weather
are predictive for ticket sales. Furthermore we find that customers seem to be unaware
of their erroneous behaviour and do not learn from mistakes. We conclude that from
the fact that buying behaviour is independent of the time horizon between purchase date
and screening day and likewise is unrelated to customers’ previous experience with the
cinema.
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Alternative explanations do not have any bite: We show that current weather is a very
poor predictor for future weather and – even more important – does not contain informa-
tion beyond the weather forecast. Furthermore we can rule out that correlations between
the number of potential customers and weather are the (sole) driver of the results. Fi-
nally, capacity constraints of the cinema are not suitable to explain the observed pattern
in advance sales.
In a broader context, the finding can have important implications for markets with higher
trade volumes. Behavioural finance literature recently provided several examples in which
purchasing decisions of investors are driven by current and past returns of the respective
assets.2 In situations, in which current experience only poorly predicts future returns
this behaviour may seriously bias investment and saving decisions with potentially severe
consequences for individuals. By providing causal evidence for projection bias, we suggest
a behavioural mechanism that is consistent with findings in this literature. Our results
may hence help to develop de-biasing strategies, supporting individuals to make more
informed decisions in the future.
The second and the third chapter of this thesis are closely related as both contributions
make use of the same dataset of British firms, the 5th wave of the “Workplace Employment
Relations Survey”. More importantly, however, both essays aim to provide answers on
how non-standard behaviour, more precisely social preferences of employees, shape labour
relations.
The second essay is joint work with Florian Englmaier and Stephen Leider. In this con-
tribution, we relate various organisational choices of firms to the human resource practise
of compulsory personality tests for job candidates, which we interpret as a predictor
of reciprocity within organisations. Applying theoretical models on moral hazard with
reciprocity, we regard reciprocity similarly to gift-exchange behaviour, where reciprocal
behaviour of employees needs to be “activated” by a kind gesture of the employer. Most
easily this can be achieved with wages which are higher than the employer expects to
receive in comparable labour relations, but any other non-pecuniary benefit may trigger
the same behaviour. As a response to that gesture, employees may return the gift by
increasing effort.
But not all employees may be inclined towards reciprocal incentives which forces firms
to select the “right” employees if they want to make use of social preferences: In that
respects are personality tests among the most popular screening devices. Such tests are
commonly designed on basis of the Five Factor model and aim to uncover personal and
2See for example Benartzi (2001), Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008), Barber et al. (2009) or Choi et al.
(2009).
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social traits of individuals. Some of these traits precisely measure behaviour which is
described by reciprocity in laboratory experiments. For that reason, we interpret the
use of personality tests for job candidates as an indicator for reciprocity within a firm:
Establishments which screen for personality should on average employ workers, who have
a higher sensitivity towards gift-exchange motives than workers in firms which do not
screen.
We find that personality tests are highly predictive of a series of benefits for employees:
Workers in firms with personality tests on average are less likely to receive very low wages
and are more likely to be granted non-pecuniary benefits like an employer pension scheme
and extended annual leave. Furthermore are these employees eligible to more training and
also the matters, the training covers are defined broader, implying a higher general value
to the employee. There also seems to be a tendency towards more job security in these
firms. It is important to understand that some of these policies require substantial (non-
monetary) investments into an employee which partly deprives the employer of the option
to discipline the worker later on. If however employees are inclined towards reciprocity
and such policies are perceived as a kind gesture, then adverse behaviour against the
employer should not occur.
For reciprocity to be a consistent explanation of the previous findings, we conjecture that
employers with and without compulsory personality tests should furthermore differ in
dimensions which are favourable for the firm and attainable when using reciprocal moti-
vation devices – if employers do not receive benefits from kind behaviour, such policies are
unlikely to be cost-efficient. In line with this argument, we find that firms using personal-
ity tests make use of team-working more frequently and report to be more successful with
regard to financial performance, labour productivity, and provide better product quality.
Ability tests are, contrary to personality tests, unable to predict this pattern of benefits
for the firm and/or benefits for employees. This strengthens the view that screening for
personality is elementary to explain favourable labour relations between employer and
employee as opposed to screening per se.
The third chapter intends to shed light on human resource management practises and
labour productivity, addressing the fundamental trade-off between granting high levels of
discretion to employees on the one hand and effort provision on the other hand. Results
from previous studies indeed suggest that autonomy in the workplace and less strictly
defined work flows can substantially increase productivity if employers manage to prevent
agents from exploiting discretion by high levels of shirking.3 Providing monetary incen-
tives to employees is the traditional solution of economists, but recently increasingly many
3See Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) for a survey.
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contributions refer to behavioural mechanisms in order to understand employer-employee
relationships. The third chapter of this dissertation likewise focuses on reciprocity as one
potential force which can mitigate shirking in labour relations.
Information on three dimensions of human resource management policies – the level of
discretion employees enjoy, the generosity of wage payments, and the use of personality
tests upon hiring, which I again use as a proxy for the inclination of the average employee
within an establishment towards reciprocity – allow me to explore effectiveness of each of
these policies first in an isolated context and second when multiple practises are applied
simultaneously. In line with previous results, I find that providing high levels of discretion
does not have detrimental effects on labour productivity, even if no complementary human
resource policies are introduced. This could suggest that against common sense employees
do not (immediately) exploit reductions in monitoring.4 However, if firms in addition to
granting substantial autonomy also pay high income to their employees and workers were
screened for personality when entering the firm, then these firms report to be exceptionally
successful with regard to labour productivity. A pattern of paying high wages (“gift”) to
the “right” employees (personality tests) rendering discretion to become desirable is highly
consistent with reciprocal behaviour between employer and employee. This is remarkable,
because firms which are similarly structured but do not screen for personality tests report
significantly lower labour productivity. The same negative result applies to firms which
only screen their applicants for ability instead of personality: A combination of high
wages, discretion and competency tests fail to predict high labour productivity implying
that not screening itself but screening for personality is crucial when firms want to make
use of motivation through social preferences.
These findings match closely with results from a laboratory experiment by Bartling et al.
(2012a). In this study, the authors provide evidence for the emergence of highly paid
jobs with high degrees of discretion if employers have the opportunity to screen job
candidates for previous effort provision. The parallelism of the results is remarkable
because the results of Bartling et al. (2012a) were generated under artificial conditions
in the laboratory whereas these findings use field data, which intrinsically do not allow
for the same degree of controlling the environment. In addition to laboratory results,
however, I can furthermore provide evidence for the importance of personality tests to
understand complementarities in human resource management practises.
The logical next step on this agenda is to aim to causally identify reciprocity as an
underlying mechanism in employer-employee relations for firms with personality tests.
But even in the light of the findings in this dissertation, it seems plausible to assume that
4Cf. Nagin et al. (2002)
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social preference can shape labour relations which suggest that markets respond to non-
standard behaviour of individuals. Findings in this dissertation are encouraging news with
regard to the effect of social preferences on labour market outcomes: The labour force
is offered more favourable contracts with high compensation and further benefits and
employer may make use of additional channels to motivate their employees. Nevertheless
it has to be explored in future research whether the utilisation of social preferences in
labour market relations throughout leads to favourable outcomes for all parties involved.
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Projection Bias under Risk0
1.1 Introduction
In many economic decision problems, the utility from choice materialises in the future
such that individuals need to predict their future utility in order to make informed de-
cisions. While standard economic models assume that individuals predict their utility
correctly, Loewenstein et al. (2003) argue that individuals make systematic errors; specif-
ically, people tend to underestimate the extent to which changes in the state of the world
alter utility. Hence, predicted future utility (at unknown future states) is biased towards
utility at today’s state. Loewenstein et al. call this error projection bias.
There is accumulating evidence that projection bias affects economic decisions like house,
car, and apparel purchases (Conlin et al., 2007; Busse et al., 2012) or college choice
(Simonsohn, 2010). For example, in parallel work Busse et al. demonstrate that sales of
4-wheel drive vehicles increase by 6 percent after a snowstorm, that is at times when the
weather-related utility from owning a 4-wheel drive is very high. All these papers have
in common, however, that the weather-related dimension of utility, which serves as the
testing ground for projection bias, is most likely not of primary importance for decision
makers. Yet, if this is the case and individuals devote only limited attention to predicting
the weather-related dimension of utility for available alternatives, they may be more prone
to make errors in that dimension.1 Therefore, it remains an open question whether people
are able to overcome projection bias when their attention is drawn to the state-dependent
nature of utility.
In this paper, we test for projection bias in a situation where state-dependent utility is
0This chapter is based on joint work with Lukas Buchheim.
1See Schwartzstein (2012) for theoretical and Hanna et al. (2012) for empirical evidence on how
limited attention may lead to errors.
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expected to be at the centre of decision maker’s attention: We study online advance sales
for an outdoor movie theatre. In this context, projection bias predicts that good weather
on the purchase-date leads customers to overvalue their utility from visiting the theatre
on the movie-date. Hence, the number of advance sales for the theatre should increase if
purchase-date weather is good.
The state-dependent nature of utility in this setting is salient for a number of reasons.
First, the presence of risk when buying tickets in advance highlights the possibility of
facing a different state of the world in the future. Customers face risk when deciding
whether or not to buy tickets today for an outdoor movie night in the future because
only movie-date weather – as opposed to purchase-date weather – affects utility. This risk
is obvious because tickets are only valid for one particular show and are non-refundable
(tickets are a perishable good). Additionally, the ticketing website points out the risk in
a clear way by stating: “The show is going to take place regardless of weather conditions.
(...) You have to pay for your tickets even if you do not collect them.”2 We demonstrate
that there is considerable risk because weather at the location of the theatre is highly
variable.
In addition to risk, two further characteristics of the decision problem are expected to
de-bias potential customers. First, the weather-related dimension of utility is a very
important component of total utility derived from the movie night – in a survey, the
majority of customers states that weather is at least as important as the movie shown.3
Since weather is important to customers, they should devote a considerable amount of
attention to predicting weather-related utility correctly. Second, when considering to
purchase tickets few days in advance, customers can condition their decision on reliable,
unbiased, and free information provided by weather forecasts to overcome projection bias.
Contrary to our conjecture that potential customers are by and large de-biased, we find
that variations in purchase-date weather explain variations in advance sales to a large
degree, controlling for the weather forecast. Across different time horizons – the number
of days tickets bought in advance ranging from one day up to three weeks – a one standard
deviation increase in sunshine duration leads to an increase in sales between 10 and 25
percent on average. Our findings are robust to considering different subsets of customers.
Notably, the results do not change when we consider the behaviour of customers with
prior bad experiences defined as rainfall during a previous show they purchased tickets
for. The dependence of ticket orders on current weather is thus prevalent for customers,
who had the possibility to learn from previous mistakes.
2Authors’ translation from https://www.didax.de/kms/index.php [4 October 2012].
3We conducted a survey at the theatre on a total of 13 nights, interviewing 443 customers. For details,
see Section 1.3.3.
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We rule out a number of alternative explanations for this finding. First, we show that
purchase-date weather has at most negligible predictive power for movie-date weather,
ruling out the possibility that current weather is an informative signal for future weather.
Second, we investigate whether the positive effect of purchase-date weather on aggregate
sales merely reflects an increase in the number of potential customers who consider vis-
iting the theatre as an attractive leisure activity without affecting individual decisions
directly. This may be the case, for example, if good current weather reminds people of
the possibility to visit the theatre. We use a strategy similar to Conlin et al. (2007) to
distinguish between the latter explanation and projection bias by looking at the decision
to collect the tickets that have been purchased in advance. If, on the one hand, projection
bias affects individual purchase decisions, utility of customers is upward biased at times
of good purchase-date weather. Then, tickets are mistakenly purchased with a higher
likelihood. We therefore expect that the likelihood that customers let their tickets expire
increases with better purchase-date weather if projection bias affects decisions. If, on the
other hand, individual decisions are unbiased and purchase-date weather solely affects the
aggregate number of potential customers, there should be no effect on tickets collected.
We find a negative effect of purchase-date weather on the probability that tickets are
collected, providing further evidence for projection bias.
Third, we argue that weather-related market interactions cannot explain why sales depend
on purchase-date weather. In particular, there may be a “precautionary” rationale for
purchasing tickets at times of good weather as the latter may increase the perceived
probability for the theatre selling out in advance. However, this seems unlikely to be
the sole explanation for our findings for two reasons. First, sales well in advance of the
movie-date – when the probability for the theatre to sell out is essentially zero – are also
weather-dependent. And second, we show that hourly variations in weather explain hourly
changes in ticket sales. This is in line with projection bias but does not fit an explanation
based on “precautionary” purchasing motives because the perceived probability of the
theatre selling out is unlikely to vary with hourly changes in weather.
By showing that projection bias affects individual decisions even in situations in which the
state-dependence of utility is particularly salient, our paper complements the emerging
literature on projection bias in economics discussed above. In addition to this literature
in economics, there is a number of papers in psychology providing evidence for projection
bias. This literature deals mostly with how current visceral states – for example hunger
or sexual arousal – affect decision making.4 See Loewenstein and Schkade (1999) for an
overview.
4See for example Loewenstein (1996), Loewenstein et al. (1997), Read and van Leeuwen (1998), van
Boven and Loewenstein (2003), and Nordgren et al. (2007).
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Furthermore, it is important to note that projection bias is observationally equivalent to
agents holding subjective beliefs that assess the current state of the world to be more likely
in the future (this has been pointed out by DellaVigna, 2009).5 There is some evidence for
agents holding these types of beliefs, which Fuster et al. (2010) call “extrapolation bias”.
For example, several papers in behavioural finance find that individuals tend to choose
assets with high current returns more frequently even if current returns do not predict
future ones (Benartzi, 2001; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2008; Barber et al., 2009; Choi et al.,
2009). Similar evidence comes from the literature on heterogeneous expectations (see
Hommes, 2011, for an overview of the literature); for example, Chavas (2000) estimates
that 47 percent of cattle producers use the current price as proxy for future prices when
planning future supply, despite large fluctuations in price over time (widely known as
“hog cycle”).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we develop a
simple model and derive predictions regarding how current weather may affect advance
sales and the subsequent decision of customers whether or not to visit the theatre. In
Section 1.3 we describe the data in greater detail. Section 1.4 discusses our main empirical
findings. In Section 1.5 we evaluate alternative explanations for our findings as well as
their robustness. The last section concludes.
1.2 A Simple Model and Hypotheses
To fix ideas, this section provides a simple model of individual purchase decisions as
well as aggregate purchasing behaviour. The model nests rational behaviour as well as
projection bias and the “reminder-effect” of weather, where the latter two are models of
how the current state – weather on the purchase-date – may affect individual choices and
total sales. From the general model, we derive testable predictions to distinguish between
rational behaviour and the two potential explanations for weather-dependent individual
decisions and sales.
1.2.1 Individual Purchase Decisions and Aggregate Sales
Individual Decisions Survey results indicate that weather is an important determinant
of the utility derived from an outdoor movie night.6 Overall, 81 percent of respondents
state that dry weather is “very important” or “important” for having a good night at
5Recall that projection bias is a mistake in predicting utility at unknown future states. The beliefs
regarding the likelihood of each state are assumed to be correct.
6For a description of the survey see Section 1.3.3.
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the movie; comfortable temperatures are of importance for 66 percent. In our model,
therefore, each customer derives weather-related utility u(wτ ) when watching a movie
on date τ given weather conditions wτ ∈ R.7 The utility function u(·) is assumed to
be increasing, twice differentiable, and concave on the real line. When not visiting the
theatre, individuals receive utility u(η) from a heterogeneous outside option η ∈ R, which
is distributed within the population according to the distribution G(·).
On the purchase-date t < τ , an individual decides whether or not to buy a ticket for the
movie-date at costs c (in utility terms). On the purchase-date, the realisation of weather
on the movie-date is uncertain. We denote the distribution of wτ at t by H(·), which
is known to potential customers. We assume that H(·) belongs to the location family
of distributions with location parameter ft and is independent of actual weather wt (we
will justify this assumption empirically in Section 1.5.1).8 The parameter ft denotes
the weather forecast at t for the movie-date τ , which is available to individuals free of
charge. The forecast predicts expected weather on the movie-date and contains all relevant
information regarding movie-date weather at t: E[wτ | ft] = E[wτ | ft, wt] = ft, where E is
the expectations operator with respect to H(·).
To incorporate projection bias in our model, we adopt the formulation of “simple pro-
jection bias” (Loewenstein et al., 2003) and assume that the current state – in our case
current weather – receives weight α ∈ [0, 1] in an agent’s expected utility function. Clearly,
the case α = 0 represents fully rational behaviour. The case α > 0 captures that individ-
uals cannot fully assess the extent to which a change in the state of the world will alter
their utility and thus unconsciously anchor their utility on the current state.9
Expected utility from purchasing a ticket on the purchase-date for an individual with
outside option η is then given by
vB(ft, wt, η) = (1−H(η))
(
(1− α)E[u(wτ )|wτ ≥ η, ft] + αu(wt)
)
+H(η)u(η)− c. (1.1)
A customer who owns a ticket will only visit the theatre if movie-date weather exceeds
the outside option (wτ ≥ η). In this case, captured by the first term of (1.1), she receives
weather-related (expected) utility from visiting the theatre, which may have excessive
7For simplicity, the model abstracts from potential explanations for ticket orders different from
weather such as the popularity of a movie. In the setting we are analysing, these factors are orthog-
onal to purchase-date weather such that omitting them in this analysis does not alter the empirical
implication of the model. We control for popularity of the movie in one of the robustness checks in
Section 1.5.3.
8In practice, H(·) would depend on the forecast horizon τ − t and the season of the year as well.
Considering these factors does not change the analysis. To ease notation, we therefore omit them here.
9As mentioned in the introduction, this interpretation is equivalent to individuals holding beliefs
about the distribution of future state, which are unconditionally biased towards the current state.
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weight on the current state. If movie-date weather turns out to be unexpectedly bad
(wτ < η), she will let her ticket expire and choose the outside option instead. In either
case, she has to bear the ticket costs c.
Clearly, an individual with outside option η¯ will be indifferent between buying and not
buying a ticket on the purchase-date iff
F P (ft, wt, η¯) ≡ vB(ft, wt, η¯)− u(η¯) = 0 (1.2)
A natural candidate for optimal choice behaviour is that all individuals with low outside
options η ≤ η¯ buy tickets on the purchase-date and all individuals with high outside
options η > η¯ do not. Lemma 1.1 below states that optimal choices can indeed be
completely described by a unique η¯ satisfying (1.2). Before stating the lemma, however,
we need to assume sufficient conditions for a unique fixed point to exist.
Assumption 1.1.
(i) For all ft there exists an η satisfying FR(ft, η) ≡ (1−H(η))
(
E[u(wτ )|wτ ≥ η, ft]−
u(η)
)
−c = 0.
(ii) The hazard rate of H(·), h(w)/(1−H(w)), is weakly increasing.
Assumption 1.1 (i) ensures that there is at least one potential customer, who, given the
optimal use of information, would be indifferent between buying a ticket on the purchase-
date and not buying a ticket at all. This ensures existence of a fixed point of (1.2).
Assumption 1.1 (ii) is the monotone hazard rate assumption, which provides a sufficient
condition for uniqueness of the fixed point and holds for a variety of frequently used
distributions like the normal and uniform distributions. Given this, we can state the
following lemma:
Lemma 1.1. Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Then, for each (ft, wt) a unique η¯ satisfying
(1.2) exists.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. A direct implication of the above lemma is that
there is always a positive probability, G(η¯) ∈ (0, 1), that some customer will buy a ticket
on the purchase-date.
Aggregate Sales Given the individual propensity to buy a ticket, expected aggregate
sales depend on the total number of potential customers. Here, we incorporate the idea
in our model that good weather makes the choice option “outdoor movie theatre” more
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salient and thus enlarges the customer base. One possible interpretation is that customers
face cognitive restrictions regarding the number of choice options they can consider at a
given time. For this reason, they consider a choice option only if it “comes to mind”,
which is supposed to be positively related to its attractiveness at the current state.10
If the number of potential customers is weather-dependent, ticket sales may be driven by
weather even if individual decisions to buy tickets are fully rational. To allow for this
explanation in our model, we assume that the number of potential customers n(wt) is
increasing in purchase-date weather wt. The expected total number of sales on purchase-
date t is thus given by y(ft, wt) = n(wt)G(η¯(ft, wt)). If customers are fully rational –
that is, they have all choice options in mind at all times –, n(·) is independent of wt.11
1.2.2 Hypotheses
Our empirical analysis in Section 1.4 is guided by testable predictions derived from the
model. Our first hypothesis deals with the effect of purchase-date weather on sales.
Hypothesis 1.1. If customers are rational (α = 0 and ∂n(wt)/∂wt = 0) advance sales
are independent of purchase-date weather. Otherwise, sales increase when purchase-date
weather is good.
If we reject the implications of rational behaviour in our data – if variations in purchase-
date weather explain variations in advance sales –, our model assumes that this effect can
be explained by projection bias or a reminder-effect of current weather. For this to be
the case, we expect customers to be unaware of the limitations underlying their choices
– otherwise, they could adopt strategies to arrive at optimal choices nevertheless. This
conjecture provides a plausibility test for our model, because sales should be affected
by purchase-date weather regardless of customer’s past experiences or the time horizon
between purchase-date and movie-date if customers are indeed unaware of the impact on
weather on their purchase decisions.
Furthermore, we derive testable predictions to disentangle whether the current state wt
affects individual decisions via projection bias or whether purchase-date weather solely
affects the total number of potential customers. Since we do not observe individuals who
abstain from buying a ticket, we answer this question by examining the individual decision
to collect paid-for tickets on the movie-date. Our model predicts that individuals buy a
10Another possible interpretation for a weather-dependent customer base is that good weather at the
purchase-date facilitates the coordination of larger groups.
11A third possible explanation for a positive relation between good weather on the purchase-date and
sales is that customers expect the theatre to be sold out with higher probability. We discuss this potential
explanation theoretically after Hypothesis 1.2 and empirically in Section 1.5.2.
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ticket if their outside option is worse than η¯ and to collect it if movie-date weather is
sufficiently nice (wτ > η). The probability that a customer collects her ticket is therefore
given by
Pr(collect | buy) = 1− Pr(wτ < η < η¯)Pr(η < η¯) =
G(wτ )/G(η¯) if wτ < η¯1 else. (1.3)
If individual purchase decisions are affected by current weather, good weather increases
the expected utility of buying tickets in advance and thus leads to a higher η¯. Since
the realisation of movie-date weather wτ is independent of purchase-date weather wt, the
likelihood that a customer prefers her outside option therefore increases if purchase-date
weather was nice. In contrast, if current weather has no effect on individual decisions (but
only on the aggregate number of customers), the likelihood of ticket collection is expected
to be independent of purchase-date weather. The following hypothesis summarizes this
argument.
Hypothesis 1.2. If customers are rational (α = 0 and ∂n(wt)/∂wt = 0) or if current
weather increases the pool of potential customers (∂n(wt)/∂wt > 0), the probability that
tickets are collected is independent of purchase-date weather. Otherwise – if individual
decisions are affected by projection bias (α > 0) and if movie-date weather is worse than
expected – the probability that tickets are collected decreases when purchase-date weather
is good.
Before we continue, it is important to point out a few assumptions upon which our model
and hypotheses rests. First, as noted above, we assume that purchase-date weather has
no information value for movie-date weather. Otherwise, our results could be explained
by customers taking current weather as informative signal. We show in Section 1.5.1
that purchase-date weather is indeed not informative. Nevertheless, individuals could
perceive current weather to be informative for the future. As discussed in the introduction,
we cannot rule out this explanation if individuals perceive purchase-date weather to be
informative regardless of the time span between purchase-date and show. However, it is
natural to assume that the perceived information content of current weather is declining
in the time horizon one is trying to predict. Then, we would expect that the effect
of purchase-date weather on sales becomes weaker with increasingly long horizons. In
Section 1.5.2 we will see that this is not the case.
Finally, to keep the model simple, we have abstracted from the fact that potential cus-
tomers essentially face a dynamic problem when they decide on which date they would
like to buy their tickets. Clearly, the timing of buying tickets can be affected by purchase-
date weather, for example if the latter affects the perceived probability that the theatre
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may sell out. We discuss this potential alternative explanation in more detail in Section
1.5.2.
1.3 Data
Our data comes from four different sources. An outdoor movie theatre located in Munich,
Germany, provided us the record of their online advance tickets sales platform. The
Meteorological Institute of the University of Munich shared their detailed data on the
weather conditions in Munich with us; the local weather forecast was collected from the
archives of the newspaper “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, a high quality newspaper located in
Munich. Finally, we conducted a survey among visitors of the theatre at 13 different
nights of the 2011 season.
1.3.1 Weather and Forecast
We collect data on weather and weather forecasts for the months June to August of the
years 2004 to 2011, which are the times at which the theatre screens and for which we
have sales data (for details, see below).
The Meteorological Institute of the University of Munich12 provides us hourly measures
for precipitation (measured in 1/100 mm), temperature (measured in degrees Celsius)
as well as the average sunshine duration (in percent) between 8 am and 7 pm.13 Most
statistical inferences uses daily averages (24 hours) of these three weather variables.
We hand-collect the weather forecast from the archives of the daily newspaper “Süd-
deutsche Zeitung”, which is published every day except Sundays and public holidays.14
It provides a regional forecast for each day, one to four days out, for the South of Bavaria
including Munich. The forecast comprises forecasted maximum and minimum tempera-
ture (in degrees Celsius) and one of the following weather symbols: sunny, partly sunny,
shower, rain, and scattered thunderstorms.15
The weather in Munich is highly variable, especially during the summer months, during
which there are daily shows at the movie theatre. This is mostly due to the proximity
12The distance of the weather station to the movie theatre is 5.3 km (3.3 miles).
13The latter restriction ensures that the changing times of dusk and dawn do not confound our measure
of sunshine duration.
14Weather forecasts take up a lot of memory capacity, which is why they are not stored by any German
weather firm.
15There are in total 12 observations of the symbol overcast, which we group with “shower” to simplify
the exposition of results. Undoing this grouping does not lead to any significant changes throughout.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Weather and Forecast
Weather
All day Evening SD within day
Avg. Sunshine Duration 54.32 47.86 18.73
(34.99) (38.06) (13.96)
Avg. Temperature 19.01 19.15 3.01
(3.60) (3.99) (1.28)
Avg. Rainfall 11.23 20.27 28.38
(24.81) (63.16) (62.83)
Forecast
Minimum Maximum
Forecasted Temperature 12.66 23.56
(2.75) (4.02)
Notes: We report the means of variables; their standard deviations are in parentheses. Sunshine duration
is mesured in percent per hour, temperature is measured in degrees Celsius, and rainfall is reported in
1/100 mm per hour. In the column "SD within day" we report the average of the variable’s standard
deviations over the course of each single day.
of the Alps, which leads to frequent and often unexpected rainstorms. These tend to
occur especially in the evening hours. For this reason, there is high monthly precipitation
in the summer months, when total precipitation is on average 123 mm per month (for
comparison: London 51 mm, New York City 92 mm, and Berlin 61 mm). Long periods
of stable good weather are the exception; rather, there are frequent shifts in weather
patterns every few days as reflected by the mean number of 12.4 rain days per month
(days with at least 1 mm of rain) during the summer months (for comparison: London
10.5 days, New York City 8 days, and Berlin 8.7 days).16
The weather thereby varies within as well as across days. This can be seen in Table
1.1, where the summary statistics of average daily weather are depicted in the first two
columns. Standard deviations of sunshine duration as well as rainfall are high compared
to their respective means; the coefficient of variation for sunshine duration is 1.55 and 0.45
for rainfall. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that rainfall in the evening hours is considerably
higher than during the day reflecting the higher likelihood of rainstorms at these times.
The third column of Table 1.1 provides information for the variation of weather within
days by depicting the mean of within-day standard deviations of the respective weather
variable. Note that both sunshine duration and precipitation exhibit high within-day
variation. The within-day variation for temperature is not very informative, as there is a
cyclical pattern of temperature within each day. (Keep in mind that sunshine duration
16Sources of long term monthly averages: World Meteorological Organization
http://worldweather.wmo.int/ [4 October 2012].
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Forecasted Weather (Symbols)
This figure plots the distribution of forecast symbols pooling over forecast horizons (one to four days in
advance).
is only measured between 8 am and 7 pm such that darkness does not contribute to the
within-day variation of sunshine duration.)
Regarding the forecast, note first that average forecasted temperatures are in a similar
range as average temperatures (Table 1.1), which is what we expect. The distribution of
weather symbols for all forecast horizons – as shown in Figure 1.1 – again reflects the high
variations in local weather across days.17 Note furthermore that the forecast frequently
predicts scattered thunderstorms and showers, which indicates rather unstable weather
conditions within days as well.
1.3.2 Ticket Sales
The data on advance ticket sales were provided by “Kino, Mond und Sterne” [Movies,
Moon, and Stars], one of four outdoor movie theatres in Munich. The theatre usually
screens daily during the months of June, July, and August, and shows the movie regardless
of weather conditions. The latter fact is important for our study, since it implies that
tickets bought in advance are non-refundable. A consumer, who buys a ticket for this
theatre in advance, thus bears the full weather risk.18 Customers are expected to be
aware of this risk, as it is explicitly mentioned prominently on the ticketing website.
The theatre has a total of 1,300 seats available, tickets for which are sold at the box office
17The distributions of symbols by forecast horizon do not differ substantially.
18None of the seats are covered. See Appendix A.3 for a picture of the theatre.
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and various advance ticket sales locations. The majority of advance sales are sold online
where tickets for a particular show are available until 6 pm on the day of the screening.
Our goal is to explain these advance sales such that our main data set comprises of all
online ticket orders for the theatre between 2004 and 2011. This amounts to a total of
20,999 orders.19 For each order, the system records the number of tickets bought, the
exact date of the transaction and a unique alphanumeric customer ID, which allows us to
track repeat customers.
Additionally to the data on online sales for the years 2004 to 2011, we have data on the
total number of visitors of the theatre – including box office sales – for the years 2009
to 2011. This allows us to assess the importance of advance online sales, which amount
to 24 percent of the total number of tickets during this period. More than half (almost
60 percent) of online tickets are sold on the day of the show. Our main analysis focuses
on sales between one and four days before the show, on which the weather forecast for
the movie-date is available. Within this period, 30 percent of online tickets are sold, with
percentages declining between one and four days out. The remaining 10 percent of online
tickets are sold five days or earlier before a show.
Our main variable of interest is aggregate ticket sales on a daily base. More precisely, one
observation is the sum of ticket orders on a single day for a specific show. If no tickets
are sold on a day at most 23 days before the show, we add an observation with aggregate
orders of zero. This results in at least 24 observations for every single movie shown, one for
each day between 0 and 23 days out. We construct additional aggregates of ticket sales
for robustness checks. For example we count orders of repeat customers (identified by
their unique customer ID), who have bought tickets more than once since 2004. Another
noteworthy variable are ticket orders by repeat customers who had previously bought
tickets for a show during which it was raining.
For the years 2009 – 2011, we additionally know for each order whether tickets were in
fact collected at the evening of the show. Of the total of 4,102 orders, the vast majority
(88 percent) of tickets was collected on the day of show.
The summary statistics for ticket sales are presented in Table 1.2, organised according to
how early in advance tickets were sold. The average number of ticket orders decreases
from 7 one day out to 1 four days out, representing the declining pattern of orders. The
number of tickets sold per order remains stable at about 2.6, independent of the time
horizon. About half of the ticket orders are placed by repeat customers, who have bought
tickets online more than once.
19Ticket prices have been stable at about 7.40 Dollar (5.70 Euro) each during the entire period.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Orders
Day of show 1 day out 2 days out 3 days out 4 days out
Avg. Orders 24.74 7.18 2.78 1.36 0.89
(33.97) (10.82) (4.30) (2.24) (1.37)
Tickets per Order 2.46 2.55 2.55 2.63 2.58
(0.69) (0.92) (0.88) (1.24) (1.24)
Notes: We report the means of daily ticket orders bought on the day of the show as well as one to four
days in advance. For the same five days we additionally provide average numbers of tickets per order.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
1.3.3 Survey
During the 2011 season, we conducted a survey among visitors of the cinema. As many
visitors spend some time in the theatre before the movie starts, the willingness to par-
ticipate in the survey was high. Overall we received 443 questionnaires for 13 different
days with considerable variance in weather conditions (and accordingly varying number
of questionnaires obtained per day). This amounts to more than 10 percent of the audi-
ence on these days on average. Of all surveyed customers, 25 percent bought their ticket
online (compared to 24 percent of all customers in the years 2009 – 2011) and 7 percent
purchased it one to four days in advance (compared to 8 percent of all customers between
2009 and 2011). Throughout, we use the survey to provide supporting evidence for our
arguments. That being said, none of our main results depends on data from the survey.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test the hypotheses derived in Section 1.2. We first show that weather on
the purchase-date explains variation in ticket orders for various model specifications, re-
jecting rational behaviour from Hypothesis 1.1. Furthermore, we show that good weather
on the purchase-date decreases the likelihood that the purchased tickets are collected on
the movie-date, providing evidence for projection bias (Hypothesis 1.2).
1.4.1 Purchase-Date Weather and Ticket Orders
Figure 1.2 illustrates the effect of weather on ticket orders by comparing the number of
orders across different weather conditions on the purchase-date. For the sample of ticket
orders one to four days ahead of the movie date – which we use in the empirical analysis
below – we group ticket orders into bins based on five percent quantiles of purchase-date
19
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Figure 1.2: Purchase-Date Weather and Ticket Orders
This figure plots the average number of daily ticket orders (between one and four days in advance) for
bins based on five percent quantiles of purchase-date sunshine duration. Bins are sorted from dates with
shortest sunshine duration (to the left of the horizontal axis) to days with longest sunshine duration (to
the right of the horizontal axis).
sunshine duration and plot, for each of these bins, the average number of ticket orders
per day. Consistent with projection bias, Figure 1.2 shows that the average number of
daily ticket orders strongly rises parallel to an increase in sunshine duration from the left
to the right of the horizontal axis.
An obvious concern with the graphical analysis above is that other factors which explain
ticket sales – like the weather forecast – may possibly be correlated with purchase-date
weather. To address this concern, we estimate the effect of purchase-date weather on the
number of daily ticket orders in a number of regressions. In all of these regressions, we
include average sunshine duration as well as average precipitation on the purchase-date t
as explanatory variables (collected in the weather vector Wt).20 In addition, we control
for the weather forecast at t for the movie-date τ by adding the forecasted maximum and
minimum temperatures, as well as separate dummy variables for each forecast symbol as
independent variables; these variables are collected in the forecast vector Fτt. Because
the forecast is only available for a horizon ∆ of up to four days, we limit the sample to
ticket orders between one and four days ahead of the show.
For the first empirical model we organise the data in a panel structure with day of the
20We omit average temperature from our analysis, since it is highly correlated with sunshine duration
(ρ = 0.6), which makes the analysis of the respective coefficients difficult. We chose to keep sunshine
duration for its greater salience compared to temperature. However, our results are not qualitatively
affected by this choice. For further details see the discussion in Section 1.5.3.
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show τ as unit of observation and advance sales one to four days out being observations
over time. Within this structure the model is
yτt = W′tβW + F′τtβF + D′τtβD + vτt, (1.4)
where Dτt includes dummy variables for each time difference between purchases and
show. We assume that the error term vτt is iid between different shows τ but may be
arbitrarily correlated between advance sales for the same show. To control for unobserved
heterogeneity possibly correlated with our regressors, we estimate (1.4) as a fixed effects
model.
For the second econometric model we organise our data as cross sections separately for
each purchase-date being ∆ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} days ahead of the movie-date. This gives us less
power due to limiting observations, but allows us to exploit cross sectional variation and
to include a set of controls Xτt, which are for most observations time invariant between
t and τ . Specifically, we control for the day of the week of the show τ , average sunshine
duration and precipitation of the past two weeks before t, as well as dummy variables for
year and month. For each ∆, we estimate the following model:
yτt = W′tβW + F′τtβF + X′τtβX + ετt. (1.5)
Since ∆ = (τ−t) is fixed, there is a single observation for each movie night τ . Imposing the
identifying assumption from above – that errors ετt are uncorrelated across movie-dates
τ – we can estimate (1.5) by OLS.
Table 1.3 displays the estimation results for the two models. Similar to the graphical
analysis in Figure 1.2, the results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.1: the effect of
sunshine duration on aggregated ticket sales is positive and significant throughout. In the
fixed effects model (1.4) and the cross sections (1.5) for one and three days out, average
rainfall has furthermore a negative effect on ticket sales, which is significant at least at
the ten percent level. Moreover, as predicted by the theoretical model, we find significant
effects of the weather forecast on sales at least for one to three days out. This is especially
true for forecasted temperature. Forecast symbols seem to have an effect one and two
days out, only. In the fixed effect model (1.4) we find no statistically significant effect of
these symbols at all, which may mostly be explained by their limited within variance.
In order to interpret the estimated parameters of the variables of interest and to compare
their impact across different advance sales horizons ∆, we calculate the statistic m(x) =
β(x) s(x)/y¯∆ for the estimated models. The nominator of m(x) is the product of the
coefficient β(x) of an independent variable x and its standard deviation s(x), which gives
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Table 1.3: Effect of Purchase-Date Weather on Ticket Orders
Daily Ticket Orders
Fixed Effects 1 day out 2 days out 3 days out 4 days out
Avg. Sun 0.023∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.0061∗ 0.0046∗∗
(0.0054) (0.014) (0.0054) (0.0032) (0.0021)
Avg. Rain −0.014∗∗ −0.028∗∗ 0.013 −0.0059∗ 0.0020
(0.0063) (0.014) (0.012) (0.0036) (0.0033)
Forecasted Maxtemp. 0.19∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.053∗
(0.072) (0.17) (0.084) (0.041) (0.027)
Forecasted Mintemp. −0.014 0.61∗∗ 0.12 −0.0063 0.019
(0.090) (0.24) (0.12) (0.056) (0.030)
Symbol Partly Sunny 0.30 −4.05∗ −2.31∗∗ 0.32 −0.55∗∗
(0.79) (2.19) (0.94) (0.40) (0.24)
Symbol Shower −0.21 −6.92∗∗∗ −3.30∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.46∗
(0.74) (2.23) (0.90) (0.37) (0.24)
Symbol Rain −1.13 −8.09∗∗∗ −3.19∗∗∗ 0.49 −0.61
(1.02) (2.62) (1.14) (0.59) (0.50)
Symbol T-Storm −0.53 −10.7∗∗∗ −1.95∗ 0.34 −0.12
(0.81) (2.32) (1.04) (0.47) (0.36)
2 Days Out −4.44∗∗∗
(0.38)
3 Days Out −5.94∗∗∗
(0.47)
4 Days Out −6.43∗∗∗
(0.49)
Time-invariant
Controls No Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 1635 413 411 406 405
Adjusted R2 0.282 0.350 0.306 0.205 0.181
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of total daily ticket
orders on purchase-date weather, forecast, and control variables. In the first column, the sample consists
of all daily ticket orders between one and four days before the show (show-date and horizon fixed effects
included). In the remaining columns, the sample is split according to the number of days out tickets
are purchased. "Avg. Sun" is the average sunshine duration in percent on the purchase-date between
8 am and 7 pm; "Avg. Rain" denotes average rainfall on the purchase-date in 1/100 mm. Forecasted
temperatures are from the forecast at the purchase-date for the movie-date and measured in degrees
Celsius. The variable "Symbol Partly Sunny" takes the value 1 if the forecast is partly sunny for the
movie-date on the purchase-date and 0 otherwise. Other symbol-variables are defined accordingly; the
baseline forecast symbol is sunny.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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us the impact of one standard deviation change of x on the number of advance sales. To
compare this effect across different advance sales horizons ∆, we normalize it by the mean
of the respective number of advance sales y¯∆. Thus, the statistic m(x) denotes the impact
of a one standard deviation change of x on sales as percentage of mean sales for a given
empirical specification.
In the estimated model, one standard deviation change of actual sunshine duration leads
to a change in sales between 10 and 25 percent of the mean. In comparison, one standard
deviation of the forecasted temperature has an effect on sales between 10 and 40 percent
of the mean – the effects of these two determinants of sales are thus of comparable size.
This leads to our first result.
Result 1.1. Purchase-date weather has a statistically and economically significant effect
on aggregate ticket orders.
We further investigate the conjecture from Section 1.2.2 that the effect of weather on sales
is independent of customers’ past experiences to address the concern that the results are
driven by inexperienced customers.21 To this end, we estimate the fixed effects model
(1.4) replacing total advance sales on a given day by sales to three different subsets of
repeat customers as the dependent variable.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A.2.22 Average sun-
shine duration has a positive and highly significant effect on sales to the sub-population
of repeat customers, who had bought tickets at least previously once during the entire
period between 2004 and 2011 or at least once during the same season. Ticket orders by
customers, who had previously bought tickets for a show during which it was raining, can
also be explained by variations in sunshine duration on the purchase-date. The economic
significance as measured by statistic m(·) is in approximately the same range as the es-
timates for the complete sets of customers for both forecast and purchase-date weather.
These results suggest that decisions of experienced customers are influenced by current
weather, even if weather at previous visits turned out to be bad.
1.4.2 Purchase-Date Weather and Ticket Collection
So far, our analysis has focused on explaining aggregate purchase behaviour. Using ag-
gregate data, we cannot distinguish whether the current state – purchase-date weather
21We investigate the additional conjecture that the effect of weather is independent of the time horizon
between purchase-date and movie-date in Section 1.5.2
22Although we only report the results from the fixed effect model (1.4), similar results are obtained
from model (1.5). The results can be obtained from the authors on request.
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– affects the number of potential customers (through reminding them of their choice op-
tions) or whether it affects individual decision making directly (through projection bias).
We assess to what extent purchase-date weather alters individual behaviour by exploiting
information on the individual decision whether or not to collect paid-for tickets on the
movie-date.
According to the model in Section 1.2, the likelihood that tickets are collected decreases
with good weather on the purchase-date if individual decisions are directly affected. In
contrast, if good weather at purchase merely increases the number of potential customers,
the decision to actually visit the theatre is expected to be independent of purchase-date
weather.
Let the decision of a customer i, who has purchased a ticket on date t for a movie at τ ,
to collect her ticket be denoted by ψitτ = 1 and the decision to let the ticket expire by
ψitτ = 0. The likelihood that a customer collects her ticket on the movie-date is estimated
using the probit model
Pr(ψitτ = 1) = Φ(W′tβWt + W′τβWτ + F′τtβF + X′τtβX). (1.6)
Since the model predicts that individual collection decisions depend on movie-date
weather, we include movie-date weather Wτ on the right hand side of (1.6) additional
to purchase-date weather Wt, forecast Fτt, and controls Xτt as defined in Section 1.4.1.
Since sunshine duration ceases to be a salient indicator for actual weather at night, we
add a dummy variable indicating whether tickets were purchased later than 8 pm to the
vector Xτt. In order to assess the robustness of the estimates, we re-estimate (1.6) without
controls Xτt.
The first two columns of Table 1.4 report the estimated coefficients from model (1.6) for
all customers who had purchased tickets one to four days in advance in the years 2009
to 2011. Extended sunshine duration on the purchase-date tends to reduce the likelihood
that tickets sold in advance are actually collected at the box office. However, the estimated
coefficients are not significantly different from zero at any common level. We conjecture
that this is due to limited variance of the dependent variable: 93 percent of all customers
collect their ticket. In fact, the model predicts that the probability for advance tickets
being collected equals one if the realised weather at the movie turns out to be at least as
good as the outside option of the marginal customer. In other words, our model predicts
that customers should decide to let their tickets expire only in cases in which movie-date
weather is a negative surprise. Including all customers in our analysis should therefore
bias the coefficient for purchase-date sunshine duration upwards.
To test this conjecture, we estimate (1.6) for a sample of movie-dates at which realised
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Table 1.4: Effect of Purchase-Date Weather on Ticket Collection
Tickets Collected
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Full Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample
Avg. Sun −0.0020 −0.0019 −0.0049∗∗ −0.0049∗
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Avg. Rain 0.00080 0.00062 0.0024 0.0000020
(0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0037)
2 Days Out −0.28∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
3 Days Out −0.084 −0.13 0.057 0.0036
(0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20)
4 Days Out −0.52∗∗∗ −0.61∗∗∗ −0.40∗ −0.46∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.23) (0.24)
Sun before Film 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0047) (0.0046)
Rain Film −0.0011∗∗ −0.00099∗ −0.00098∗ −0.0018∗∗
(0.00050) (0.00056) (0.00059) (0.00076)
Temp. Film 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028)
Forecasted Maxtemp. −0.082∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.047∗ −0.057∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032)
Forecasted Mintemp. −0.024 −0.018 −0.065∗ −0.061
(0.028) (0.029) (0.036) (0.039)
Symbol Partly Sunny 0.10 0.094 0.25 0.28
(0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.24)
Symbol Shower 0.0059 −0.012 0.10 0.12
(0.14) (0.15) (0.23) (0.25)
Symbol T-Storm 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.58∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.24) (0.27)
No. of Tickets 0.097∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.046 0.051
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Evening 0.19∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.11 0.13
(0.097) (0.097) (0.14) (0.14)
Controls No Y es No Y es
Observations 2620 2620 874 874
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.227 0.200 0.218
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of Probit regressions explaining individual
decisions to collect advance tickets. The first two columns refer to the full sample of all advance sales for
the seasons 2009 – 2011. Column (3) and (4) provide estimates for a restricted sample considering only
shows during which the weather was worse than expected (see the text for details). Variables indicating
purchase-date weather ("Avg. Sun" and "Avg. Rain") and variables of the purchase-date weather forecast
("Forecasted Max(Min)temp.", "Symbol . . . ") are defined as in Table 1.3. The baseline forecast is sunny.
We control for movie-date weather by "Sun before Film" (average sunshine duration between 5 pm and
7 pm in percent), "Rain Film" (rainfall in 1/100 mm between 7 pm and 11 pm), and "Temp. Film"
(temperature on the movie-date between 7 pm and 11 pm), as well as for whether the ticket was bought
at darkness on the purchase-date (Evening = 1), the number of tickets ordered ("No. of Tickets"), and
the number of days tickets were bought in advance ("x Days Out").
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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weather was a negative surprise. For all movie-dates in the restricted sample, expected
sunshine duration Sˆt as predicted by model (1.7) in Section 1.5.1 is greater than realised
sunshine duration shortly before the movie starts. As predicted by the theoretical model,
almost all customers (97 percent) dropped from the sample chose to pick up their tickets;
in contrast, 15 percent of the remaining customers let their ticket expire.
The results from re-estimating (1.6) for this sample are depicted in columns (3) and (4) of
Table 1.4. It becomes apparent that the magnitude of the (negative) effect of purchase-
date sunshine duration on the likelihood of tickets to be collected doubles at the mean
of the sample. This confirms our conjecture that the coefficients in columns one and two
are upward biased.23 Furthermore, the coefficients become statistically significant at the
five and ten percent level, respectively. This leads to our second result.
Result 1.2. Customers are less likely to collect their tickets on the movie-date if they
experienced good weather on the purchase-date, providing evidence for projection bias (Hy-
pothesis 1.2).
1.5 Alternative Explanations and Robustness
In the previous section we have shown that projection bias can account for both, weather-
dependent sales and decisions to collect purchased tickets. However, there may exist
alternative explanations that could explain these findings as well. In this section, we
discuss plausible alternative explanations and the robustness of our results to different
empirical specifications.
1.5.1 Is Current Weather Informative for Future Weather?
An immediate concern of our analysis so far is that individuals use current weather to
update their beliefs about future weather conditions. There are two reasons why this could
be optimal. First, current weather may be informative by itself such that looking up the
weather forecast is unnecessary. Second, current weather may enhance the prediction of
future weather, even given the weather forecast. This may be the case, for example, if
the forecast cannot take regional factors into account sufficiently well.
We argue that the information content of current weather for future weather is, in general,
limited if not nil due to large day to day fluctuations of local weather in Munich. In
Figure 1.3, we plot average sunshine duration one to four ahead (purged for seasonal
23The estimates from the restricted sample are potentially still upward biased if customers are subject
to the sunk cost fallacy (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).
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Figure 1.3: Predictive Power of Current for Future Sunshine Duration
This figure provides a scatterplot of current sunshine duration against residuals of a regression of future
sunshine duration (1 to 4 days ahead, respectively) on month and year dummy variables. The black
solid line depicts the estimates of a regression of residuals on current weather, the grey lines depict the
95 percent confidence interval.
(a) 1 Day Ahead (b) 2 Days Ahead
(c) 3 Days Ahead (d) 4 Days Ahead
effects by year and month dummies) against current sunshine duration. It turns out
that tomorrow’s sunshine hours are at best slightly positively related to today’s sunshine
duration. Furthermore, today’s weather has no explanatory power for weather two or
more days out.
In contrast, the weather forecast is able to explain future sunshine duration well. Figure
1.4 again plots average sunshine duration purged for seasonal effects as above but this
time against the forecast as given by forecast symbols. Evidently, there is a clear positive
relationship between symbols indicating good future weather and realised sunshine du-
ration. Especially, the symbols “rain”, “partly sunny”, and “sunny” seem to predict the
weather quite well, even as far as four days into the future.
In order to reassure that the predictive power of current weather – even when not control-
ling for the forecast – is low, we complement the graphical analysis above with empirical
estimates. In particular, we forecast evening sunshine duration Sh (in percent) at some
date h > t with the following model
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Figure 1.4: Predictive Power of the Weather Forecast for Future Sunshine Duration
This figure provides a scatterplot of current forecast symbols against residuals of a regression of future
sunshine duration (1 to 4 days ahead, respectively) on month and year dummy variables. The black
solid line connects the means of future sunshine conditional on the forecast, the grey lines connect the
95 percent confidence intervals of the conditional means.
(a) 1 Day Ahead (b) 2 Days Ahead
(c) 3 Days Ahead (d) 4 Days Ahead
Sh = W′tγW + F′htγF + V′tγV + ξht, (1.7)
where controls Vt include average sunshine duration and precipitation of the past two
weeks before t as well as year and month dummies. Current weather Wt and forecast
indicators Fht are defined as above. We estimate model (1.7) with and without includ-
ing the forecast Fht; the results including the forecast are displayed in Table A.2, the
results without forecast in Table A.3 in Appendix A.2. Confirming the graphical results,
current weather does not help to assess future weather except for one day ahead where
the coefficients of current sunshine duration are statistically significant but small (a one
percent increase in sunshine duration today leads to an increase in sunshine duration
tomorrow of at most 0.21 percentage points). In contrast, the predictive power of the
forecast is sizable, since adding it to the model leads to a roughly threefold increase in
variance explained. To further appreciate the predictive power of weather symbols, note
that evening sunshine duration has a standard deviation of 38. If the forecast symbol for
four days in advance is “shower” instead of “sunny”, evening sunshine duration decreases
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by 70 percent of one standard deviation.24
Given this, the question arises whether customers appreciate the predictive power of the
forecast. Our survey results indicate that this is indeed the case as customers report to
consult the weather forecast frequently and appreciate its reliability. From all respondents,
84 percent consult the weather forecast at least every other day or when they are planning
weather related activities. Regarding forecast reliability, 85 (86) percent state that the
forecast for tomorrow (two days ahead) will be correct in at least 80 (60) percent of cases.
Overall, given the above results, it seems unlikely that customers knowingly base their
predictions of future weather-dependent utility on actual weather – especially since the
vast majority of customers are locals, who should be expected to know the regional weather
conditions well.
1.5.2 Probability of Ticket Availability
Another concern is that the theatre has a capacity constraint of 1,300 seats such that
higher ticket sales at any given point in time lead to a higher risk that the movie may
sell out. Thus, if customers believe that the likelihood that tickets will be available on
the movie-date decreases with good weather on the purchase-date, they have a higher
incentive to buy on the purchase-date. Such a “precautionary” motive for buying tickets
early at times of good weather would shift purchase decisions to earlier dates with good
weather, which could be a potential explanation for our results.
In fact, the movie theatre in question has been sold out in 13 percent of evenings over
the entire time span of our analysis, but has, so far, never been sold out in advance. In
general, customers seem to understand that they are always able to buy tickets online:
88 percent of customers state that it is “unlikely” or “very unlikely” that all tickets for
tomorrow’s screening will be sold out in advance.25
Some customers may nevertheless perceive the probability of ticket availability to depend
on current weather few days before the show. However, deferring the purchase decision to a
later date should perceived to be riskless for particularly early purchase-dates, for instance
five days in advance and earlier. Thus, if customers’ concerns that the theatre may sell
out were the sole explanation for the effect of current weather on sales, particularly early
ticket orders should be unaffected by purchase-date weather. In contrast, if our results
24Here, we assess the predictive power of current weather and the weather forecast for the main weather
indicator of interest – sunshine duration – only. Repeating the exercise for precipitation and temperature
gives similar results.
25The likelihood that the theatre sells out, however, is empirically unrelated to weather (and the
forecast) prior to the movie-date.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Purchase-Date Weather on Early Ticket Orders
Daily Ticket Orders
5 - 11 9 - 15 13 - 19 17 - 23
Days Out Days Out Days Out Days Out
Avg. Sun 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.00091∗∗∗ 0.00041 0.00058∗∗
(0.00043) (0.00034) (0.00026) (0.00023)
Avg. Rain −0.00046 0.00036 −0.00014 −0.00022
(0.00043) (0.00034) (0.00029) (0.00021)
Horizon Indicators Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 3472 3472 3462 3437
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.010 0.004 0.002
Notes: Coefficients and robust standard errors are reported for OLS regressions of daily ticket orders on
purchase-date sunshine duration (in percent of time), purchase-date rainfall (in 1/100 mm), and horizon
indicators (dummy variables for the number of days between purchase-date and movie-date). Fixed effects
for the show are included. One observation is the number of sales for a particular show per day. The
column headings indicate how many days in advance tickets are purchased in the sample used.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
can be explained by projection bias (or a reminder-effect of good weather), we expect to
find an effect on early orders as well.
To analyse this prediction, we estimate (a variant of) the fixed effects model (1.4) for
separate sets of advance sales which are defined by how many days in advance tickets
were sold. More precisely, we estimate the effect of weather on ticket orders between
5 and 11 days in advance. Since weather forecasts for this time horizon are lacking, we
cannot include the term FτtβF in these regressions. We repeat this exercise for time spans
between 9 and 15, 13 and 19, and 17 and 23 days in advance.26
Table 1.5 reports the results. It becomes apparent that the effect of average sunshine
duration on sales is significantly greater than zero at least at the five percent level for
most estimated models. The notable exception are the results with sales between 13 and
17 days in advance; here, the coefficient of sunshine duration is rather small.27 Regarding
the economic interpretation of the estimates, one standard deviation change in weather
explains variations in sales between 10 and 17 percent of (quite low) mean sales for the
respective periods and is therefore in a similar range as for all our estimates in Section
1.4.1.
26Obviously, the choice of beginning and end days of these time-spans is arbitrary. However, our
qualitative results do not depend on the exact location of the time spans as long as they are sufficiently
long (greater than four days) to allow for enough within variation for early sales.
27We observe fairly small coefficients for all intervals which include the time horizon of exactly 16 days.
Excluding observations for this time horizon leads to significant coefficients throughout, which suggests
that this time horizon is an outlier for which we have no plausible explanation.
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Table 1.6: Effect of Hourly Changes in Weather on Changes in Ticket Orders
Hourly Ticket Orders
Morning & Afternoon Morning Afternoon
Diff. Sun per h. 0.00038∗∗ 0.00043 0.00043∗
(0.00018) (0.00029) (0.00024)
Diff. Rain per h. 0.000019 −0.000028 0.000027
(0.000038) (0.000042) (0.000048)
Hour Indicators Y es Y es Y es
Observations 22454 8984 11225
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.000
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the first difference of
hourly ticket orders on the first difference of hourly purchase-date sunshine duration (in percent of time),
the difference in purchase-date rainfall (in 1/100 mm), and hour indicator variables. Column 1 reports
coefficients for all orders between 8 am and 8 pm. The two remaining columns split the dataset into
orders before and after 2 pm.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note that these results can also be seen as a robustness check for the concern that in-
formation content of current weather drives the results. As early as three weeks before
the movie-date, (perceived) information content of purchase-date weather for movie-date
weather should be nil.
Another instance in which changes in weather can naturally be assumed to have little
impact on the probability of ticket availability are variations in weather from one hour to
the next. Again, we only expect to find an effect of hourly changes in weather on changes
in ticket orders if the state of the world by itself – and not its effect on results of market
interactions – affects choice behaviour.
To test this prediction, we regress, for a given movie-date, the first difference of ticket
orders per hour on the first difference of sunshine duration and precipitation. In addition,
hour dummies are included as independent variables to control for different sales volumes
over the course of the day. We restrict the sample to hours with potentially positive
sunshine duration (8 am to 8 pm) as well as to hours in the morning (8 am to 2 pm) and
afternoon (2 pm to 8pm) between one and four days ahead of the movie-date.
In this analysis, the effect of weather on ticket orders is identified through variations in
weather within a given day. Given the low within-day variation in sales and thus low mean
differences as dependent variable, the estimated coefficients are rather small (see Table
1.6). Still, hourly changes in weather have a statistically significant effect on changes in
ticket orders. The estimates seem to be mainly driven by sales in the afternoon when
most tickets are ordered and therefore hourly variation in sales is highest.
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In light of the evidence that both, very early sales as well as hourly changes in sales
are affected by current weather, we conclude that current weather explains ticket order
at which the probability of ticket availability is independent of purchase-date weather.
Summarizing our above arguments, projection bias is the only explanation, which can
simultaneously account for all our empirical findings.
1.5.3 Robustness
We examine the robustness of our empirical results along various dimensions.28 First,
we check whether the results depend on estimating linear models in the form of (1.4)
and (1.5). We therefore repeat the entire analysis using count data models (poisson and
negative binomial regressions). None of the results are altered by estimating either of
these models.
Second, we evaluate whether the main results in Table 1.3, for which we have most
statistical power, are driven by specific subgroups of customers, movie genres, or the
weekday of the show. To this end, we repeat the analysis for the subgroup of sales
conditioning on the timing of the order (morning, afternoon, and evening), the number of
tickets ordered (one, two, three, and more than three), the age of the buyer (below and
above 30 years), movie genre (drama, comedy, and action/adventure), and the weekday
of sale and movie respectively (weekend, weekday). The number of total orders across
these subgroups varies considerably – for example, more than 50 percent of ticket orders
comprise of two tickets, while less than 10 percent of customers order three tickets – which
is accompanied by different degrees of statistical power for the analysis.
Nevertheless, the estimated effect of sunshine duration and (to a lesser extent) rainfall on
total orders continues to be statistically and economically significant at least for the fixed
effect model (1.4). The only exception from this rule are ticket orders on weekends (Friday
to Sunday), for which the number of observations is lowest (N = 291). Additionally, the
cross-section models (1.5) yield meaningful effects for current weather on sales for the
majority of specifications.
Third, we check whether our results are driven by the selection of average sunshine dura-
tion as the relevant weather variable. To do so, we substitute average sunshine duration
by average temperature in all regressions with ticket orders as the dependent variable.
By and large, this substitution leaves the results unchanged. Similarly, we test whether
our conclusions are sensitive to the choice of the independent variable. Instead of using
28Due to the large number of robustness checks, we do not include the detailed results in this paper.
The estimation results for all analyses mentioned in this subsection are available from the authors on
request.
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aggregated ticket orders as the quantity to be explained, we could have also used the
overall number of tickets sold as independent variable. These two measures are highly
correlated, such that it is not surprising that this modification does not lead to different
conclusions.
A fourth possible concern could be that ticket sales depend on recent rather than current
weather. For example, customers may be more inclined to buy tickets if weather was
good for a couple of days, possibly indicating a stable high pressure weather system.
We account for this by including one period lagged weather indicators in our analysis of
models (1.4) and (1.5). In these models, current weather persists to have explanatory
power, contrary to weather one day earlier.
Finally, we examine the robustness of all empirical results to the inclusion and exclusion
of various control variables. First, we attempt to proxy for the probability of ticket
availability directly by (a) including a dummy indicating whether the theatre turned out
to sell out for the particular show of interest and (b) including the number of ticket orders
until the purchase-date in all variants of cross-section models (1.5). Second, we control
for the popularity of the movie by including either the number of theatres in which the
movie was shown on the opening weekend in Germany, or movie gross in Germany on
the opening weekend (or both) as independent variables in all variants of model (1.5).29
Neither of these modifications changes the results in any meaningful way. The same holds
true for excluding controls Dτt and Xτt, respectively, in all the models we estimate.
1.6 Conclusion
There is a growing literature which shows that projection bias impedes the ability of
individuals to consistently predict future utility. Predicted utility at unknown future
states of the world tends to be biased towards utility at today’s state of the world.
This paper presents evidence for projection bias in a simple decision problem (purchasing
advance tickets for an outdoor movie theatre), in which the transient nature of today’s
state is obvious due to risk and explicitly pointed out to decision makers. The availability
of unbiased and precise forecasts regarding future states, on which individuals may con-
dition their decisions, should further reduce the extent to which projection bias affects
29The choice of the popularity indicator is somewhat arbitrary; for example, we could have chosen the
total gross of the movie shown as well. We opted for opening weekend measures to avoid measurement
error due to the total time the particular movie has been screened in theatres. The concern for measure-
ment error arises, because the outdoor movie theatre in question shows recent films as well as classics.
All data for this analysis have been retrieved from the database http://www.boxofficemojo.com [October
2011].
33
Projection Bias under Risk
choices. We find that the current state – current weather – influences choices to a large
extent, which suggests that de-biasing decision makers may turn out to be challenging.
Put in a broader context, our result that projection is present even in very simple decision
problems points towards the possibility that it may have important aggregate implica-
tions, specifically when decisions of individuals observing the same state of the world are
biased in the same direction. It has been shown recently that such correlated errors can
be amplified through feedback effects in markets, leading to potentially large fluctuations
(Hassan and Mertens, 2011). For this to be the case, further research is needed to an-
swer the question whether projection bias affects choices over alternatives, whose utility
depends on an endogenous state of the world (like consumption and savings decisions
depending on the state of the economy).
Finally, studying projection bias under risk highlights the need to understand how exactly
individuals mispredict future utility. Do they indeed undervalue the extent to which
utility varies with the state (and hold correct beliefs regarding future outcomes), the
standard interpretation of projection bias? Or are their beliefs regarding the likelihood
of future states biased towards the current state (and the predictions of state-dependent
utilities correct)? Answering these question is certainly important for finding ways to
help individuals to predict future utility accurately and to make good decisions.
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Reciprocity in Organisations –
Evidence from the WERS0
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the behaviour of employees in labour relations is crucial for managers and
firm owner who aim to align potentially diverging interests of management and workforce.
In the last decades contract theorists developed a consistent framework in which monetary
incentives induce agents to exert effort, serving as a guideline for real-world firms.2 While
modern human resource departments (to some extent) rely on theoretical considerations,
the majority of real-world labour contracts are characterised by fixed payments and – if
at all – only a minor part of employees’ income is attributed to incentive pay.3 The classic
static moral hazard theory would predict lower levels of effort exertion than the real-world
examples show.
Incorporating concepts from behavioural economics may provide additional explanations
for real-world observations. In an early contribution, Akerlof (1982) demonstrates that
wages may exceed the market-clearing wage when employers attempt to influence work-
ing norms via gift-exchange.4 More recently, Englmaier and Leider (2012) introduce
the concept of reciprocity – i.e. gift-exchange motivation – into the classical principal-
agent framework concluding that firms with reciprocal employees have more leeway to
cost-efficiently induce effort: shifting away from direct monetary incentives and induc-
0This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Englmaier and Stephen Leider.
2See Prendergast (1999) for a survey.
3Lemieux et al. (2009) estimate that approximately 37% of male labour market participants in the US
(using the PSID, Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1976 - 1998) receive variable payments with a median
magnitude of 3.5%. Englmaier and Leider (2012) discuss further studies corroborating this argument.
4Also in a labour market context, Becker et al. (2011) provide field evidence for heterogeneous long-
term responses to gift-exchange motivation.
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ing employees to behave reciprocally towards their employers allows firms to save high
costs from risk premia they would have to pay when using strong incentives. Relying on
reciprocity, however, requires firms to screen for employees with reciprocal traits.
In this paper we use Englmaier and Leider (2012) as a theoretical guideline and search
for evidence for the use of reciprocity based motivation in organisations. Using the 5th
wave of the “Workplace Employment Relations Survey” (WERS 2004) a large scale survey
of Britain-based firms, we find evidence for firm behaviour consistent with gift-exchange
motivations. We use compulsory personality tests for job candidates as an indicator
whether firms explicitly screen applicants for personality traits that may be correlated
with job candidates’ inclination towards reciprocity. In line with gift-exchange motives,
these firms are more likely to provide their employees high wages and other non-pecuniary
benefits like employer pension schemes and extended paid annual leave. Furthermore,
employees in these establishments enjoy more on-the-job training (c.f. Leuven et al.
(2005)) and have a higher chance that their employer provides guaranteed job security.
Screening applicants’ personality and providing benefits for those who get hired may pay
for the firm if employees reciprocate with higher effort. Even though we are not able
to measure effort directly, we find that employers using personality tests report higher
levels of firm performance and are more likely to organise work in teams. The latter is
particularly interesting as reaping synergy effects when working in teams requires team
members to subordinate their own desires to the common good.
In contrast, two additional measures of modern human resource practises – competency
tests for job candidates and variable payments for employees – fare in general much worse
in predicting benefits for employer or employees (if they do at all). This implies that
only screening for personality as opposed to the use of competency tests or other human
resource practises explains patterns consistent with gift-exchange motives. The lack of an
association between personality tests and dismissals within an establishment furthermore
provides suggestive evidence that personality tests do not merely increase the “fit” between
employer and employee, which otherwise might have caused similar relationships between
screening and benefits.
Closest to this work is Huang and Cappelli (2010). Based on a national survey of US
employers they argue that employers who state that they particularly value applicants
with high “work ethic” are less prone to monitor their employees, organise more work
in teams, and have lower turnover rates. Furthermore employees receive higher wages
and firms are more productive. Comparing their results with ours we can, by and large,
confirm their findings, with the exception that we do not find any relationship between
personality tests and turnover and monitoring respectively.
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Despite some similarities with Huang and Cappelli (2010), we are distinct in at least two
main dimensions: First, we are able to go beyond the analysis in Huang and Cappelli
(2010) as the richness of our data allows us to include the entire range of occupational
groups within an establishment, from managers to unskilled labour, into our analysis.
Huang and Cappelli (2010) are restricted to data on frontline worker only. Both studies,
however, have in common that the cross-sectional structure of the data does not allow
to pin down a unique explanation of the observed pattern. Despite evidence in favour of
reciprocity as the underlying principle we cannot establish causality of the effects.
Second, Huang and Cappelli (2010) use a survey question in which managers have to
rate how important candidates’ “work ethic” is for them when assessing applicants. In
contrast, we use hard information on whether written personality tests are used in the
hiring process. These tests are based on observable practise, implying that other datasets
may contain this measure as well which ensures that the analysis is transferable to other
data sources containing information on test use.
Personality tests are only one potential dimension of how firms screen job candidates.
Among other popular methods are interviews, reference letters and – widely used – com-
petency tests.5 Whereas the latter aims to uncover cognitive ability, personality tests –
the “Big Five” framework is a prominent example – measure a whole range of character-
istics of a potential employee. In particular we interpret the use of these personality tests
as a proxy for firms that are more likely to have (highly) reciprocal workers – in most
cases due to screening also for other desirable traits that are correlated with reciprocity,
though in some cases firms may be directly screening for reciprocity.
Our empirical approach is consistent with findings that document that personality traits
usually identified with personality tests within the “Big Five” framework are (closely)
correlated with measures of reciprocity as commonly defined in laboratory experiments.6
Ben-Ner et al. (2004a) link behaviour in a dictator game with switching roles to previously
elicited personality traits and find that “Big Five” indicators “agreeableness” and “open-
ness” are associated with higher amounts a dictator sends in response to the amount
she previously received. Opposed to that, cognitive ability seems not to influence the
propensity to reciprocate. In an earlier contribution, Ashton et al. (1998) concludes on
basis of hypothetical questions that high “agreeableness” and high “emotional stability”
are associated with high reciprocal altruism. Consistent with the patterns in our data,
5See Rynes and Cable (2003) for an extensive review on the various methods employed in modern
hiring procedures.
6Autor and Scarborough (2008) document the hiring procedures of a large retail firm, which (accord-
ing to the authors) is representative for the industry, that uses personality tests to screen workers upon
hiring. The firm gave hiring preference to applicants with positive z-scores for “agreeableness”, “consci-
entiousness”, and “extroversion”, “Big Five” traits that are predictive for the presence of reciprocity.
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Autor and Scarborough (2008) provide evidence that firms widely make use of screening
for personality and Wilk and Cappelli (2003) show that employers differ substantially in
the extent to which they make use of applicant screening.
The importance of social preferences for individual decisions has been documented in
various studies, for extensive surveys see Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and for field evidence
DellaVigna (2009). Fehr and Gächter (2000) in their survey explicitly concentrate on the
prevalence of reciprocity. In several theoretical contributions, social preferences have been
associated to optimal contract designs, suggesting that not only productivity and ability
but also social traits can influence the generosity of contract offers.7 In an empirical study
using survey data, Dohmen et al. (2009) provide evidence from real-world labour markets
for the importance of reciprocity on wages and effort provision. Englmaier et al. (2011)
in a real-effort laboratory experiment elicit both productivity and social preferences from
agents and find that principals increase wages for both traits by adapting contract offers
accordingly. In an earlier contribution, Cabrales et al. (2010) predict outcomes in a gift-
exchange experiment on basis of elicited behavioural preferences.
Another strand of the personnel literature explores synergies between different human
resource practises. Using firm data from steel finishing lines, Ichniowski and Shaw (1997)
find that modern human resource practises are associated with productivity of these firms.
More detailed, practises like incentive payments, work organised in teams, flexible job as-
signment, job security, and training for the employees has positive effects on productivity.
In a recent experimental study Bartling et al. (2012a) find complementarities between
high discretion, high wages and rent sharing, job characteristics which are commonly as-
sociated with “good jobs” (see Part III of this dissertation). The authors demonstrate
that these jobs emerge endogenously (as they are profitable) if employers have the op-
portunity to screen job candidates. Importantly, they show that it is screening for social
preferences and not for competency which is necessary for “good jobs” to emerge.
We contribute to the literature by combining evidence from both strands of the literature.
Using field data, we show that screening for personality when employers hire new employ-
ees is associated with a bundle of benefits for employees and employers like on-the-job
training, workflows organised in teams, provision of additional (possibly non-pecuniary)
benefits, or better performance of the firm per se. In contrast to these findings, com-
petency tests predict outcomes by far worse. Moreover, personality tests are unrelated
to dismissals within firms. Hence, explanations solely targeting on correlations between
successful firms and application of modern human resource practises are too narrow and
we feel confident that our results point at a more nuanced, behavioural, explanation of
7See for references Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2007) or Englmaier and Wambach (2010)
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the observed patterns: The systematic use of reciprocity based motivation by firms.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we provide an extensive
description of the WERS 2004 with a special focus on personality tests. Section 3 contains
details on the Hypotheses, the estimation strategy, and results. Furthermore a substantial
part of the section is dedicated to robustness checks. Section 4 concludes with a discussion.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 The WERS 2004 Dataset
The empirical analysis relies on the 2004 “Workplace Employee Relations Survey” (WERS
2004)8, the fifth in a government-funded series of surveys carried out at British workplaces.
The WERS 2004 covers information on employment relations of British workplaces and
is provided by employees and employers. The following analysis entirely relies on the
information about establishments provided by employers.9
The WERS 2004, consisting of 2,295 establishments surveyed, is a representative sample
of the British economy.10 The number of employees per establishment varies widely
between a minimum of 5 jobs per workplace up to 10,006 with an average of 414 jobs per
workplace. Note, however, that the mean is inflated by few extremely large companies
– the median firm size is 69 jobs and even the 99th percentile only contains a maximum
of 4,936 jobs per workplace. The firms cover almost all branches of the economy with a
slight concentration on health, whole trade and manufacturing.11 About one fourth of the
establishments are attributed to the public sector. More than half of the establishments
are unionised (58 percent).
21 percent of the establishments are part of the productive sector, three quarters are
one of a number of different workplaces in Great Britain belonging to the same organ-
isation, 23 percent are a single independent establishment and 2 percent are the sole
UK establishment of a foreign company. Overall 78 percent of the firms are either en-
8For further information on the WERS see: http://www.wers2004.info.
9The WERS consists of different datasets with varying respondents. Besides the survey answered by
employers, the WERS also comprises datasets on employees and employee representatives with questions
targeted to figure out their individual view on the establishment and their working conditions. The latter
two datasets are not employed for our analysis.
10“WERS 2004 (...) provide(s) a nationally representative account of the state of employment relations
and working life inside British workplaces.” Source: http://www.wers2004.info/wers2004/wers2004.php,
October 23rd 2012.
11Workplaces are classified according to the SIC 2003 (Standard Industrial Classification) by the UK
National Statistics. Sectors not covered by the WERS 2004 include: Agriculture, hunting and forestry,
fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial bodies.
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tirely or predominantly UK-owned, whereas the controlling head office of the company is
foreign-based in only 12 percent of the cases. Market shares are widely dispersed with
approximately 39 percent (15 percent) of the firms indicating a market share of less than
five percent (more than 50 percent). Roughly in line with this, about 75 percent of the
firms report that the perceived degree of competition in their market is either high or
very high whereas 11 percent state it to be low or very low.12
Within each firm the WERS 2004 distinguishes between 9 different occupational groups.13
Panel (d) of Figure 2.1 provides absolute frequencies for all nine occupational groups pool-
ing all 2,295 establishments. Not surprisingly, almost all firms state to have a management
department and about 80 percent of the surveyed firms have employees in secretarial or
administrative positions. As several variables of interest, including modern human re-
source practises, are provided on occupational group level, our subsequent analysis relies
on both, firm level and occupational group level.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for variables of interest, including the following
statistics: the number of observations, averages and standard deviations, the 25th, 50th
and 75th percentile as well as minimum and maximum values. The first set of variables
is reported on firm level.
“Monitoring” is an ordinal variable asking for the proportion of non-managerial employees
who have job duties which involve supervising other employees. Value one indicates
that no employee has monitoring tasks – on average firms indicate that between one
and 19 percent of the workers have monitoring tasks. The continuous variable (relative)
“Dismissal” measures the percentage of the workforce which has been dismissed within
the previous year. The data suggest that dismissals occur very rarely.
“Firm Performance” is an indicator which combines the following self-reported perfor-
mance measures: “Financial Performance”, “Labour Productivity” and “Product Qual-
ity”. The indicator is one, if firms in at least one of the three dimension report to have
better performance than the median answer of all firms for each dimension.14 This clas-
12The fractions of the legal state, market share and the degree of competition are calculated dropping
any unclear answers.
13These occupational groups are: (1) Managers and senior officials, (2) professional occupations, (3)
associate professionals and technical occupations, (4) administrative and secretarial occupations, (5)
skilled trade occupations, (6) caring, leisure and other personal services, (7) sales and customer service
occupations, (8) process, plant, and machines operatives, and drivers, and (9) routine and unskilled
occupations.
14For these three measures employers were asked to rate the performance of their firm compared to
the relevant industry, resulting in heavily over-rated own performance: for the example of “Labour Pro-
ductivity”, 49 percent of employers state to be better or a lot better than the average and 94 percent
state to be at least about average for the industry. Overrating is similarly severe for variables “Finan-
cial Performance” and “Product Quality”. To account for this overrating we classify establishments as
successful if their own rating is better than the median rating of all firms.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Pctl.
Obs. Avg. SD 25 50 75 Min. Max.
Firm Level
Monitoring 2278 2.52 1.08 2 2 3 1 7
Dismissal 2159 0.01 0.04 0 0 0.01 0 0.88
Firm Performance 2160 0.54 0.5 0 1 1 0 1
Firm Benefit 2295 0.8 0.4 1 1 1 0 1
Firm Benefit 2 2295 0.89 0.31 1 1 1 0 1
Job Security 2295 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 0 1
Top Wage 2135 0.18 0.24 0 0.08 0.27 0 1
Low Wage 2135 0.03 0.13 0 0 0 0 1
Personality Tests 2292 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 0 1
Competency Tests 2291 0.61 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Incentive Pay 2295 0.57 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Largest Occupational Group
Possibly Non-Pecuniary Benefits
Any Benefit 2286 0.89 0.31 1 1 1 0 1
No. Benefis 2286 2.6 1.36 2 3 3 0 5
Pension Scheme 2286 0.77 0.42 1 1 1 0 1
Company Car 2286 0.18 0.38 0 0 0 0 1
Private Health 2286 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
Extended Paid Leave 2286 0.75 0.43 1 1 1 0 1
Sick Pay 2286 0.70 0.46 0 1 1 0 1
On-the-Job Training 1950 4.05 1.09 3 4 5 1 6
General Training 2288 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Team-working 2279 5.08 2.25 3 6 7 1 7
Notes: Statistics for each variable are calculated omitting “refusal”, “don’t know” and “not applicable”,
indicating unclear answers. “Job Security”, “Personality Tests”, “Competency Tests” and “Incentive
Payments” are collapsed on firm level to guarantee comparability. The lower panel refers to information
on the largest occupational group only. “Monitoring”, “On-the-Job training”, and “Team-Working”
are ordinal variables with lower values corresponding to lower levels of monitoring, training, and
team-working respectively. “Dismissal”, “Top Wage”, and “Bottom Wage” are continuous fraction of
dismissed employees, and employees with high and low earnings. “No. Benefits” counts the number of
granted benefits, the remaining variables are binary.
sification based on self-reporting, splits the data into two almost equal parts of rather
successful and unsuccessful establishments.
We construct the variable “Firm Benefit” as a comprehensive measure of successfulness of
establishments. It either relates to self-reported outcomes or to the ability of the firm to
employ highly desirable work practices: The measure takes the value one if the respective
firm either reports higher than median firm performance, uses more team-working than
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the median firm, or relies less on monitoring (compared to the median).
We also use an alternative indicator for overall firm benefits, “Firm Benefit 2” which
includes dismissals and reports high benefits if additionally the firm has dismissals lower
or equal to median dismissals. The purpose of this procedure is to fully address all firm
benefits – monitoring, team-working, dismissals, and productivity – which were suggested
by Huang and Cappelli (2010) in one compound measure. However this procedure comes
at a price: By doing so, we lose much of the variation as most firms do not have any
dismissals within the previous year, c.f. Table (1), resulting in almost 90 percent of firms
being classified as firms which reap some suggested benefits.
The data contain rich information on various aspects of the workers compensation and
benefit package. “Job Security” is reported for each occupational group. In this table,
however, we collapse the measure on firm level. Hence the dummy variable on “Job
Security” is one if at least in one occupational group within an establishment employees
enjoy job security or non-compulsory redundancies.15 Finally, “Top Wage” (“Low Wage”)
is an indicator variable which provides information about the relative size of top-wage
(low-wage) earners compared to all employees within a firm. The WERS defines the
highest wage category (we label this category “Top Wage”) as wages equal or more than
15 pounds per hour. The dataset provides three more wage categories: 4.5 or below (“Low
Wage” category), 4.51 – 5, 5.01 – 15 or 15 and above pounds per hour.
For the second set of variables the dataset provides measures for the largest occupational
group in terms of employees. Possibly non-pecuniary benefits for the employee comprise
different measures of benefits for a worker. “Any Benefit” is a binary variable indicating
whether employees of the largest occupational group receive any of five benefits suggested
in WERS 2004, with almost 90 percent of firms providing at least one benefit.16 “Number
of Benefits” is an ordinal measure how many (between zero and five) different benefits of
the suggested five benefits employees receive. We furthermore provide summary statis-
tics for all in the survey suggested benefits, namely “Pension Scheme”, “Company Car”,
“Private Health Insurance”, “Extended Paid Leave” and “Sick Pay”.
The variable “On-the-Job Training” is measured ordinally with value one indicating that
employees of the largest occupational group did not experience any training within the
previous year and six implying ten days and more. The WERS 2004 furthermore distin-
guishes between providing training on computing skills, team-working, communicational
15Non-compulsory redundancies cover voluntary redundancies and early retirement, see
https://www.gov.uk/staff-redundant/noncompulsory-redundancy, November 20, 2012.
16The survey asks for the following non-pay terms and conditions: (1) Employer pension scheme, (2)
company car or car allowance, (3) private health insurance, (4) more than four weeks paid annual leave,
(5) sick pay in excess of statutory requirements, and (6) none of these.
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skills, leadership skills, operation of new equipment, customer service, health and safety,
problem-solving methods, equal opportunities, reliability and working to deadlines and
quality control procedures. We classify team-working skills, communicational skills, and
leadership skills under the label “General Training” as these cover matters which are not
narrowly job-specific but may be considered as more general and hence can be beneficial
for an employee’s entire working life across different employers.
Finally “Team-working” is an ordinal variable asking for the proportion of employees in
the largest occupational group being designated to teams. No team-working at all (value
one) is rather rare, and an average of almost three indicates that 60 – 80 percent of largest
occupational group employees work in teams.
2.2.2 Modern Human Resource Practises
WERS 2004 provides detailed information about human resource practises within estab-
lishments including the prevalence of personality tests, competency tests and variable
payments by occupational group. In order to be able to control for the fact that some
workplaces might have an in general more sophisticated HR department we classify estab-
lishments that use these three practices as employing modern human resource practises.
More than one third of all establishments use personality tests when screening job can-
didates whereas more than 60 percent of firms make use of competency tests in at least
one occupational group (see Table 2.1). Both personality tests and competency tests
are less prevalent in sectors with lower skill intensive tasks (i.e. construction, wholesale
and retail, and hotels and restaurants) while we find high rates of competency tests in
financial services, public administration and education.17 Similarly, personality tests are
prominent in financial services, public administration and manufacturing.
Analysing the prevalence of both screening tests within the firm it is no surprise that
screening devices are most common for hiring managers. Excluding managers, in about
24 percent (56 percent) of establishments personality (competency) tests are required at
least in one occupational group when recruiting new employees.
The prevalence of personality and competency tests by occupational group is summarised
in detail in panel (a) and (b) in Figure 2.1. Comparing both panels it again becomes
clear that employers use competency tests more often when hiring applicants: for each
occupational group the relative frequency of competency tests exceeds that one of per-
sonality tests. More interestingly, the distributions of both tests differ to a large extent.
17One notable exception of lower skill intensive tasks and very high rates of both tests is the sec-
tor “electricity, gas and water” as classified by the UK National Statistics. However this may not be
representative due to small sample size of only 45 observations for this sector.
43
Reciprocity in Organisations
Figure 2.1: Relative Frequency of Human Resource Practises by Occupational Group
This figure provides an overview over the prevalence of personality tests, competency tests
(upper row) and incentive pay for nine different occupational groups (bottom left). The picture
on the bottom right depicts the prevalence of each of the nine occupational groups in absolute
terms.
(a) Personality Tests (b) Competency Tests
(c) Incentive Pay (d) Occupational Group
Whereas firms make use of competency tests to rather similar extent across occupational
groups (with exceptions of personal services and unskilled labour with clearly lower rates)
the prevalence of personality tests starkly declines with decreasing skill intensity. The ex-
ception is the group of sales employees who are very likely to be screened for personality
upon hiring.
A comparison of both distributions provides some tentative evidence that personality
tests and competency tests are measuring different characteristics of the job candidate
and are applied to different job requirements. This assessment is further supported by
a correlation coefficient of only ρ = 0.17 between personality tests and competency tests
for non-managers implying no strict path dependency in firms’ choice of which screening
devices to apply.18 Of all firms, 38 percent only screen for competency and 5.5 percent
exclusively screen for personality upon hiring, whereas 39 percent apply both devices.19
18This measure correlates personality tests and competency tests both for all occupational groups
excluding managers.
19Including managers shifts these fractions a bit: 38 percent of firms use exclusively competency tests,
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The third measure for advanced human resource practises are incentive components in
employees’ compensation schemes. Paying some sort of variable payment – either per-
formance pay or profit pay – is common in 57 percent of establishments (and in half of
the firms in at least one occupational group if abstracting from the group of managers).20
As can be seen from panel (c) in Figure 2.1 the distribution of incentive pay across oc-
cupational groups declines for less skill intensive tasks with the exception of sales, where
incentive pay is common.
2.3 Reciprocity in Organisations
In this Section we use the presence of personality tests in a firms’ hiring procedure as a
proxy for this firm having a weakly more reciprocally inclined workforce. Even if a firm
does not use personality tests to directly screen for reciprocal workers, it might end up
with a more reciprocal workforce as a by-product (see the discussion in the Introduction).
This allows us to test various hypotheses regarding reciprocity in organisations within one
data set. Some of these hypotheses have independently been advanced in Leuven et al.
(2005), Huang and Cappelli (2010), and Englmaier and Leider (2012).
2.3.1 Hypotheses
The model in Englmaier and Leider (2012) serves as a loose theoretical background for
developing the following hypotheses. In this model employers can employ incentives based
on gift-exchange if two conditions are fulfilled: First, in a labour market with heteroge-
neous agents, the employer has to screen for reciprocal job candidates, willing to repay a
generous contract offer with increased effort. Second, the willingness of these reciprocally
inclined employees to reciprocate needs to be “activated” by the employer via initial “kind
behaviour”. More technically, the employer has to offer a contract that exceeds the agent’s
outside option. This can be achieved by offering a higher than market wage21 or, as the
model is based on utility arguments, by providing other, possibly non-pecuniary, benefits,
like an employer pension scheme or paid annual leave.
According to Leuven et al. (2005), firms with a more reciprocal workforce are more likely
to provide training to their employees. Besides regarding training as additional benefit for
7 percent personality tests and 39 percent both tests.
20The dataset only indicates whether a firm provides variable pay for a certain occupational group
but does not give estimates of its magnitude compared to the fixed wage.
21A different explanation of high wages is provided by Huang and Cappelli (2010): As workers with
high work ethic help the firm to save costs, employers attempt to hire as many of these types as possible,
which drives up their wages (rent sharing).
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workers, reciprocal behaviour of the agent might be a necessary condition for the provision
of (excess) on-the-job training. As benefits from training are inherently sequential, the
employer has to trust her employee that the employee does not enjoy the training and then
leaves for a better offer. Put differently, training could be regarded as an increase in the
worker’s outside option. Furthermore if the employer is convinced of the worker’s recip-
rocal behaviour, she may be willing to provide relatively more general training, which is
advantageous not only for a specific job but for the worker’s entire employment biography.
In a similar vein, employers may provide job security to their labour force, signalling
confidence in workers’ loyalty towards the firm. If agents, however, lack reciprocal attach-
ment to the establishment, job security schemes enable employees to exploit this device
via shirking while being protected against immediate consequences.
Hypothesis 2.1 (Generosity to Workers). Firms which screen for reciprocity pay higher
wages, are more likely to provide their workforce additional (potentially non-pecuniary)
benefits, should have a higher likelihood to provide their workers higher amounts of on-the-
job training, in particular more general training, and should be more inclined to provide
job security to their employees.
On the other hand, making use of motivational devices which are based on reciprocal
behaviour is costly for firms in the first place, as most gifts like higher wages or pension
systems involve direct costs. Job security, for instance, inhibits employers to adjust the
size of the labour force to fluctuations in demand in the short run. Hence, a rational
employer using reciprocal motivation should expect to enjoy some benefits which at least
offset these investments. Though the data does not allow us to pin down the cost-efficiency
of a firm’s behaviour, we proceed in our analysis by providing some insightful correlations.
Screening job candidates for their personality may be associated with employers’ inclina-
tion to organise tasks in teams. If firms benefit from team-working under the condition of
non-shirking and it is harder to measure effort of each team member compared to individ-
ual production (as the employer may only observe team output) then the implementation
of team structures should be more likely in organisations with more reciprocal employees.
This leads us to the hypothesis that organisations with compulsory personality tests and
team-working of employees should be complements.
The strongest link between reciprocity and benefits for the firm are correlations of firm
performance and screening job candidates for personality. Such relationships could imply
that firms relying on reciprocity as a means of motivating workers on average are more
successful in the market.
Huang and Cappelli (2010) document correlations between “work ethic” monitoring and
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turnover respectively. First, they argue that screening for “work ethic” and monitoring
should be substitutes as employees with high “work ethic” exert effort voluntarily. Second,
turnover decreases because the fit between job candidate and the firm should be better
– a classical matching argument. For completeness, we likewise include these two results
from Huang and Cappelli (2010) into the set of our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2.2 (Value to Firms). Firms which screen for reciprocity should have more
leeway to organise tasks in teams and should perform better in the market. According
to Huang and Cappelli (2010) these firms could reduce monitoring and should have less
turnover. In any case, firms should benefit in at least one of these dimensions when
screening job candidates.
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis
To study the effect of reciprocity on different outcome variables we use personality tests
upon hiring as a measure for reciprocity. The general specification of our estimations is
the following reduced form model:
yid = PidβP + I′idβI + X′iβX + id
where yid is the outcome of the dependent variable in occupational group d of firm i. The
subscripts of Pid, an indicator for the use of personality tests, are defined accordingly. Iid
are indicators, which are (for each establishment) available on occupational group level.
Xi are (firm-wide) firm fixed controls and id is an error term, which is assumed to be i.i.d.
across firms but may be arbitrarily correlated within firms (between occupational groups).
These potential within-firm correlations are accounted by clustering on firm-level.
Estimations differ in two main dimensions: First, we distinguish whether the dependent
variable is reported at the firm-level or separately for each occupational group. The
latter allows for matching between human resource practises and dependent variables on
occupational group level. Second, different yid are scaled differently, suggesting to adapt
estimation strategies accordingly.
Job security – i.e. non-compulsory redundancies as defined in footnote 15 – is the only
outcome variable which is provided for each occupational group; hence we estimate the
effect of personality tests on job security pooling all available occupational groups.22 This
22For this estimation we use all occupational groups per firm and create an indicator, whether the
firm provides job security for employees in the respective occupational group. As differently sized firms
may have more of less occupational groups (and hence giving firms with more groups a higher number
of observations) and different sized firms may at the same time be differently likely to provide their
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implies that we are able to match the provision of job security for each occupational group
with the employed set of modern human resource practises.
The next set of dependent variables only contains information on the largest occupa-
tional group within an establishment. This set consists of all non-pecuniary benefits
for the employee, including “Pension Scheme” and “Extended Leave”, the “No. Ben-
efits” as well as its prevalence (“Any Benefits”). Furthermore it comprises “On-the-
Job Training”, “General Training” and “Team-working”. We adapt the model accord-
ingly and replace the dependent variable with the outcome for the largest group y
id˜i
,
d˜i = max(# of employees(di)) ∀i and d ∈ {professionals, ..., unskilled occupations}. We
proceed analogously for personality tests P
id˜i
and Iid˜i . Firm fixed controls which are
summarised in Xi are unaffected.
For the remainder of the dependent variables, i.e. “Dismissal”, “Monitoring”, “Low
Wage”, “High Wage”, “Firm Performance”, and “Firm Benefit” the dataset only pro-
vides information at the firm level and lacks individualised occupational group specific
data. Hence we construct aggregate measures from the occupational specific measure of
personality tests, defining indicator Pi being one if in at least one occupational group (ex-
cluding managers and senior officials) job candidates are screened via personality tests.23
Analogously to personality tests, we collapse Iid to the firm level and obtain Ii.
Secondly, as outcomes are reported on different scales for different variables we adapt esti-
mators accordingly. “Low Wage”, “High Wage” and “Dismissal” are continuous variables,
suggesting OLS estimation. Both employee benefits “Pension Scheme” and “Extended
Leave” as well as the indicator whether the firm pays any benefits (“Any Benefit”) are
binary outcomes, implying probit regressions. The same applies to the variables “Job
Security”, “General Training”, “Firm Performance”, and “Firm Benefit”. Finally “Team-
working”, “On-the-Job Training”, “No. Benefits”, and “Monitoring” are provided on an
ordinal scale which leads us to use an ordered probit estimation approach.
The first set of controls, Iid, comprises competency tests and a compound measure,
whether employees (i.e. non-managers) either receive performance payments or profit
payments. We define this measure as “Incentive Pay”. These two variables can (along
with personality tests) be regarded as indicators for modern human resource practises,
which itself may be correlated with all outcome variables we observe. Controlling for
them, we hope to reduce the problem of omitted variables.24
employees job security, we include the number of occupational groups per establishment into the set of
controls. By this procedure we aim to reduce the likelihood that this effect may confound the results.
23The results are robust to the inclusion of managers. However, as the focus of this study is on
reciprocal behaviour of employees, we exclude managers, who traditionally stand between the workforce
and the owner of the company and hence may have different incentives.
24Note that we are fully aware of the difficulty to establish any causal effect of personality tests and
48
Reciprocity in Organisations
Table 2.2: Benefits for the Employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS O. Probit Probit Probit
Bottom Wage Top Wage Training Gen. Training Job Security
Pers. Test −0.051∗∗∗ −0.0066 0.26∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.22
(0.014) (0.015) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14)
Comp. Test −0.012 0.012 0.087 0.038 0.11
(0.012) (0.013) (0.088) (0.11) (0.099)
Inc. Pay −0.0059 0.049∗∗∗ 0.14 0.13 0.042
(0.014) (0.012) (0.097) (0.12) (0.12)
Foreign −0.012 0.21∗∗∗ 0.29 −0.29 −0.56
(0.022) (0.062) (0.28) (0.39) (0.42)
Union −0.034∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ 0.0061 −0.052 0.49∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11)
PubSector −0.043∗∗∗ 0.00064 0.13 0.18 0.38∗∗
(0.014) (0.028) (0.15) (0.21) (0.18)
Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2115 2189 1888 1964 7892
R2 0.170 0.395
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of employees
within a firm, who earn less than 4.5 pounds per hour (“Bottom Wage”, reported in column (1)), the
share of employees earning the “Top Wage” (more than 15 pounds per hour, reported in column(2))
as well as of probit regressions of provision of “Training” (column (3)), “General Training” (column
(4)), and “Job Security” (column(5)), on dummy variables personality tests, competency tests, and on
controls. Regressions in the first two columns provide results on firm level, and estimates for column
(3) and (4) report estimates for the largest occupational group. Column (5) provides estimates for each
occupational group and includes an additional dummy to control for the number of occupational groups
per firm.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Firm fixed controls are summarised in Xi, containing dummies for all nine possible oc-
cupational groups in a firm. We include these dummies whenever running regressions
on occupational group level. In all regressions, we control for whether a firm belongs
to a foreign organisation or is unionised. Furthermore we control for detailed recruiting
practises and account for region, industry, size of the establishment, and use a dummy
which indicates whether the establishment belongs to the public sector. As explained
in footnote 22, estimating the effect of personality tests on “Job Security” includes the
number of occupational groups into firm-level controls.
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 summarise estimation results on Hypothesis 1, previously defined
as necessary conditions to induce reciprocal behaviour of employees. We interpret person-
ality tests as an indicator of whether employers search for potentially reciprocal workers.
we do not claim to be able to do so.
49
Reciprocity in Organisations
If they do so we should observe patterns associated with gift-exchange motivation.
Table 2.2 column (1) provides evidence that personality tests are significantly and nega-
tively related to the relative size of employees receiving very low wages of 4.5 pounds per
hour or less. Note also, that this is true for personality tests, but not for the other two
proxies for modern human resource practises, competency tests and variable payments. In
contrast, we do not find that personality tests can explain the relative share of employees
who earn top wages, see column (2). These results provide some tentative evidence for
the presence of a gift-exchange motive when employers screen on personality traits upon
hiring.
Firms which screen their job candidates for personality offer significantly more days of
on-the-job training per year (column (3)) and are more likely to train their employees with
general skills which are beneficial for their future working life (column (4)). Similarly to
low wages, neither competency tests nor incentive payments predict the amount of on-
the-job training. The same applies to the matters that the training covers: the coefficient
on competency test for instance is ten times smaller than the estimate of personality tests.
Finally, there seems to be a weak tendency for firms with obligatory personality tests
to provide more job security, as shown in column (5). However, this relationship is not
significantly different from zero. In Section 2.3.3 we repeat our analysis with different sets
of human resource controls. There we find persistent and significant correlations of job
security with personality tests.
Table 2.3 exploits information about non-pay terms and conditions in more detail. In
column (1) we find personality tests being associated with the likelihood that at least one
of five suggested benefits is provided by the employer.25 The intuition for this result is
simply that firms expect to receive some benefit from providing reciprocal incentives in
terms of being able to use more progressive forms of production. However without data
on the firm’s costs for providing each single benefit we expect to see at least one of the
possible benefits for firms using personality tests.
The next column provides evidence for a positive relation between personality tests and
how many of five different benefits employees within a firm enjoy which confirms the
results from the first column. Finally, we analyse two non-pay terms: the presence of an
employer pension scheme and the provision of more than four weeks annual paid leave are
strongly correlated with the use of personality tests.26
25The classification of these benefits are summarised in footnote 16.
26We report estimation results only for two out of five potential non-pay terms (c.f. footnote 16). These
omitted conditions show systematically positive, though insignificant, correlations with personality tests.
Estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2.3: Non-Pecuniary Benefits for the Employee
Probit O. Probit Probit Probit
Benefits No. Benefits Pension Extended Paid Leave
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pers. Test 0.36∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗
(0.20) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16)
Comp. Test 0.059 0.083 0.24∗∗ 0.13
(0.13) (0.078) (0.11) (0.11)
Inc. Pay 0.31∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.083) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign −0.35 0.0073 0.0029 −0.22
(0.35) (0.32) (0.39) (0.35)
Union 0.48∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.094) (0.14) (0.14)
PubSector 1.32∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.14) (0.26) (0.20)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of provision of
“Benefits” (column (1)), provision of employer “Pension” scheme (column (3)), “Extended Paid Level”
(column(4)) and ordered probit regressions of the “No. Benefits” (column (2)) on personality tests,
competency tests, and on controls. All regressions provide estimates for the largest occupational group.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
These benefits are not only strongly associated with personality tests but similarly closely
related to variable payments. Note, however, that competency tests only poorly predict
the provision of these benefits. Only for employer pension schemes (column (3)) we find
significant correlations for competency tests, confirming our assumption that personality
tests and competency tests are not substitutes.
Result 2.1 (Generosity to Workers). Firms which screen for job candidates’ personality
are less likely to pay very low wages and provide more on-the-job training which then covers
more general matters. Furthermore employees in firms with personality tests benefit from
a higher likelihood to receive non-monetary benefits, especially employer pension schemes
as well as extended paid leave and they receive a higher number of non-pay benefits overall.
Rational employers provide gifts only if they expect to benefit from this strategy. Hence
the second set of hypotheses is concerned with the employers’ side.
Table 2.4 summarises potential benefits for the employer. Column (1) reports estimation
results of personality tests on team-working. We find that the use of personality tests
upon hiring is highly significant. Competency tests are associated to team-working as
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Table 2.4: Benefits for the Employer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
O. Probit O. Probit OLS Probit Probit Probit
Teamworking Monitoring Dismissal Performance Firm Benefit Firm Benefit 2
Pers. Test 0.43∗∗∗ 0.081 0.0045 0.26∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.15) (0.10) (0.0059) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Comp. Test 0.17∗ −0.035 −0.00075 −0.089 0.076 0.0012
(0.095) (0.083) (0.0041) (0.099) (0.11) (0.14)
Inc. Pay 0.039 0.067 0.0076∗ 0.19∗ 0.083 −0.18
(0.092) (0.089) (0.0043) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15)
Foreign −0.20 −0.39 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.12 0.33 0.18
(0.25) (0.29) (0.0060) (0.36) (0.33) (0.37)
Union −0.032 −0.00094 −0.0087∗∗ −0.15 −0.17 0.100
(0.12) (0.12) (0.0036) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
PubSector 0.23 0.048 −0.0065∗ −0.058 0.22 −0.31
(0.18) (0.16) (0.0038) (0.19) (0.24) (0.23)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2268 2279 2149 2147 2279 2279
R2 0.075
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered probit regressions of the degree
of “Team-working” (column (1)), and “Monitoring” (column (2)), OLS regressions on the relative share
of the variable “Dismissal” within one year in column (3) and probit regressions on firm “Performance”
(column (4)) and in columns (5) and (6) two compound measures for overall “Firm Benefit” on dummy
variables personality tests, competency tests, and on controls. Regression in the column (1) is based on
the largest occupational group and column (2) – (6) provide results on firm level.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
well, but comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients, it becomes clear that the use of
personality tests has more than twice the impact than the use of competency tests has.
Furthermore it is important to notice that incentive pay has no influence on the likelihood
of what fraction of employees are designated to teams.
The second two hypotheses are borrowed from Huang and Cappelli (2010). Contrary
to their results, however, we do not find any relation between personality tests (or any
other modern human resource practise) and monitoring. Similarly, there seems to be no
(strong) relation between relative dismissals and any of the suggested human resource
practises including personality tests.
At the same time the result on relative dismissals refutes the argument that firms do
not use personality tests to primarily identify a specific trait, like social preferences and
reciprocity, but are rather supposed to make sure an employee better “fits” to a company.
If the latter was the case, we expect to see fewer dismissals in firms that use personality
tests. Hence we conjecture that personality tests are not merely used to improve general
fit of employees to firms but are devices to screen for social preferences.
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Column (4) provides evidence that firms using personality tests seem to perform better, at
least according to self-rated performance measures. Similarly to previous results compe-
tency tests have no explanatory power, whereas incentive pay predicts success comparably
well.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) report results of the constructed measure on firm’s bene-
fits. “Firm Benefit” – i.e. whether work flows are organised in teams, the firms uses
little monitoring, or reports high productivity – is highly related to personality tests and
screening for personality is the only dimension of modern human resource practises which
has predictive power. Furthermore, the alternative measure “Firm Benefits 2”, which
additionally to “Firm Benefits” assigns benefits to the firm if not a single employee was
dismissed within the preceding year provides similar evidence.27 For these two measures
it is most striking that only personality tests can explain, whether firms are profiting in
at least one of the suggested dimensions. However as personality tests and dismissals are
unrelated, lower coefficients of “Firm Benefits 2” compared to “Firm Benefits” are not
surprising.
Result 2.2 (Value to Firms). Firms which screen for job candidates’ personalities des-
ignate more employees to work in teams and report to be more successful on the market.
Pooling potential benefits, more team-working, less monitoring, better market performance
(and less dismissals in a second specification) are highly related to the use of personality
tests in hiring.
2.3.3 Robustness
By providing robustness tests for the previous results, this section also offers an extensive
discussion of our results so far. We are aware that drawing causal inferences is not valid
as we cannot argue that personality tests were randomly assigned to firms. However, we
go to great lengths to control for the general sophistication of a firm’s human resource
department. Modern human resource devices like personality tests or competency tests
are likely to be correlated with (unobservable) other dimensions of quality of management
practises which itself may be related to suggested benefits as well. Without being able to
entirely exclude this mechanism, we aim to address that shortcoming by applying different
sets of human resource practises as control variables.
We suggest five sets of human resource practises, only affecting the vector Iid. Set 1 only
includes whether the respective firm requires competency tests upon hiring and neglects
incentive payments. Thus the indicator vector Ii only varies across firms, not within firms.
27See section 2.2 for a proper definition of “Firm Benefits 2”.
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The second set, Set 2, additionally includes whether the firm asks for personality tests
for managers.28 Set 3 additionally includes incentive payments. For the last two human
resource sets we construct indicators reflecting potential complementarities between these
measures: In Set 4 the indicator for modern human resource practises is equal to one if
at least one of three, competency tests, personality tests for managers or incentive pay, is
present at the respective firm. This measure has the least strict requirements for a firm to
be classified as using modern human resource policies. In contrast to that, Set 5 requires
firms to use all of the previously listed devices, implying it to be the strictest criterion for
a classification in to the modern human resource category.
The appendix contains robustness tables on coefficients and standard errors for personality
tests for each dependent variable and for each set of human resource controls. Note that
even though not all coefficients of interest are significant at the highest level, the very
systematic pattern of correlations emerging across a large set of specifications lends our
core results substantial support. Table B.1 to Table B.5 refer to the table “Benefits for
the Employee”, Table 2.2. Both bottom and top wages are summarised in Table B.1 and
Table B.2. “Bottom Wage” is related to personality tests for each set of controls, whereas
“Top Wage” is not correlated to personality tests across any specification.
We observe similar behaviour of personality tests on employee benefits. Personality tests
are significantly associated with “On-the-Job Training” in three of five control sets (Ta-
ble B.3) and screening for personality of non-managers is significant in all regressions
on “General Training” except when we explicitly include personality tests for managers
(Table B.4).
In Table 2.2, “Job Security” is positively though insignificantly related to personality tests.
Regarding Table B.5 we find significant association in four of five specifications. With
weak evidence from our main regressions, we conclude to only provide some tentative
evidence in favour of higher job security in establishments with personality tests.
The next set of tables, Table B.6 to Table B.9 relate to dependent variables in Table 2.3.
Common to all four tables is that in specification 1, 4 and 5 coefficients change to only
minor degrees and standard errors are comparable. Control sets 2 and 3 on the contrary
depict smaller impacts of personality tests on dependent variables which in most cases
– with the exception of employer pension scheme – lead to insignificant coefficients of
personality tests. However, explicitly including personality test for managers (the deci-
sive criterion of Set 2 and Set 3) into our analysis of whether personality tests influence
suggested benefits changes the situation: Performing an adjusted Wald test for joint sig-
28Remember that managers are excluded in the entire analysis in order to avoid confounding results,
as managers’ job profiles involve both principal and agent duties.
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nificance of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers provides
evidence for joint importance of personality tests. Personality tests for managers and non-
managers are jointly significant at the ten percent level in Set 2 for “Any Benefit” (Table
B.6). Both tests are jointly significant for both sets for “No. Benefits” on a one percent
level, as can be seen in Table B.7. Finally, both tests are jointly significant for “Pension
Scheme” and “Extended Paid Leave” on a five percent level, as reported in tables B.8 and
B.9.29
Finally, Tables B.10 to Table B.15 provide a closer look on all six regressions in Ta-
ble 2.4, which summarises benefits for the employer. The influence of personality tests
of non-managers on team-working (Table B.10) is stable and significant across all five
specifications of modern human resource practises. Even with different sets of controls,
hypotheses on less monitoring (Table B.11) and reduced dismissals (Table B.12) are un-
related to personality tests of non-managers. This is also true for joint significance for
manager and non-manger screening of the establishment. These negative results on dis-
missals across all control sets provides further evidence that personality tests are not
(only) applied to improve the “fit” between applicant and firm.
Table B.13 shows significant correlations between personality tests of non-managers and
“Firm Performance” for all but one control sets. The same applies to “Firm Benefit”, the
compound measure whether firms benefit at least in one dimension of less monitoring,
more team-working, or better performance, as depicted in Table B.14. Finally, there is a
weaker relationship between screening for job candidates’ personality and “Firm Benefit
2” (Table B.15). This should not be surprising, as “Firm Benefit 2 ” is defined as “Firm
Benefit” plus less dismissals. However, as shown previously, dismissals are not related to
personality tests.
Summarising, Result 1 is robust to specifications 1, 4 and 5, but seems less robust re-
garding specifications 2 and 3, i.e. when personality tests for managers are explicitly
included to the controls. However as many firms use personality tests for managers and
non-managers provided that they use personality tests, both measures are highly corre-
lated, resulting in imprecise point estimates. This is the reason why we reported adjusted
Wald tests, which are by and large in line with the main regressions. Robustness tests for
Result 2 do not systematically deviate from findings in the main section, suggesting that
the association between personality tests and firm benefits seem to be profound.
29Details are available from the authors upon request.
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2.4 Discussion
In previous years increasingly many contributions in personnel economics relate social
preferences of employees to firm behaviour. Accounting for employees’ (social) prefer-
ences may alter organisational structure within the firm and can lead to different job
characteristics. (See Bartling et al. (2012a))
In this paper we use the 2004 wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS 2004) and find that firms behave consistent with a model gift-exchange based
motivation for their employees if they screen job candidates for personality. We use
personality tests as a proxy for the degree of reciprocity (susceptibility to gift-exchange)
within the workforce. Previous research has documented that traits elicited in personality
tests are correlated with (laboratory) concepts of reciprocity.
Firms which apply personality tests are more likely to provide their employees possibly
non-pecuniary benefits like employer pension schemes or grant extended paid annual leave.
These employers are furthermore less likely to pay very low wages and provide more on-
the-job training to their employees. The topics covered in the provided training are rather
general instead of workplace related, implying a higher added value for workers. Finally,
there is a weak tendency that firms with personality tests are more likely to provide their
employees protection against redundancies via job security. On the other hand, firms
also benefit from screening for personality: we find that these firms have higher rates of
team-working and are generally more successful on the market.
Importantly, competency tests upon hiring and incentive pay, both modern human re-
source practises similarly to personality tests, predict only poorly (if at all) benefits both
for the firm as well as for employees. This implies that the use of modern human resource
practises is not sufficient to explain the provision of benefits and firm performance. It is
necessary that firms explicitly screen for job candidates’ personality.
Closest to this study is Huang and Cappelli (2010). Using US survey data, they proxy
for the importance of job candidates’ “work ethic” for employers’ hiring decisions. These
authors find that firms which put high weight on “work ethic” on average pay higher wages,
have more team-working and are more productive. Furthermore these firms monitor their
employees to a lower degree and have fewer turnovers.
By and large, our analysis confirms the results of Huang and Cappelli (2010). Our re-
sults based on the WERS 2004 only deviate in two dimensions: First, we do not find
stable relationships between screening and monitoring. Second, our measure of turnover
– dismissals relative to firm size – is unrelated to personality tests. Note that the latter
(negative) result also implies that personality tests are not primarily a device to improve
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the fit between applicant and firm. Together with poor predictive power of other hu-
man resource practises gift-exchange motives in firms with personality tests seem to be a
plausible explanation for our findings.
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Chapter 3
Good Jobs, Screening, and Labour
Productivity – Evidence from the
Field
3.1 Introduction
What is the optimal level of discretion employers should grant their workforce? On the one
hand leaving employees a lot of leeway can increase productivity, as workers themselves
might know best how to get their tasks done most efficiently.1 This result has extensively
been reviewed in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003). However, defining operating processes less
strictly may induce employees to lower effort without having to fear immediate conse-
quences. The latter argument is in line with classical moral hazard frameworks where
agents maximise utility by minimising effort costs – at the expense of the principal who
may for several reasons not be able or willing to fully monitor employees’ actions. This
basic trade-off between monitoring and shirking gave rise to fruitful research on incentive
mechanisms which aim to circumvent one of the two extreme outcomes: either literally
no discretion at the cost of high efficiency losses or some amount of discretion combined
with high levels of shirking. To overcome that dilemma, standard theory usually suggests
to pay agents for performance or, alternatively, provide efficiency wages to avoid poten-
tially high risk premia and to cope with situations in which monitoring is particularly
difficult.2 An efficiency wage strategy is promising when both parties repeatedly interact
such that the employee has a high continuation value from the relationship and the threat
of dismissal is credible.
1The terms “worker” and “employee” are used interchangeably throughout this essay.
2See Prendergast (1999) for an extensive survey on incentive mechanisms.
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More recently, increasingly many contributions highlight the importance of non-standard
behaviour of employees. Among others, two distinct mechanisms may both lead to em-
ployees providing higher effort even in situations with moral hazard: Huang and Cappelli
(2010) find that self-reported employee performance seems to be higher if managers pre-
fer to employ job candidates with high “work ethic”. It is argued that these employees
unconditionally exert higher levels of effort as working hard is part of their personality.
This trait makes them more desirable for firms to hire.
Great attention in recent research however was also dedicated to the concept of reciprocity
which implies gift-exchange behaviour between employer and employee.3 Employees with
reciprocal traits respond to kind labour contracts – commonly achieved with higher than
outside option income for them – with high levels of effort. Compared to the concept
of efficiency wages, which is agnostic about (non-standard) agent behaviour and to the
mechanism of “work ethic” which assumes employees to intrinsically work harder, firms
attempting to make use of reciprocity need to meet two conditions: in a world with het-
erogeneous agents, the firm first has to employ workers with reciprocal traits and second
has to offer these employees generous labour contracts. The first part can be achieved by
explicit screening for reciprocity whereas the second part is most easily accomplished by
paying higher than outside option incomes.
In this paper I use data from the 2004 wave of the “Workplace Employment Relations
Survey” (WERS 2004), a representative survey of the British economy, to explore comple-
mentarities between human resource management practises (HRM) and labour produc-
tivity. Common sense suggests that firms deciding to grant employees high discretion may
need to implement complementary practises to prevent workers from exploiting increased
shirking opportunities. Contrary to this intuition I will find that firms leaving discretion
do not face detrimental consequences even if discretion is not complemented with addi-
tional HRM practises which suggests that shirking may (here) not be the predominant
effect. However combining high discretion with providing high income (this combination
is henceforth referred to “good jobs”, a terminology which is borrowed from Bartling et al.
(2012a)) along with screening job candidates for personality significantly predicts higher
than average labour productivity. Importantly, the necessary combination of personality
tests upon hiring and high income suggests a conditional relationship which is consistent
with gift-exchange as an underlying mechanism: generous firms may only expect high
effort exertion (and hence high labour productivity) by the “right” employees, i.e. those
who were screened for personality and hence should exhibit reciprocal traits. Simply pro-
viding “good jobs” alone without screening for personality is not sufficient to predict high
firm performance. This study therefore casts doubts on efficiency wages as the optimal
3For comprehensive surveys on reciprocity, see Fehr and Gächter (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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strategy to efficiently make use of discretion. Complementing discretion with personality
tests for job candidates in hope to select the “right” employees who unconditionally exert
high effort even for low wages likewise fails to be related to beneficial firm outcomes.
Finally competency tests – a screening device to uncover applicant’s cognitive ability –
is not suitable to predict labour productivity to a similar extent as personality tests do.4
This suggests that not screening itself but screening for personality is the key parameter
to complement “good jobs”, as only personality tests reveal reciprocal types.
Relating firm outcomes to generosity in income and discretion requires me to match
responses from two sources of the WERS 2004 dataset. Labour productivity is taken
from the management survey, which supplies firm level estimates of labour productivity.
Estimates for the level of discretion and the generosity of income are derived from an
employee questionnaire, for which a number of employees is drawn randomly from each
firm surveyed in the WERS 2004. As income and the degree of discretion depend on
several personal characteristics of the respective employee, I separately regress income and
discretion on a series of observables like age, tenure, or occupational group to generate
estimated values of both variables.5 I then compare estimated and actual values of income
and discretion separately to determine the degree of firm’s generosity towards each single
employee for each dimension. As the dataset does not provide information on individual
performance or effort exertion I aggregate employee responses on firm level by calculating
average scores of deviations of income and discretion for each establishment.
With personality tests and competency tests I use two distinct screening procedures job
candidates may have to undergo. Though both practises are commonly used by em-
ployers, each device measures different dimensions of applicants’ qualifications. Whereas
competency tests are cognitive ability tests to reveal the intellectual capacity of employ-
ees, personality tests aim to uncover personal traits of the workers. Personality tests are
generally based on the Five Factor Model, a theory in psychology which classifies human
traits into five dimensions. These so called Big Five personality traits are “openness”,
“conscientiousness”, “extraversion”, “agreeableness”, and “neuroticism”. In a laboratory
study, Ben-Ner et al. (2004a) relate these five traits to behaviour in dictator games and find
that “agreeableness” and “openness” are positively correlated with agents’ generosity in
4Screening usually can be distinguished in two main dimensions: screening for personality and screen-
ing for ability/competency. Interviews, computer-based tests, and reference letters are popular screening
devices and are applied to both dimensions.
5This two-step approach of first comparing actual from estimated values and then using these devia-
tions for further inference is similar to Black and Lynch (2001). Black and Lynch, in a first step, estimate
production functions for each establishment and then relate the residual to human resource practises.
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gift-exchange games.67 In an earlier contribution Ashton et al. (1998) find that reciprocal
altruism as measured in laboratories is closely linked to personality traits “agreeableness”
and “emotional stability”; the latter refers to “neuroticism”.8 Day and Silverman (1989)
furthermore find that personality traits significantly predict job performance even when
cognitive ability is controlled for.
In light of this evidence, I interpret personality tests upon hiring as an indicator for the
degree of reciprocity within a firm’s labour force – not necessarily because employers
explicitly screen for reciprocity but due to correlations between Big Five traits and labo-
ratory measures of reciprocity. In contrast to personality tests, Ben-Ner et al. (2004a) do
not find associations between ability and Big Five traits. This suggests that competency
tests seem to measure traits which are orthogonal to personality traits like reciprocity.
This study at hand was inspired by a laboratory experiment by Bartling et al. (2012a).
In this paper a principal sets a fixed wage and decides on the level of worker’s discretion:
high discretion implies high productivity of effort at the cost of unlimited shirking op-
portunities for the employee. Indeed the authors find that providing discretion turns out
not to be profitable on its own as shirking is widely prevalent. However combining discre-
tion with high wages renders profitable for employers (and employees) if employers can
offer such contracts selectively to workers with high effort record. Exogenous variation
in the viability of screening agents for their past effort provision allows the authors to
identify screening opportunities as the causal determinant of the creation of “good jobs”.
If screening is permitted then this leads to the emergence of two job-clusters: “good jobs”
with high wages, high discretion, and high rent-sharing and “bad jobs” with low wages,
low discretion, and little rent-sharing for employees with poor reputation. Most notable,
only trust and trustworthiness are necessary for the dichotomy of job-clusters to emerge
endogenously.9
The most important difference between Bartling et al. (2012a) and this study is that I use
real-world data. The nature of the data also implies that I cannot exogenously change
the market environment as generally done by laboratory studies. Despite this limitations
my results give rise to reciprocity as a plausible underlying mechanism casting doubts on
6“Agreeableness” refers to cooperative and compassionate behaviour towards others. “Openness”
describes the degree of intellectual curiosity in comparison to cautious behaviour. For further reference,
see Atkinson and Hilgard (2000).
7A similar finding is reported in Ben-Ner et al. (2004b). Evidence on predictability of Big Five
indicators on giving can be found in Ben-Ner and Kramer (2011).
8See Part II of this dissertation for an extensive discussion on personality tests and reciprocity. En-
glmaier and Leider (2012) furthermore provide evidence for increased effectiveness of reciprocal incentives
if a personality test beforehand classified agents to be reciprocal.
9Altmann et al. (2013) suggest a non-behavioural mechanism for labour market segregation which is
the result of incomplete contracts.
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efficiency wages and “work ethic” to be the sole explanations of my findings. However,
this paper refrains from making causal statements: The study exploits variations which
exclusively come from endogenous firms’ choices of whether to make use of screening
devices or not. Hence this contribution should be regarded as providing correlations
between complementarities in HRM practises and labour productivity.
An asset of the WERS 2004 is that the dataset is a representative sample of the British
economy, which allows making general statements. This complements the limited gen-
eralisability of laboratory experiments, in which the researcher usually does not observe
behaviour of real-world decision makers. Of course, real data come at the cost that
behavioural responses cannot be measured with the same accuracy in the field as in lab-
oratory experiments: For instance, instead of using effort levels of each employee I rely
on firm-wide labour productivity, which itself is a function of employees’ effort provision.
But regardless whether the relationship between effort and productivity is one-to-one or
not, it seems plausible to regard productivity and not merely effort provision as a decisive
part in managers’ objective functions. Despite these potential drawbacks of real-world
datasets, my results are remarkably consistent with findings of Bartling et al. (2012a).
Finally this contribution highlights the importance of personality tests in understanding
interactions between the behaviour of the employer and the employee in the workplace.
Altogether, my results give rise to reciprocity as a plausible explanation for the strong
relationship between high firm performance, “good jobs”, and screening for personality.
This paper contributes to the rich literature on workplace organisation and personnel
economics. Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) provide evidence from various studies that high-
performance work systems, in particular high levels of discretion, seems to turn out to
be (highly) predictive for firm success whereas traditional and hierarchical workplace
organisations are less correlated with favourable outcomes; in this respect this contribution
is not an exception. However Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) suggest conventional methods
like indoctrination of employees, management culture, or work practises which establish
high effort norms and fosters peer pressure to mitigate the free-rider problem. In a study
on steel finishing lines, Ichniowski et al. (1995) and Ichniowski et al. (1999) demonstrate
that innovative HRM practises like incentive pay and workflows being organised in teams
are associated with high line productivity.
In contrast to the above, some recent studies put more emphasis on behavioural aspects
of employer-employee relationships. In a laboratory experiment Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) provide evidence for workers’ adverse behavioural responses after an increase in
workplace control, as such policies are perceived as signals for distrust against employees
(“hidden costs of control”). Even though such costs may amplify positive effects of high-
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performance work systems with high discretion (and are consistent with my results), this
paper does not build on that mechanism. Another example for employees’ non-standard
reaction on institutional changes within the workplace is put forth by Nagin et al. (2002)
in a field experiment on shirking in call centres. A significant fraction of employees does
not react adversely to reductions in monitoring rates suggesting heterogeneity in fairness
concerns among workers. These results may imply that choosing the “right” job candidates
allows employers to provide discretion to their employees without facing the immediate
threat of extensive shirking. This complements findings by Bartling et al. (2012b) who
provide an example in which employers with fairness concerns have a broader range of
contracts they are able implement as compared to selfish employers.
Similar to Bartling et al. (2012a), this study advances reciprocal responses of employees
on employers’ behaviour as a potential mechanism to overcome the trade-off between
discretion and shirking.10 In a theoretical contribution, Englmaier and Leider (2012)
incorporate such reciprocal traits of employees into the utility function and solve an
otherwise classical moral hazard problem.11 In their framework, employing reciprocal
agents gives employers the opportunity to use two distinct devices to motivate employees:
Classical monetary incentives and providing the agent with higher than outside option
utility, which induces effort provision through gift-exchange motives.
Closer to this study, however, are empirical papers highlighting the importance of reci-
procity in the field. Leuven et al. (2005) provide survey evidence that workers with higher
inclination to reciprocity have higher training rates compared to employees with low sen-
sitivity for reciprocity. Similarly, Dohmen et al. (2009) relate individual measures for
reciprocity to employee-specific labour market outcomes. They find that positive reci-
procity tends to increase wages and is associated with working harder. Bellemare and
Shearer (2009) report strong and persistent effects of gift-exchange for a tree-planting
firm in British Columbia.12
Finally, this paper is related to research on screening methods of employers. Autor and
Scarborough (2008) report that screening is widely prevalent among firms. This also is in
line with the WERS data used in this study, where one third of all firms use personality
tests and even two thirds of surveyed establishments require competency tests upon hiring.
In a laboratory experiment, Englmaier et al. (2011) show that employers pay substantial
wage premia for information about a worker’s cognitive ability and her trustworthiness,
10Evidence on a relationship between effort and wage can be found in Fehr et al. (1993), Charness
(2004), Cohn et al. (2012), and Kube et al. (2012).
11Another formal foundation of reciprocity can be found in Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
12Kube et al. (2013) find that employees react with negative reciprocal behaviour on wage cuts.
Contrary to these studies with positive effects of reciprocity on labour market outcomes, Gneezy and List
(2006) do not find strong and long lasting effects of gift-exchange in the field.
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implying willingness to pay for screening devices. Finally, Wilk and Cappelli (2003) report
that employers differ to a substantial extent in the level they make use of screening devices.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 3.2 I develop three hypothe-
ses on labour productivity and workplace organisation. Information about the WERS
2004, the matching procedure and the estimation of income and discretion are provided
in Section 3.3, along with an extensive description of the final dataset. Section 3.4 empir-
ically tests the hypotheses with various econometric specifications. A variety of different
specifications to evaluate the robustness of the results is offered in Section 3.5. Section
3.6 discusses the results.
3.2 Hypotheses
In this section I develop testable hypotheses on the relationship between HRM policies
and labour productivity. First I generate job-clusters which are derived from combina-
tions of different HRM practises and correspond to at least three major HRM policies:
paying efficiency wages, screening for “work ethic” and making use of reciprocity. This
classification will later on be refined to provide conditions under which reciprocity appears
to be a plausible explanation.
As reviewed in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003), empirical evidence suggests that decentral-
isation of information flows and implementation of high-performance work systems are
associated with firms being more productive. Theoretically, however, the relationship
is ex-ante ambiguous as gains from decentralisation may not necessarily outweigh the
increase in shirking opportunities for employees which may potentially result in overall
lower effort provision. Additional empirical challenges due to the cross-sectional nature of
the data arise because firms with high-performance work systems may differ in several ob-
servable and unobservable dimensions from firms with rather traditional human resource
policies. In this paper I hence regard the relationship between firm performance and the
implementation of high-performance work systems as an inherently empirical question
which leads me to formulate the first hypothesis rather cautiously.
Hypothesis 3.1 (Discretion and Firm Performance). High-performance work systems
and firm performance should be positively correlated if productivity gains outweigh potential
reductions in effort provision or if firms with high-performance work systems differ in other
dimensions which are positively correlated with performance.
Even if firms with high-performance work systems may report systematically different firm
performances, the focus of this paper is to identify HRM-clusters, which are correlated
64
Good Jobs, Screening, and Labour Productivity
with high productivity. Inspired by Bartling et al. (2012a), I focus (next to the degree
of employee discretion) on firms’ generosity in wage payments and firms’ use of screening
methods in their hiring practises. For the latter, I distinguish between personality tests
which may be correlated with agents’ preferences and competency tests which are not.
If neither screening for personality nor the generosity of employees’ income is correlated
with labour productivity, then the data should not show any pattern in firm productivity
between firms with high income provision and/or personality tests and firms without these
practises. Such a pattern should be observed, when, firstly, firms are able to motivate em-
ployees independently from income levels. For instance, peer effects or effort norms could
generate high effort exertion despite shirking opportunities. If secondly personality tests
measure personal traits which are orthogonal to effort provision, then a firm’s decision to
screen job candidates should not systematically be related to performance.
Following the argument of efficiency wages, it could be sufficient to motivate workers
by paying incomes which are substantially higher than obtained in comparable labour
relations. This option is disregarded in static principal-agent models, as in these models
interactions are one-shot. Hence this implies an abstraction from the threat of dismissing
agents if their effort provision is too low. However, efficiancy wages are independent from
screening devices as effort provision is not a result of agent’s other-regarding preferences
but is derived from inter-temporal utility maximisation.
Huang and Cappelli (2010) suggest “work ethic” to be the decisive human resource param-
eter to attain high firm performance. Employees with high “work ethic” unconditionally
provide high effort, which makes it particularly cheap for employers to mitigate the trade-
off between discretion and shirking: The employer has to pick job candidates with high
“work ethic” but can provide wages that meet the agent’s outside option.13 It follows that
firms that screen for personality (“work ethic”) and pay low income should perform weakly
better than firms paying high income, as wages are, at least in this model, unrelated to
effort provision.
Finally, if employees can be motivated via gift-exchange (reciprocity), two conditions
have to be met. First, an employee has to have reciprocal traits. By applying personality
tests, firms either screen for reciprocity directly or screen for personal traits, which are
correlated with reciprocity. The average worker hence should in these firms be more
inclined to reciprocity than in firms without screening for personality. But as reciprocity
is not an unconditional concept, reciprocal employees only provide high effort if the firm
13In fact, Huang and Cappelli (2010) find that firms screening for “work ethic” also pay higher wages.
The authors explain this finding with competition among firms for these unconditionally motivated work-
ers which finally results in rent-sharing of the generated surplus. Higher wages are hence interpreted as
a consequence of high effort and not as a prerequisite for that.
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previously provided a gift to them. This is achieved most easily by paying higher than
outside option income. Hence, if reciprocity between employers and employees is the
underlying mechanism, the data should show particularly high performance for firms
which provide high wages and screen for personality.
These considerations result in the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.2 (Job-Clusters and Firm Performance). Positive associations between
high-performance work systems and firm performance should be (weakly) stronger for job-
clusters in which the firm
a) neither screens nor pays high income if employees can sufficiently be motivated oth-
erwise,
b) pays high income if efficiency wages are sufficient to induce high effort from em-
ployees (regardless of applying screening devices),
c) screens for “work ethic” and pays low wages, if the firm can pick employees who
unconditionally work hard, and
d) screens job candidates for reciprocity and pays high wages, if reciprocity is the un-
derlying behavioural mechanism which induces employees to work hard.
Ex-ante a potential association between “good jobs”, personality tests and high firm out-
comes, however, is just as plausible as the explanation that screening itself, not narrowly
screening for personality is sufficient to predict that pattern. As screening in general is
likely to be an indicator of careful human resource policies, firms using tests upon hiring
may be able to successfully provide leeway to employees and simultaneously discipline
them.
However, if not screening for personality is the decisive factor for the correlation between
“good jobs” and firm performance but the fact that firms use any of various possible
screening devices, then the same pattern of “good jobs”, screening and firm performance
should arise similarly for competency tests as well. Firms using any screening devices
should be aware of modern human resource practises but only personality tests are asso-
ciated with traits which predict reciprocity. This insight gives rise to the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.3 (Competency Tests and Firm Performance). If screening itself as op-
posed to narrowly screening for personality is sufficient to generate a positive association
between “good jobs” and firm performance, then firms using competency tests to screen
job candidates should likewise report exceptional high productivity.
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3.3 Data
The data comes from the fifth wave of the “Workplace Employment Relations Survey”
(WERS 2004) with fieldwork taken place in 2004. Funded by the British government this
study is part of a series with previous waves conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990, and 1998
and intents to “provide a nationally representative account of the state of employment
relations and working life inside British workplaces”.14 The data consists of four separate
datasets including a management survey, an employee survey as well as a questionnaire
for employee representatives and a financial performance questionnaire. The following
paper studies both the management and the employee survey.
In total, the management survey consists of 2,295 Britain-based establishments from al-
most all branches of the economy with a minimum of five employees per firm.15 Within
each firm, a maximum of 25 employees were randomly sampled and requested to partici-
pate in the employee survey.16 Overall, in three fourths of the establishments at least one
employee returned a questionnaire – hence for 562 firms only information from the man-
agement questionnaire is available. Provided a minimum of one employee questionnaire
returned, the overall response rate is slightly above 60 percent.
This paper relates firm outcomes to the following three parameters of personnel policy:
The generosity of wages, the amount of discretion employees are granted, and whether
the firm screens for the personality of job candidates. Whereas I retrieve information
on the first two policies from the employee survey, data on personality tests and the
outcome variable, labour productivity, are derived from responses by managers from the
management survey. In the remainder of this section I first outline the matching procedure
followed by an extensive description of the matched dataset with a special focus on the
level of discretion employees enjoy as well as their income. Next, I provide information
on the procedure of how wages and discretion were estimated on an individual level. I
proceed by presenting details on the aggregation procedure and finally an overview of all
variables of interest will be provided.
Matching A unique firm identifier allows me to match the management dataset and the
employee survey, leading to a dataset which consists of 1,733 firms with 22,451 workers
surveyed. The median number of workers surveyed per firm is 13 and the 25th (75th)
percentile gives 8 (18) returned questionnaires per firm. Very low response rates and
14Source: http://www.wers2004.info/wers2004/wers2004.php. January 28, 2013.
15Sectors not covered by WERS 2004: Agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying,
private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial bodies.
16Questionnaires were distributed to all employees if the respective establishment employed less than
25 workers.
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rates close to 25 are rather rare, as can be seen in Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2. The
newly generated dataset is weighted with the standard weight which is provided in the
employee dataset, is stratified according to the suggested procedure, and standard errors
are clustered on firm level.17
Description of Employee-Level Variables In the employee questionnaire workers
are asked to state their weekly income before taxes and other deductions by marking one
out of 14 income intervals, ranging from 50 pounds a week and below to 871 pounds per
week and above. The brackets are not equally spaced and the spacing increases with
income.18 Overall 414 employees refused to indicate their income and 19 multi-coded, so
that 22,018 answers on income remain. A histogram of the income distribution is depicted
in the left panel of Figure 3.1. The median income in the sample is 311 - 360 pounds a
week (16,121 - 18,720 pounds per year). Notice however that employment relations are
not necessarily full-time; about one quarter of surveyed employees work less than 30 hours
a week.
To proxy for discretion I use two different measures. Employees are asked to rate whether
they feel to have “a lot”, “some”, “a little” or no (“none”) influence over what tasks
they do in their job and how they do their work.19 A histogram of both distributions is
provided in the right panel of Figure 3.1. A very large fraction of surveyed employees
feels to have at least some leeway over how they perform their work and which actions
they can choose. However, even though only approximately 15 (25) percent state to have
little or no control over the tasks they do (how they do work) a substantial difference in
discretion may exist between statements of having “a lot” or only “some” leeway.
Both income and the individual level of discretion are likely to depend on several char-
acteristics of the employee, such that absolute levels are likely to only be a poor signal
about a firm’s generosity – the income of an unskilled routine worker with a generous
wage will in most cases still be less than that of a badly paid manager. In order to assess
generosity in income and discretion, I use deviations of actual income and discretion from
estimated values. However, before presenting results from the regressions I first introduce
the set of control variables which are summarised in Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.
To generate indicators of generous wages and high levels of discretion, I control for an
17For reference, see http://www.wers2004.info/FAQ.php#5, section 5.6 “How do I apply weights and
correctly estimate variances in Stata?”, January 28, 2013.
18The precise categories of weekly income measured in pounds are as follows: 50 and below, 51 - 80,
81 - 110, 111 - 140, 141 - 180, 181 - 220, 221 - 260, 261 - 310, 311 - 360, 361 - 430, 431 - 540, 541 - 680,
681 - 870 and 871 and above.
19The exact wording is “In general, how much influence do you have over the following?”, followed by
“What tasks you do in your job” (“What Tasks”) or “How you do your work” (“How to Work”).
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Figure 3.1: Histograms of Income Distribution and Distribution over Perceived Discretion
This figure provides historgrams for the income distribution (measured in pounds per week) (left) and
the distribution of two measures for perceived discretion (right) – the dark grey bars of panel (b) refer
to preceived discretion in how employees can do their work, the light-coloured bars provide evidence
on the autonomy which tasks can be done by employees. All employees who refused to answer or who
multi-coded are excluded.
(a) Weekly Income (b) Discretion
employee’s age and tenure, gender, academic and vocational qualifications, whether the
employee is a member of a union, as well as the occupational group. Finally, I also control
for the number of hours worked per week.
The median age of surveyed employees is between 40 and 49 years, with only 3.3 percent
of very young (under 20) and 4.7 percent of old employees (60 and older). Employees are
on average between 2 and 5 years in the respective workplace. The data furthermore dis-
tinguishes between nine occupational groups. Each employee may belong to: (1) manager
and senior officials, (2) professional occupations, (3) associate and technical occupations,
(4) administrative and secretarial occupations, (5) skilled trades occupations, (6) caring,
leisure and other personal service occupations, (7) sales and customer service occupations,
(8) process, plant and machine operatives and drivers, or (9) routine unskilled occupa-
tions. As can be seen from Table C.1, Appendix C.1.1, employees are relatively equally
sampled from all occupational groups, with slightly less observations for groups (5) - (8).
More than a third of the surveyed labour force is unionised and about 17 percent have
been in the past. Almost half of the employees (46 percent) obtained a GCSE grade D-G
(or comparable)20, whereas only 4 percent of surveyed employees finished education with
a university degree. 80 percent of employees obtained at least a level 1 NVQ (National
Vocational Qualification) but less than 0.5 percent reach the top level 5, which involves
substantial autonomy and includes bearing high amounts of responsibility. Gender is split
almost equally with a slight concentration of males and the average working time is 36
hours per week.
20The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) is a necessary prerequisite for attending
high school in the UK education system.
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Estimation The estimation of income first has to account for censoring at the bottom
and at the top and second has to take bracketing of the answers on income levels into
account. For this reason I estimate a variant of a Tobit model which accounts for the sur-
vey structure of the data and allows for differently spaced intervals.21 For the underlying
(unrestricted) model of income I assume the following Mincer-type model:
wi = S′iβS + F′iβF + X′iβX + εi. (3.1)
where wi is the wage employee i receives, Si is a vector which contains the set of dummy
variables from both academic qualification and vocational training. The vector Fi includes
variables that describe the employee’s experience, namely the tenure and the age. Xi
finally summarises all remaining control variables I introduced beforehand, and εi is the
error term. Tobit models imply two critical assumptions: First, it is assumed that the
error is normally distributed and second a homoskedastic error structure is required, i.e.
εi ∼ N(0, σ2). The first issue is addressed in the robustness section by using log-income
instead of income.22 I deal with the second issue by re-estimating the wage equation with
plain OLS, which does not change results.23
Results of the wage regression are presented in Table C.2, column (1) in Appendix C.1.
Here I provide regression results for a specification that slightly deviates from the classical
Mincer wage regression, by omitting the quadratic term on experience. However, both
proxies for experience, age of the employee and tenure, are included as dummies for each
possible category. As can be seen immediately, an inversely u-shaped relationship between
age and income emerges: Ceteris paribus, employees aged between 40 and 49 have the
highest income, significantly higher than the base category of under 16 - 17 year olds.
With age above 49, the coefficients decrease but income stays significantly above those
of job entrants. A similar picture emerges for tenure: Employees with long histories in
a particular establishment have substantially higher income than employees with short
tenure.
“Occupational group” has the expected influence on income: the more abstract and skill-
intensive the occupation, the higher the income. The base category is managers and senior
officials. Women on average earn less.
The right panel of Table C.2 provides estimates on expected discretion, which I obtain
estimating the same equation 3.1 substituting income with discretion but using simple
regression techniques. Column (2) gives results for the question of perceived discretion
21For further references see commands “intreg” and “svy” in StataCorp. (2011).
22Transforming income into log-income and re-estimation of the model does not change results.
23Regression results are available from the author upon request.
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concerning what tasks employees are allowed to perform and column (3) refers to how
work is done. The pattern here is again similar to what is expected: Older workers with
more tenure in more abstract jobs on average report to have more leeway on what tasks
to perform and also how to do them.
Aggregation and Generation of Variables Results from estimating equation 3.1
provides expected income for each employee, conditional on observables. In order to
obtain an estimate of whether the employer is generous towards the respective employee
with regard to income, I calculate deviations of estimated income from actual income for
each employee. As however actual income is only reported within intervals, I use mean
income within each interval as actual income. If an employee reports to have income in
the highest or lowest category (i.e. her income is censored) I cannot calculate deviations
from estimated income, because there is no sensible average for these two categories. If
I, for example, set actual income of the top (open) category to its lower boundary, i.e. to
871 pounds per week, then every employee in this category with estimated income higher
than 871 pounds would automatically be classified as not being paid generously, because
estimated income then always exceeds actual income. In the same manner, all employees
falling in the lowest category (and having estimates lower than 50 pounds) would be
treated as earning higher than expected income when using the upper end of the category
(i.e. 50 pounds per week). For this reason I set observations on income to missing if an
employee states to be paid in the highest income category and the estimated income is
above 871 pounds, which indicates the top (open) category; I proceed analogously with
the lowest income category. For discretion I also compare actual and estimated values,
but do not have to take censoring into account.
As survey responses for income and discretion are measured in brackets, this procedure is
not innocuous. It implies that employees whose continuous estimate for income exactly
meets the indicated interval, but exceeds the mean income of the respective interval are
classified to receive higher than expected income. But as observed data do not contain
any information about within category distribution, these deviations within the interval
only provide tendencies towards more or less generosity in salery.
For this reason I alternatively generate a more conservative measure of generosity: Em-
ployee contracts are classified to be as expected whenever the estimated value lies in the
reported interval. This implies that only large deviations of estimated and actual income
lead to contracts being classified as generous. I provide further details on this procedure
in Section 3.5, where I show that results of this paper do not hinge on any of the suggested
specifications.
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After obtaining measures for firm generosity in income and discretion for each employee,
I need to aggregate this information on firm level. This is done by generating the average
deviation of employees’ income and discretion within each firm, such that each firm obtains
a continuous score of generosity separately for income and discretion.
Subsequently I collapse the dataset by deleting all duplicate observations with regard to
firms, implying that only firm level information can furthermore be used. All individual
employee level information has to be aggregated on firm level at this stage. In order to
additionally obtain a more compact measure than continuous firm generosity, I generate
a binary variable indicating whether a firm pays higher than expected income/discretion
to its employees or not. For that, I calculate the mean deviation across all firms and then
relate the score of the respective firm to the average score across all firms.
Description of Firm-Level Variables Summary statistics of firm-level variables, in-
cluding deviations in estimated averages of employees’ income and discretion within a
firm are provided in Table 3.1.
The first panel summarises the distribution of labour productivity, according to self-
reported assessments of managers rating their own workplace on a five-point ordinal scale
compared to competitors in the same industry.24 As can immediately be seen, most
managers regard the labour productivity of their establishment to be average or even
better compared to their industry, whereas only 6.5 percent claim to perform worse. In
accordance with recent literature however, this overrating bias from self-reporting seems
to merely affect the absolute level but keeps the relative ordering among firms unaffected,
as shown in Wall et al. (2004).25 As the study at hand compares relative productivity
and is agnostic about absolute levels, using self-reported productivity measures seems to
be valid.
Human resource policy variables are summarised in the second panel of Table 3.1. The
continuous measure of income generosity is centred around zero with 50 percent of the
values lying between -49.5 pounds per week (i.e. less than expected) and 39.1. Reducing
information to generate a binary variable of deviations in income gives a dummy variable
with almost equal split.
24The exact question is: “Compared to other establishments in the same industry how would you
assess your workplace’s labour productivity?” Managers could answer the following: “A lot better than
average”, “better than average”, “about average for the industry”, “below the average”, “a lot below the
average” or “no comparison possible”. For intuitive reasons, I re-labelled the variable, such that higher
values correspond to higher productivity.
25Guthrie (2001) and Baer and Frese (2003) compare subjective and objective performance measures
and find product-moment correlations between 0.41 and 0.81. For further evidence on self-report bias see
Machin and Stewart (1996).
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Firm-Level Variables
Pctl.
Obs. Avg. SD 25 50 75 Min. Max.
Outcome Variable
Labour Productivity
A lot better 1977 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 0 1
Better 1977 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 0 1
Average 1977 0.45 0.50 0 0 1 0 1
Worse 1977 0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 1
A lot Worse 1977 0.004 0.06 0 0 0 0 1
Modern Human Resource Policy
Continuous
Income 1728 −0.89 80.8 −49.5 −8.9 39.1 −329.8 384.7
Income: Binary 1728 0.44 0.49 0 0 1 0 1
Discretion
What Task 1732 0.01 0.41 −0.21 0.02 0.26 −2.50 1.34
What Task: Binary 1732 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 0 1
How Work 1732 0.01 0.35 −0.18 0.04 0.22 −2.56 1.01
How Work: Binary 1732 0.54 0.50 0 1 1 0 1
Pers. Test 2292 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 0 1
Comp. Test 2291 0.61 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Control Variables
Firm Size 2285 411 947.7 21 67 300 5 10006
Union 2295 0.58 0.49 0 1 1 0 1
Public Sec. 2295 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 0 1
Foreign 2295 0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1
Notes: This table provides information on the number of observations, mean and standard deviation,
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles as well as minimum and maximum values of firm performance, human
resource practises and control variables. Statistics for each variable are calculated omitting answers
“refusal”, “don’t know” and “not applicable”, indicating unclear answers.
Both variables for discretion, i.e. the level of leeway what tasks employees do and how
they do their work are centred around zero. As the distributions of both measures for
discretion are highly symmetric, the binary representations of discretion have a mean
close to 0.5.
About one third of the firms screen job candidates for personality, or, may (indirectly)
search for reciprocal types. In contrast, over 60 percent of firms make use of competency
tests aiming to elicit workers’ (cognitive) ability. The correlation between both screening
devices is modest: ρ = 0.19. About one third of the firms do not screen at all and one
third only uses competency tests. Slightly below 7 percent of the firms only screen for
personality and 27 percent rely on both tests. Whereas personality tests are most likely
for applicants in high-skilled and abstract jobs (and sales occupations), competency tests
are demanded throughout all occupational groups (see Part II of this dissertation).
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The third panel refers to control variables, which aim to control for industry specific
differences. More specificly, I control for firm size and firm size squared, unionisation,
whether the establishment belongs to the public sector and whether it is foreignly con-
trolled. Furthermore I include dummies for the industry and regional dummies (not part
of Table 3.1).26
3.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section I test for the hypotheses developed in Section 3.2 with a special focus
on Hypothesis 3.2, by offering three methodological approaches: First I generate HRM-
clusters and relate them to firm outcomes. Second, the relationship between outcomes and
HRM practises is explored in a fully-fledged regression model. Finally, this paper makes
use of continuous deviations of estimated and actual values in income and discretion.
3.4.1 Discretion and Labour Productivity
Figure 3.2 provides an illustrative description of the subsequent empirical elaborations.
Raw correlations provide tentative evidence for a positive association between provid-
ing high discretion to employees and labour productivity confirming previous results on
positive effects of high-performance work systems on firm performance. The dashed line
in Panel (a) (discretion measured via the question on leeway of “What Tasks” to per-
form) refers to the full dataset, i.e. including all firms and shows a slightly increasing
but concave pattern. Even though I do not count these graphs as hard evidence, the
correlations at least do not support a hypothesis of adverse effects of discretion on labour
performance. The second measure for discretion (the level of autonomy of how to per-
form tasks) shows a similar pattern. A potential interpretation to these findings is that
firms do not seem to excessively suffer under shirking, even in cases where employees are
granted high discretion and discretion does not come along with specific human resource
practises.
Restricting the sample to firms which pay higher than expected income and screen for
personality (solid line) draws a different picture. If discretion is at most as high as
expected, then firms paying high salery and screen job candidates report similar labour
26 Industry is classified according to the UK National Statistics and distinguishes between (1) manufac-
turing, (2) electricity, gas, and water (3) construction, (4) wholesale and retail, (5) hotel and restaurants,
(6) transport and communication, (7) financial services, (8) other business services (9) public admin-
istration, (10) education, (11) health, and (12) other community services. Regional dummies are the
following: (1) North East, (2) North West, (3) Yorkshire & The Humber, (4) East Midlands, (5) West
Midlands (6) East of London, (7) London, (8) South East, (9) South West, (10) Scotland and (11) Wales.
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between Discretion and Firm Performance
These figures illustrate the quadratic relationship between deviations of actual to estimated levels of
discretion and labour productivity. The dashed line is based on the entire sample of firms; the solid line
describes the relationship for the subset of firms which pay higher than expected income and screen for
personality. The dotted line uses the full sample of firms excluding firms which pay high wages and use
personality tests (i.e. the subset of firms used for the solid line). For graphical reasons, I use Stata’s
jitter option for the scatter plot, which adds random noise to observations (the slope of the functions are
unaffected).
(a) Discretion: “What Tasks” (b) Discretion: “How to Work”
productivity as the average firm (panel (a)). But whereas higher discretion only has
minor effects on productivity for the average firm, establishments with high saleries and
screening devices report higher labour productivity. A different pattern arises when using
autonomy on how to perform tasks as measure for discretion, which is depicted in panel
(b). The relationship of productivity and discretion of firms which pay high income and
screen job candidates is similarly concave but has a steeper slope than the average firm.
This implies that if employees in high-income and screening establishments do not receive
high levels of discretion, labour productivity sharply decreases. These establishments
are successful in terms of labour productivity only if they grant high discretion to their
employees.
The dotted line corresponds to the full sample excluding firms which pay high income and
screen for personality. I provide these estimates to show that the slight positive slope of
the full sample (dashed line) is not driven by the subset of firms, which pay high income
and screen for personality (solid line).
Result 3.1 (Discretion and Firm Performance). Firms have slightly higher labour pro-
ductivity if their employees enjoy high levels of discretion.
3.4.2 Interacting Income, Discretion, and Personality Tests
HRM-Clusters – Graphical Approach In this section I use the binary representa-
tion for income and discretion, as explained in Section 3.3, where each establishment is
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Figure 3.3: Firm Performance and Human Resource Cluster
Panel (a) and (b) provide deviations and 90 percent confidence bands of mean firm performance for
firms classified in 8 different HRM-clusters. Read classification as follow: [personality tests, high income,
high discretion] i.e. the first position displays whether firms in this cluster use personality tests upon
hiring (1) or not (0). The second position refers to whether firms in this cluster pay higher than average
expected income (1) or not (0) and the last entry is related to firms with higher (1) or lower (0) than
mean expected discretion.
(a) Discretion: “What Tasks” (b) Discretion: “How to Work”
classified to either pay high or low income and to grant much or little discretion, respec-
tively. I combine this information with firms’ screening methods for personality (likewise
binary) to assign every single firm to one of eight HRM-clusters. These clusters are all
potential combinations of three binary variables implying 2×2×2 combinations, ranging
from firms with (on average) lower than expected wages, lower than expected discretion,
and no screening for personality to firms with high wages, high levels of discretion, and
personality tests for job candidates.
Figure 3.3 provides deviations from mean firm performance for each HRM-cluster to the
overall performance average of all firms in the dataset.27 Cluster on the x-axis refer to
the following notation: [personality tests, high income, high discretion], where “1” in
the respective position implies that firms requires personality tests upon hiring, pay high
income or allow for discretion. To the extremes, the illustration shows firms which do not
screen for personality, pay low income and do not grant high discretion on the very left
of each panel ([0,0,0]) and firms with personality tests, high income and discretion to the
right end ([1,1,1]).
As can immediately be seen in both panels, firms in cluster [1,1,1], i.e. establishments
providing “good jobs” and screen for personality, report the highest labour productivity
which lies significantly above average productivity. In accordance to Result 3.1, clusters
of both panels are split into two groups: All clusters, in which firms provide higher than
estimated discretion perform above average (despite not necessarily significantly higher),
27Relative frequencies of each of the eight HRM-clusters are provided in Figure C.2 in the Appendix,
Section C.2.
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whereas firms in 3 out of 4 clusters in both panels with little discretion report to have
poorer than average labour productivity. Firms using personality tests and pay high
income but do not allow their employees high levels of discretion (cluster [1,1,0]) report
exceptionally low labour productivity in panel (b).
HRM-Cluster – Regression Approach Equation 3.2 provides more structure than
simple mean comparisons. I estimate for each firm j the influence of belonging to a certain
HRM-cluster, Gj, on ordered outcome variable yj. The vector Gj includes seven dummy
variables for all but one potential HRM-cluster. Xj contains control variables, including
size of the establishment (number of employees), size squared and dummies for whether
the firm is unionised, is owned by a foreign company and belongs to the public sector.
Finally, the vector includes dummies for industry and region as described in footnote 26.
More precisely, I estimate the following reduced form model:
yj = G′jβG + X′jβX + εj. (3.2)
Simple regression analysis of equation 3.2 confirms results from previous mean compar-
isons.28 Using firms without personality tests, low income and limited discretion, i.e.
cluster [0,0,0] as base category (columns (1) and (3)), the job-cluster which refers to
“good jobs” and screening ([1,1,1]) predicts significantly higher labour productivity for
both measures of discretion. In accordance to panel (b) in Figure 3.3, all three remaining
job-clusters with high discretion concerning employees’ autonomy on how to carry out
their work ([0,0,1], [1,0,1] and [0,1,1]) yield significantly higher labour productivity as
compared to cluster [0,0,0] (column (3)).
Columns (2) and (4) provide results for the same regression but relative to cluster [1,1,1]
as baseline category. It is important to notice that all job-clusters yield significantly worse
labour productivity, when discretion refers to which tasks employees are allowed to do
(column (2)). This implies that also within the subset of rather successful firms using high
discretion (Result 3.1), paying high wages and simultaneously screening for personality is
associated with significantly higher labour productivity.
28Throughout this paper I use simple regression techniques, because an ordered probit approach yields
qualitatively the same results. As simple regression analysis facilitates the interpretation, I decided to
report these results. Ordered probit results are available from the author on request.
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Table 3.2: Regression of Labour Productivity on HRM-Cluster
What Tasks How Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HRM Cluster
[0,0,0] −0.50∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16)
[1,0,0] 0.100 −0.40∗∗ 0.13 −0.36∗
(0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.20)
[0,1,0] 0.21∗∗ −0.29∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ −0.20
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.17)
[0,0,1] 0.13 −0.37∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ −0.24
(0.10) (0.14) (0.093) (0.16)
[1,1,0] −0.065 −0.57∗∗ 0.019 −0.48∗
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.28)
[1,0,1] 0.21 −0.29∗ 0.32∗∗ −0.17
(0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.19)
[0,1,1] 0.13 −0.37∗∗∗ 0.16∗ −0.33∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.098) (0.16)
[1,1,1] 0.50∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16)
Union −0.064 −0.064 −0.042 −0.042
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Pub. Sector −0.068 −0.068 −0.060 −0.060
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign 0.55∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 3.61∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.24)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1812 1812 1812 1812
R2 0.093 0.093 0.103 0.103
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
HRM cluster and controls. The first panel (column (1) and (2)) refers to answers on the question “What
Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (3) and (4) use “How to Work”. Columns (1) and (3) use cluster
[0,0,0] as base category; column (2) and (4) omit cluster [1,1,1].
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
This result similarly applies to the second measure of discretion. Although a few job-
clusters are not significantly distinguishable from job-clusters of “good jobs” and person-
ality tests, point estimates are exclusively negative.
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Fully-Fledged Interaction Model In the following, I depart from the rather inflexible
analysis of eight pre-specified job-clusters and allow for a fully-fledged interaction model of
personality tests, income and discretion. To facilitate interpretation the following analysis
is based on binary HRM measures. Subsequently I allow HRM practises to be measured
continuously.
The following model measures the relationship of high income (Ij = 1), high discretion
(Dj = 1), and compulsory personality tests upon hiring (Pj = 1) on firm performance yj
for each firm j. Apart from the main effects of HRM practises on performance, interaction
terms are of main interest as these effects provide insight into complementarities of HRM
practises: Ij ×Dj is defined as the interaction between income and discretion and yields
value 1 if firm j both provides high income and leaves discretion to their employees
(provide “good jobs”). Ij × Pj, the interaction between high income and compulsory
personality tests and Dj × Pj, which interacts high discretion with personality tests are
defined accordingly. The three-way interaction Ij×Dj×Pj is equal to 1 for all firms which
were previously classified to provide “good jobs” and additionally demand personality
tests when recruiting new employees. Finally, the vector Xj contains control variables as
defined previously in this section.
yj = β + βIIj + βDDj + βPPj + βID(Ij ×Dj) + βIP (Ij × Pj) + βDP (Dj × Pj)
+ βIDP (Ij ×Dj × Pj) + X′jβX + εj (3.3)
Table 3.3 provides estimation results of model 3.3 using simple regression analysis.29 As all
HRM practises are defined on a binary support, the constant can intuitively be interpreted
as the labour productivity of the average firm (average with respect to controls) which
neither pays high income nor provides discretion nor screens for personality. The main
effect of income is the difference in reported labour productivity of firms which do not
pay high income compared to establishments which do pay high income (everything else
equal). If the ceteris paribus condition implies that firms neither grant high levels of
discretion nor screen for personality then the coefficient on income displays the full effect
of high income on productivity. The positive and significant coefficient on income for
all specifications hence provides evidence that firms paying high income ceteris paribus
report higher levels of labour productivity as compared to firms which pay low income.
Similarly a positive and significant coefficient on discretion in 3 out of 4 specifications
reflects a positive correlation between discretion and labour productivity. Only the main
effect of personality tests is not significantly different from zero.30
29Here, again, applying ordered probit estimation qualitatively does not change the results.
30In Part II of this dissertation, Englmaier, Kolaska, and Leider in fact find a positive relationship
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Table 3.3: Regressions of Labour Productivity on HRM Complementarities
What Tasks How Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Income (I) 0.24∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
High Discretion (D) 0.18∗ 0.13 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.099) (0.093)
Pers. Test (P) 0.12 0.100 0.15 0.13
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
I × D −0.24 −0.22 −0.37∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
I × P −0.37 −0.37 −0.40 −0.41
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
D × P −0.041 −0.024 −0.089 −0.066
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
I × D × P 0.71∗∗ 0.67∗ 0.72∗ 0.67∗
(0.36) (0.35) (0.38) (0.36)
Union −0.064 −0.042
(0.084) (0.084)
Pub. Sector −0.068 −0.060
(0.11) (0.11)
Foreign 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.13)
Constant 3.39∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.20) (0.069) (0.20)
Firm Controls No Y es No Y es
Subpop. Observations 1815 1812 1815 1812
R2 0.023 0.093 0.037 0.103
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
binary variables of income, discretion, personality tests and its interactions. The first panel (column (1)
and (2)) refers to answers on the question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (3) and (4) use
“How to Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The two-way interactions Ij × Dj is significantly negative for discretion measured in
employees’ leeway how to work. This means that firms paying high income and leave their
workers discretion but do not screen for personality report significantly lower productivity
of labour than firms with limited discretion all other parameters equal. Applying a causal
interpretation, Ij × Dj is the additional effect from complementarities between income
and discretion when switching from low to high wages in firms which already provide
between firm performance and personality tests. As model specifications are very different, results are
not directly comparable.
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high levels of discretion. As the interaction is significantly negative, this policy, which
corresponds to paying efficiency wages, turns out to be not successful. The interaction
of high income and personality tests (paying low income) Dj × Pj is not significantly
distinguishable from zero, discarding optimality of the strategy to rely solely on “work
ethic” but refrain from paying high wages. Finally the third interaction, Ij × Pj does
similarly not depict a significant pattern for any measure of discretion.
The main interest however, is placed on the three-way interaction term between income,
discretion and personality tests, Ij × Dj × Pj. This interaction is significant in all four
specifications. Intuitively (and causally interpreted) this interaction is the additional
effect of introducing personality tests given that the respective firm already pays high
income and leaves their employees high discretion on productivity. The overall effect of
personality tests (given the firm offers “good jobs”) is the sum of all coefficients, which
contain personality tests, i.e. βP +βIP +βDP +βIDP . A Wald test on the null hypothesis
that the sum of all four coefficients containing personality tests is zero can be rejected in
three out of four specifications.31
Analysis with Continuous Deviations A potential immediate critique of the previ-
ous analysis is that it entirely relies on the binary classification of firms’ HRM practises,
which implies that a lot of information is (unnecessarily) lost. In the following, I exploit
continuous deviations of actual income and discretion to estimated outcomes. However,
this procedure also comes at a cost. As answers on the survey question concerning dis-
cretion are ordinal, deviations are not directly interpretable, suggesting a very cautious
interpretation of the subsequent results.
In order to address complementarities of different HRM practises, it is essential to in-
clude interactions, as done before. However as multiple interaction effects of continuous
variables are very problematic to interpret, I keep the analysis tractable by dividing the
dataset into firms using personality tests upon hiring (Pj = 1) and those who do not
(Pj = 0). For each dataset k ∈ {0, 1}, I then separately estimate the effect of income
ij, discretion dj and the multiplication term (ij × dj) of income and discretion on firm
performance yj.
31The models which include firm controls (columns (2) and (4)) strongly reject the null at a 1%-
significance level and at a 5%-significance level, respectively. Specification (1) rejects the null at a
10%-level and model (3) fails to reject it (Prob > F = 0.18).
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Table 3.4: Regression of Labour Productivity on HRM Complementarities II
What Tasks How Work
w/o PT w/ PT w/o PT w/ PT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income −0.000086 0.00066 −0.00022 0.00070
(0.00059) (0.00075) (0.00057) (0.00074)
Discretion 0.026 0.30∗ 0.064 0.48∗∗
(0.094) (0.17) (0.089) (0.24)
Income × Discretion −0.00094 0.0019 −0.0011 0.0044∗∗
(0.00065) (0.0015) (0.00073) (0.0019)
Union −0.042 −0.13 −0.024 −0.13
(0.095) (0.18) (0.097) (0.17)
Pub. Sector −0.095 0.052 −0.093 0.015
(0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20)
Foreign 0.48∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(0.14) (0.24) (0.14) (0.24)
Constant 3.75∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.28)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 998 496 998 496
R2 0.088 0.249 0.092 0.266
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
income, discretion and the interaction between income and discretion. The first panel (column (1) and
(2)) uses answers on the question “What Tasks” as a proxy for discretion, columns (3) and (4) use “How
to Work”. Columns (1) and (3) correspond to the restricted set of firms which do not use personality
tests, columns (2) and (4) refer to establishments which make use of personality tests for job candidates.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
I estimate the following reduced-form model:
yj|Pj=k = βiij + βddj + βid(ij × dj) + X′jβX + εj ∀ k ∈ {0, 1}. (3.4)
Equation 3.4 is estimated with simple regression techniques.32 As both income and dis-
cretion are centred around zero, the intercept of each regression depicts mean labour
productivity if actual and estimated values of income and discretion are exactly aligned
(meaning that firms exactly provide wages and discretion as expected), at the mean of
all control variables. βd can be interpreted as the average difference in reported labour
productivity of the mean firm (with regard to controls) if employees on average report one
step higher perceived discretion and income is exactly as expected (i.e. ij = 0, leading
32Here, again, applying ordered probit estimation does not alter the results.
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the interaction term to be zero). The same is true for ij > 0 and dj = 0; the main effect
of income can be seen as the impact of paying one pound more per week on average to
each employee on labour productivity, given that the firms allow discretion exactly as
expected. The interaction term is hence only different from zero, if both HRM measures
depart from expected values. A positive interaction can be interpreted as follows: The
more actual income exceeds estimated income, the stronger the association of discretion
on firm performance becomes. The interpretation vice versa is true as well, implying
that the more “excess” (i.e. above estimated) discretion firms allow their employees on
average, the more increasing income is associated with firm outcomes. As in a framework
with continuous wage and measures for discretion no firm exhibits income and discretion
exactly at the sample mean, the effect of income on firm output depends on the level of
discretion if the interaction effect is significantly different from zero.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.4 provide evidence on estimates for income, discretion and
the interaction of both for the subset of firms, which do not use personality tests when
screening job candidates. For this subset of firms, neither income nor discretion (or the
interaction) is associated with labour productivity. This is true for control variables as
well with the exception of firms which are foreign owned: These firms report significantly
higher labour productivity.
Restricting the dataset to firms which screen for personality reduces the number of ob-
servations, as can be seen in column (2) and column (4). Whereas the main coefficients
of income increase but are indistinguishable from zero even if firms screen for personality,
coefficients of discretion sharply increase 10-fold and 7.5-fold. Likewise point estimates
of the interaction term increase compared to firms without personality tests and result
in significant correlation of the interaction between discretion and income, and labour
productivity in column (4). Using leeway on what task to perform as measure for dis-
cretion and conditioning on firms with personality tests also increases point estimates of
the interaction term, as can be seen in column (2). Higher standard errors however, lead
to insignificant coefficients, which may be a result of limited sample size. It is important
to notice that also the goodness-of-fit is approximately three times as high when condi-
tioning the sample on firms with personality tests but otherwise estimating the identical
model. This provides evidence for high explanatory power of HRM practises for labour
productivity.
To show that the impact of discretion on labour productivity crucially depends on the
level of income if firms screen for personality, I finally provide estimates for the evolution
of discretion along different levels of income deviations. Estimates in Table 3.5 are simply
the linear combination of the main effect of discretion on labour productivity for three
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Table 3.5: Impact of Discretion on Labour Productivity
Coeff. Std. Err. t p>|t| 95% Conf. Int.
With Personality Test
What Tasks
Slope at Mean of Income 0.30 0.17 1.78 0.08 −0.03 0.64
Slope at Mean + 1 SD of Income 0.46 0.23 2.01 0.05 0.01 0.91
Slope at Mean − 1 SD of Income 0.15 0.18 0.80 0.42 −0.21 0.50
How Work
Slope at Mean of Income 0.48 0.24 1.98 0.05 0.005 0.95
Slope at Mean + 1 SD of Income 0.83 0.37 2.26 0.02 0.11 1.55
Slope at Mean − 1 SD of Income 0.12 0.17 0.74 0.46 −0.20 0.45
Without Personality Test
What Tasks
Slope at Mean of Income 0.03 0.09 0.28 0.78 −0.16 0.21
Slope at Mean + 1 SD of Income −0.05 0.12 −0.41 0.69 −0.29 0.19
Slope at Mean − 1 SD of Income 0.10 0.09 1.12 0.26 −0.08 0.28
How Work
Slope at Mean of Income 0.06 0.09 0.73 0.47 −0.11 0.24
Slope at Mean + 1 SD of Income −0.03 0.12 −0.21 0.83 −0.27 0.22
Slope at Mean − 1 SD of Income 0.15 0.09 1.81 0.07 −0.01 0.32
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients, standard errors and confidence intervals for the
effect of discretion on labour productivity for different levels of income. The first line of each panel is the
compound effect (main effect plus interaction) of discretion at mean income payment. The second line
describes the effect of discretion on productivity if income is one standard deviation above the mean.
The third line corresponds to estimates for income one standard deviation below the mean. The first
panel reports estimates for firms using personality tests, the second panel for firms without screening for
personality.
different levels of income: income evaluated at its mean (i.e. no deviation from estimated
income), actual income being one standard deviation above and one standard deviation
below estimation. The first panel provides estimates for the subset of firms, which screen
for personality and the second panel for firms not using compulsory personality tests.
The effect of discretion on labour productivity is largest when income is high and drops
considerably with low income for firms which screen job candidates for personality. This
is true for both measures of discretion. The coefficient for discretion, given that income is
one standard deviation below its mean, is not distinguishable from zero; in that case an
increase in discretion does not predict higher labour productivity. As before, the subset of
firms without personality tests do not show a clear pattern. I interpret this as personality
tests being crucial for “good jobs” to translate into high labour productivity.
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Result 3.2 (Job-Clusters and Firm Performance). Firms paying higher than expected
income to their employees while at the same time allowing their workforce substantial
discretion on how to perform tasks (HRM practises which are associated with “good jobs”)
report significantly higher labour productivity. However, this is the case only if these firms
screen job candidates for personality. Hence, this pattern is consistent with reciprocity as
underlying mechanism to achieve high firm performance, discarding explanation (a) no
additional human resource practise necessary, (b) efficiency wages only and (c) relying on
“work ethic” as sole explanations.
3.4.3 Competency Tests
Firms offering “good jobs” report to have significantly higher labour productivity if they
screen for personality when hiring employees. However, personality tests may only be a
proxy for advanced HRM practises which itself is likely to be positively correlated with
firm performance. Competency tests may similarly proxy for firms with advanced HRM
policies but ability tests unlike personality tests aim not to uncover personal traits of the
employee but try to reveal her ability. Though both tests are indicators of modern HRM
practises of a firm, only personality tests are consistent with reciprocity as an enhancing
mechanism for productivity. Hence, this section summarises the results using the same
analysis as in the previous section but defining competency tests instead of personality
tests as a screening device.
Table C.3 (Appendix, Section C.1.2) provides estimates from equation 3.2, where person-
ality tests Pj are replaced by competency tests Cj. Column (1) and (3) report significantly
higher labour productivity if firms provide “good jobs” and screen for ability compared
to firms in cluster [0,0,0]. Furthermore using firms with “good jobs” and ability tests as
base category I find significantly higher levels of labour productivity compared to estab-
lishments in other job-clusters. This effect is particularly strong for discretion measured
by the question on how autonomous employees are allowed to perform their tasks. Even
though results in these regressions are considerably weaker than results on personality
tests, using this piece of evidence does not speak against an association of labour produc-
tivity and “good jobs” combined with competency tests.
Results on estimating three-way interactions of model 3.3 are provided in Table C.4.
Discretion relates positively to labour productivity and the coefficient is substantial if
discretion is measured by employees’ leeway on how to work. More importantly however,
the interaction effect of high income, high discretion, and competency tests is indistin-
guishable from zero for all four specifications. Intuitively this means that firms providing
“good jobs” and screen for competency when hiring employees do not report higher labour
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productivity than firms offering equally good jobs but do not screen job candidates for
ability. This is in sharp contrast to findings on the impact of personality tests which
renders screening itself unlikely to be the driving force of “good jobs” to translate into
high labour productivity.
Result 3.3 (Competency Tests and Firm Performance). Screening job candidates for
competency as opposed to personality has considerably less power to explain labour per-
formance if firms offer “good jobs”. Not screening itself but screening for personality is
decisive for “good jobs” to turn into high labour productivity.
3.5 Robustness
In this section I perform a series of robustness checks: First, instead of estimating devi-
ations in income and discretion, I use raw responses on income and discretion. Secondly,
I only classify firms to be generous if actual income/discretion is at least one category
higher than estimated values. In a third check, I perform the Tobit model substituting
income with logarithmised income. Fourth, in order to provide a different method of how
to aggregate employee responses into firm averages, I first calculate binary firm generosity
towards each employee and second aggregate over all employees per establishment. To
address the fact that some firms simultaneously make use of personality and ability tests, I
finally re-estimate models on both screening devices excluding firms which simultaneously
search for personality and ability.
Raw Responses In this section, I re-estimate models 3.2 and 3.3 using raw responses
from the employee questionnaire. By skipping the entire procedure on estimating income
and discretion I hence do not account for personal characteristics of each employee. How-
ever, because firms differ in the composition of which employees answer the questionnaire
I may systematically over- and underrate income and discretion of firms. If questionnaires
however were returned purely random in each establishment, then using raw correlations
should only increase noise but is not expected to systematically bias coefficients.
As shown in Table C.5, column (1) and (2) in the Appendix, Section C.1.3, estimates for
both measures of discretion show a similar pattern as in the main section, even though
coefficients are estimated less precisely. For model 3.2 and using job-clusters of firms
providing “good jobs” and personality tests as reference category we find consistently
negative coefficients; some clusters exhibit significant lower associations with labour pro-
ductivity. Column (1) and (2) in Table C.7 finally re-estimates model 3.3 substituting
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estimated income and discretion with raw values. Here, we find significant interaction
terms between “good jobs” and personality tests only for one of two specifications.
Categorising Deviations Another potential critique could be the use of (hypothetical)
continuous deviations between estimated and actual values for income and discretion. For
the previous analysis I generate a continuous measure of expected income, though actual
income is only observed within intervals. This, however, implies that firms are classified
to pay less generous income to a certain employee if the estimated income is higher than
the average income within the respective interval. Some employees hence will falsely
be categorised to receive generous wages. The situation is analogously when estimated
income is below the mean income within an interval, which leads firms to appear generous.
Despite inaccuracies, however, the procedure so far is not expected to systematically bias
the results (assuming a symmetric income distribution around the mean of each category)
but having rather a tendency to increase the variance.
To nevertheless address these concerns I subsequently classify firms only then to be gen-
erous with regard to income if the lower bound of their actual income interval exceeds
their estimated income. All employees, whose estimated income lies in the interval of
their actual payments are classified as to receive income as expected. If firms pay as
expected then deviations are equalised to be zero; if establishments pay higher (lower)
than expected then I use the mean payment of the actual interval as reference payment.
I similarly proceed with estimates on discretion, where employees’ answers on perceived
discretion are scales from “1” (“none”) to “4” (“a lot”).33 Given this scale, I only count
answers to be higher (lower) than expected if expected and actual values deviate by at
least the positive (negative) magnitude of 0.5. In these cases actual discretion is not the
closest integer to estimated discretion.
Table C.5 (column (3) and (4)) provides estimates from model 3.2 for both suggested mea-
sures for discretion. Contrary to the main results, in column (3) the cluster [1,1,1] is not
significantly stronger correlated with productivity compared to some other cluster, though
all point estimates direct towards this relationship. Using responses on the question “How
to Work” as measure for discretion, estimates are comparable to the main results (column
(4)). A similar picture arises for model 3.3 in Table C.7. Human resource indicators do
not show significant patterns (column (3)) using “What Tasks” as measure for discretion
– the magnitude of the coefficient on “good jobs” in combination with screening for per-
sonality is considerable smaller than in the base specification. Applying “How to Work”
as measure for discretion, results are again comparable to the main section.
33Issues on the interpretability of ordinal responses are dealt with in “Alternative Method of Aggre-
gation” in this section.
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Log-Income Crucial for the estimation of income with interval regressions is the nor-
mality assumption. As the distribution of log-income in many applications is closer to the
Gaussian normal (compared to raw income) I re-estimate model 3.1 after transforming
income into log-income.
The transformation has no effect on the results of job-clusters (Table C.5 in Appendix
C.1.3): Relating labour productivity to HRM-clusters I find negative point estimates
for all job-clusters when omitting firms with “good jobs” and personality tests as base
category. Six out of seven clusters (for each measure of discretion) report significantly
lower productivity. Results on model 3.3 are presented in Table C.7. Here, however, I
do not find significant interaction effects on Ij ×Dj × Pj for discretion measured by the
question on “What Tasks”. Using “How to Work”, I find high and significant correlations
between the three-way interaction and labour productivity. Hence, the findings in this
section affirm that results from the main section are robust to a transformation of income
into log-income.
Alternative Method of Aggregation A serious concern of the previous analysis is
the interpretation of deviations from estimated HRM practises, although discretion is an
ordinal measure without scale. Moreover, when calculating firm averages, exceptionally
high positive (negative) deviations of discretion for one employee could potentially offset
lower (higher) than expected levels for several employees.
Here, I address both problems by changing the order of aggregation and averaging across
firms. Before, I summed deviations in income (discretion) across all employees within one
establishment and then took the mean deviation in income (discretion) within the firm. In
this section I first calculate a binary measure for each single employee, indicating whether
this respective employee receives generous income (discretion) or not from her firm. In a
second step I calculate the fraction of employees with high income (discretion) for each
firm. Finally, a firm is classified to be generous with regard to income (discretion) if it
provides more employees high income (discretion) than the average firm in the sample.
Estimates qualitatively do not change when applying the latter method of aggregation.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table C.6 provide estimates for model 3.2 using job-cluster [1,1,1]
as base category. As seen immediately almost all job-clusters yield significant negative
correlations with labour productivity compared to firms which provide “good jobs” and
screen for personality. In Table C.8 (columns (1) and (2)) I find positive and significant
correlations of productivity with the interaction of “good jobs” and screening, Ij×Dj×Pj.
This implies that the effect of HRM practises on productivity is not driven by the way
how I aggregate information from the regressions on income and discretion onto firm level.
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Excluding Firms with Personality and Competency Tests A final potential worry
of the previous analysis is the fact that some firms use personality tests and competency
tests simultaneously. In this paragraph I exclude exactly these firms from the analysis.
This may be particularly interesting for the results on competency tests because these
results include a subset of firms which also screen for personality.
Estimation results on job-clusters excluding the subset of firms using both screening de-
vices are provided in Table C.6, where columns (3) and (4) refer to personality tests as a
screening device and columns (5) and (6) to ability tests. Comparing results to the main
tables, I do not find qualitative differences. This is only partly true for model 3.3. As can
be seen in columns (3) and (4) the interactions of “good jobs” and personality tests are
not significantly different from zero for both measures of discretion, even though point
estimates sharply increase. This observation however, may be explained by limited sam-
ple size resulting in standard errors which are approximately 50 percent higher compared
to the base specification. Finally, competency tests (columns (5) and (6)) in combination
with “good jobs” cannot explain labour productivity, which is in line with Result 3.3.
Here, standard errors are comparable to the standard errors in the main regressions.
3.6 Discussion
Research in personnel economics has highlighted the importance of workplace organisation
for firm success. Rather recently, however, a number of studies find that behavioural
aspects within firms may shape outcomes. This implies that taking the “right” actions
may allow employers to benefit from non-standard behaviour of employees. Three of these
potentially “right” actions are presented in this paper.
This paper uses field evidence from the “Workplace Employment Relations Survey” to
relate three human resource policies – paying high income to employees, leaving worker
high discretion, and screening for personality or competency – to firm performance. I
show that firms which pay high income, grant high level of discretion, and screen their
job candidates for personal traits report to have exceptional high labour productivity. I
interpret this finding as evidence consistent with employees responding to gift-exchange;
job-clusters which are associated with efficiency wages or high “work ethic” of employees
alone are not associated with positive firm outcomes. This similarly applies for firms
which screen for ability instead of personality.
In a broader context, this analysis shows the importance of personality tests when screen-
ing job candidates. Interestingly, however, in this dataset only one third of the firms
make use of that screening device, which is a bit of a puzzle: If personality tests are the
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key to increase labour productivity (because this device reduces the number of employees
with adverse behaviour towards the firm) then one should expect firms to increasingly
make use of screening for personality. If however, only a limited number of employees in
the population exhibit reciprocal traits then rising demand for these workers could lead
to segmentation in the labour market: Successful firms with reciprocal employees and
“good jobs” on one side and firms providing jobs with low payments and low discretion
on the other. (The argument of segmentation in labour markets has, in a slightly different
context, already been made by Bartling et al. (2012a))
A natural next step could be to provide causal evidence of HRM practises, in particular
of personality tests on firm performance using field data. Whereas laboratory studies
can isolate underlying principles, it is often not clear whether the identified mechanism
has real-world implications. Gaining evidence on the actual importance of reciprocal
behaviour between employer and employee could improve labour market relations with
potential benefits for both parties.
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A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
We begin the proof by making two observations. First, it is easy to see that FR(ft, η) is
strictly decreasing and convex in η due to strict concavity of u(·). Hence, the fixed point
η˜ satisfying FR(ft, η˜) = 0, which exists by assumption 1.1 (i) is unique. Second, note that
for all η > wt we have that
F P (ft, wt, η) < (1−H(η))
(
(1− α)E[u(wτ )|wτ ≥ η, ft] + αu(η)− u(η)
)
−c ≤ FR(ft, η),
since E[u(wτ )|wτ ≥ η, ft] ≥ u(η). Thus, for large η, FR(·) is an upper bound for F P (·),
where the former is smaller than zero for η > η˜.
Now, note that there always exists a fixed point η¯ for which F P (ft, wt, η¯) = 0. To
see this, consider the cases α = 0 and α = 1. For α = 0, F P (ft, wt, ηt) = FR(ft, ηt)
and by assumption 1.1 (i) there always exists η′ satisfying FR(ft, η′) = 0. For α = 1,
F P (ft, wt, η) = (1 − H(η)) (u(wt)− u(η)) − c, which equals zero for some η′′ < wt due
to the strict concavity of u(·). Hence, some η¯ ∈ [η′, η′′] satisfies F P (ft, wt, η¯) = 0 for
α ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, we need to show that η¯ is unique. Because FR(·) is an upper bound for F P (·)
for large η, it is sufficient to show that F P (·) is quasi-convex in η. The first and second
derivatives of F P (·) with respect to η are
∂F P (ft, wt, η)
∂η
= αh(η) (u(η)− u(wt))− (1−H(η))u′(η)
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and
∂2F P (ft, wt, η)
∂η2
= αh′(η) (u(η)− u(wt)) + (1 + α)h(η)u′(η)− (1−H(η))u′′(η).
Hence, if there is some ηˆ with ∂F P (ft, wt, ηˆ)/∂η = 0, we have
∂2F P (ft, wt, ηˆ)
∂η2
= (1−H(ηˆ))h
′(ηˆ) + h(ηˆ)2
h(ηˆ) u
′(ηˆ) + αh(ηˆ)u′(ηˆ)− (1−H(ηˆ))u′′(ηˆ) > 0,
since (1−H(ηˆ))h′(ηˆ) + h(ηˆ)2 ≥ 0 by assumption 1.1 (ii). This completes the proof.
A.1.2 Proof of Hypothesis 1.1
Clearly, ∂y/∂wt > 0 if either ∂n(wt)/∂wt > 0 or ∂η¯/∂wt > 0. The second follows directly
from application of the implicit function theorem on (1.2), iff α > 0.
A.1.3 Proof of Hypothesis 1.2
Obvious, following the same argument as in the proof of Hypothesis 1.1.
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: Effect of Purchase-Date Weather on Ticket Orders for Repeat Customers
Daily Ticket Orders
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Multiple Orders Multiple Orders Multiple Orders
per Season with Bad Experience
Avg. Sun 0.012∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0018) (0.00089)
Avg. Rain −0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0031∗ −0.00018
(0.0028) (0.0017) (0.00080)
Forecast Y es Y es Y es
Horizon Indicators Y es Y es Y es
Observations 1635 1635 1635
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.241 0.132
Notes: Coefficients and robust standard errors are reported for OLS regressions of daily ticket orders
on purchase-date weather (sunshine duration in percent of time and rainfall in 1/100 mm), forecast of
movie-date weather (forecasted temperatures and indicator variables for symbols), and horizon indicators
(dummy variables for the number of days between purchase-date and movie-date). Fixed effects for the
show are included. In the first column, the sample is restricted to sales to customers who have previously
ordered tickets at least once between 2004 and 2011. In the second column, the sample is restricted
to customers with multiple orders per season and in the final column to customers who had previously
experienced rainfall during a show they had tickets for.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.2: Predictive Power of Current Weather and Forecast
Evening Sunshine Duration
1 Day Out 2 Days Out 3 Days Out 4 Days Out
Avg. Sun 0.032 0.023 −0.0027 0.077
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052)
Avg. Rain 0.076 0.012 −0.040 −0.027
(0.068) (0.071) (0.074) (0.076)
Forecasted Maxtemp. 1.27∗∗ 0.91 1.39∗∗ 0.95
(0.62) (0.71) (0.68) (0.70)
Forecasted Mintemp. −0.38 −0.026 0.097 0.13
(0.79) (0.93) (0.93) (0.85)
Symbol Partly Sunny −20.6∗∗∗ −27.0∗∗∗ −16.3∗∗∗ −19.8∗∗∗
(4.86) (4.98) (5.41) (5.62)
Symbol Shower −47.9∗∗∗ −45.4∗∗∗ −31.7∗∗∗ −27.4∗∗∗
(5.10) (5.36) (5.42) (5.58)
Symbol Rain −43.2∗∗∗ −43.0∗∗∗ −36.3∗∗∗ −25.2∗∗∗
(5.98) (6.21) (6.64) (6.70)
Symbol T-Storm −63.7∗∗∗ −59.1∗∗∗ −47.1∗∗∗ −31.9∗∗
(9.04) (10.1) (12.0) (14.0)
MA Rain 14 days −0.11 0.27 0.29 0.11
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29)
MA Sun 14 days 0.19∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.093) (0.098) (0.10) (0.10)
Year and Month Y es Y es Y es Y es
Indicators
Observations 470 469 470 471
Adjusted R2 0.369 0.302 0.246 0.159
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions estimating expected
sunshine duration (in percent) in the evening between 5 pm and 7 pm based on information one to
four days in advance (indicated in the column heading). The information comprises of current average
sunshine duration, current rainfall (in 1/100 mm), the current weather forecast for the respective time
horizon, a moving average of sunshine duration and rainfall of the past fortnight as well as year and
month dummies.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Predictive Power of Current Weather without Forecast
Evening Sunshine Duration
1 day out 2 days out 3 days out 4 days out
Avg. Sun 0.16∗∗∗ 0.043 0.024 0.052
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
Avg. Rain −0.064 −0.051 −0.071 −0.0047
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
MA Sun 14 days 0.29∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
MA Rain 14 days −0.058 0.14 −0.00052 −0.12
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
Year and Month Y es Y es Y es Y es
Indicators
Observations 572 570 568 566
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.099 0.088 0.082
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of predictions of evening sunshine duration.
The estimated models are identical to Table 8 with the exception that the variables of the weather forecast
are excluded from the dependent variables.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.3 Picture
Figure A.1: Location of the Theater
This picture shows the location of the theatre. Visitors are sitting in the amphitheatre on different rows
on flaggings or on wooden boards (the area at the bottom left corner of the picture). The screen is on
the left of this picture (not shown).
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Table Appendix
The following tables provide estimates for five different sets of modern human resource
controls, other firm related controls are unchanged.1 Set 1 only includes a dummy variable
indicating whether the respective firm uses competency tests. On top of that, Set 2
controls for personality tests of managers, whereas Set 3 additionally includes incentive
payments. Set 4 and Set 5 are compound measures for the presence of modern human
resource practises: The dummy in Set 4 equals one if either the firm uses competency
tests or personality tests for managers or incentive pay. The indicator in Set 5 is one if all
suggested measures, competency tests, personality tests for managers and incentive pay
are present at the firm.
1We refer to the robustness section for an extensive discussion.
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Table B.1: Robustness: Bottom Wage
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test −0.40∗∗ −0.38∗ −0.38∗ −0.38∗ −0.42∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2115 2115 2115 2115 2115
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2153) 2.17 2.13
Prob > F 0.12 0.12
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of employees
earning bottom wages (below 4.5 pounds per hour) on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the firm level. The
adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers
and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.2: Robustness: Top Wage
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.16 0.023 −0.014 0.13 0.17
(0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2113 2113 2113 2113 2113
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2153) 3.06 2.60
Prob > F 0.05 0.07
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of employees
earning high wages (above 15 pounds per hour) on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the firm level. The
adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers
and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Robustness: Training
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.26∗ 0.25 0.25 0.25∗ 0.31∗∗
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1888 1888 1888 1888 1888
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2126) 1.95 1.90
Prob > F 0.14 0.15
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered probit regressions of how many
days employees are trained during one year on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the
largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.4: Robustness: General Training
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.34∗ 0.23 0.23 0.32∗ 0.32∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1964 1964 1964 1964 1964
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2124) 3.36 3.22
Prob > F 0.04 0.04
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of the provision of
general training on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the control
sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational group. The
adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers
and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
99
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.5: Robustness: Job Security
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.28 0.33∗ 0.34∗ 0.32∗ 0.34∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 6982 6982 6982 6982 6982
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2165) 1.43 1.51
Prob > F 0.24 0.22
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of the provision of job
security on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the control sets, see
Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of all occupational group and includes a control for
the number of occupational groups per firm. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that
the coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.6: Robustness: Benefits
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.37∗ 0.29 0.28 0.34∗ 0.43∗∗
(0.19) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 2.53 2.23
Prob > F 0.08 0.11
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of the provision of
benefits for the employees on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on
the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational
group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for
managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.7: Robustness: No. of Benefits
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.30∗∗∗ 0.21 0.21 0.28∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 5.30 5.22
Prob > F 0.01 0.01
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered probit regressions of the
number of provided benefits for the employees on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the
largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.8: Robustness: Employer Pension Scheme
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 3.47 3.44
Prob > F 0.03 0.03
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of whether employer
offer pension schemes on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on
the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational
group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for
managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.9: Robustness: Extended Paid Leave
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.38∗∗ 0.28 0.27 0.35∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2275 2275 2275 2275 2275
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 3.54 3.09
Prob > F 0.03 0.05
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of whether employer
offer extended paid leave on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on
the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the largest occupational
group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for
managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.10: Robustness: Team-Working
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.43∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2187) 4.39 4.33
Prob > F 0.01 0.01
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered probit regressions of what
share of employees is designated to teams on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For
further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the analysis of the
largest occupational group. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.11: Robustness: Monitoring
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.086 0.11 0.10 0.081 0.082
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2279 2279 2279 2282 2282
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2153) 0.39 0.36
Prob > F 0.68 0.70
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of ordered probit regressions of the share of
employees who have monitoring tasks on personality tests and five different sets of controls. For further
details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the firm level. The adjusted Wald
test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality
tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.12: Robustness: Dismissals
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.0051 0.0024 0.0020 0.0039 0.0041
(0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0062)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2152 2152 2152 2152 2152
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2072) 0.67 0.54
Prob > F 0.51 0.58
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of OLS regressions of the share of employees
who have been dismissed during the previous year on personality tests and five different sets of controls.
For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based on the firm level. The
adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality tests for managers
and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.13: Robustness: Firm Performance
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.28∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.31∗ 0.26∗ 0.23
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2148 2148 2148 2148 2148
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2192) 1.98 1.79
Prob > F 0.14 0.17
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of self-reported mea-
sure of firm performance being one if either managers report higher than median financial performance
of their own firm, or higher labour productivity or higher product quality on personality tests and five
different sets of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions are based
on the firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of personality
tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.14: Robustness: Firm Benefit
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.52∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2279 2279 2279 2282 2282
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2189) 8.54 8.45
Prob > F 0.0002 0.0002
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of compound measure
of firm benefit being one, if the firm either uses higher than median team-working, less than median
monitoring or reports higher than median firm performance as defined in Table B.13 on personality tests
and five different sets of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All regressions
are based on the firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the coefficient of
personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.15: Robustness: Firm Benefit 2
Control Set 1 Control Set 2 Control Set 3 Control Set 4 Control Set 5
Pers. Test 0.27∗ 0.14 0.14 0.31∗∗ 0.23
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 2279 2279 2279 2282 2282
Adj. Wald Test
F(2, 2189) 2.38 2.59
Prob > F 0.09 0.08
Notes: We report the coefficients and robust standard errors of probit regressions of compound measure
of firm benefit being one as defined in Table B.14 or has lower or equal to median turnover on personality
tests and five different sets of controls. For further details on the control sets, see Appendix. All
regressions are based on the firm level. The adjusted Wald test refers to the null hypothesis, that the
coefficient of personality tests for managers and personality tests for non-managers are zero.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.1 Tables
C.1.1 Data Description
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Employee Characteristics
Obs. Avg. SD Min. Max.
Age
< 20 22362 0.03 0.18 0 1
20 - 29 22362 0.18 0.39 0 1
30 - 39 22362 0.25 0.43 0 1
40 - 49 22362 0.27 0.44 0 1
50 - 59 22362 0.22 0.41 0 1
60+ 22362 0.05 0.21 0 1
Tenure
< 1 22367 0.16 0.36 0 1
1 - 2 22367 0.13 0.33 0 1
2 - 5 22367 0.27 0.44 0 1
5 - 10 22367 0.19 0.39 0 1
10+ 22367 0.26 0.44 0 1
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Occupational Group
Management 22762 0.11 0.31 0 1
Professional 22762 0.12 0.32 0 1
Associate Professional 22762 0.17 0.37 0 1
Administrative 22762 0.19 0.39 0 1
Skilled Trade 22762 0.07 0.25 0 1
Personal Service 22762 0.09 0.28 0 1
Sales 22762 0.07 0.26 0 1
Machine Operatives 22762 0.08 0.26 0 1
Routine and Unskilled 22762 0.11 0.32 0 1
Union
Yes 22329 0.37 0.48 0 1
No, but in the past 22329 0.17 0.37 0 1
No, never 22329 0.47 0.50 0 1
Acad. Qual. 21991 2.03 1.21 1 8
Voc. Qual 21022 1.30 0.71 1 9
Gender 22345 0.54 0.5 0 1
Weekly Hours Working 22114 35.93 12.45 0 96
Notes: This table provides information on the number of observations, mean and standard deviation
as well as minimum and maximum values of control variables for estimations on income and discretion.
Statistics for each variable are calculated omitting answers “refusal”, “don’t know” and “not applicable”,
all indicating unclear answers.
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Table C.2: Estimation of Income and Discretion Regressions
Income Discretion
What Tasks How Work
(1) (2) (3)
Occupational Group
Professional −8.12 0.33∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(8.87) (0.028) (0.023)
Associate −85.3∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(8.25) (0.027) (0.022)
Secretary −158.1∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(7.41) (0.031) (0.026)
Skilled Trade −178.2∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(8.37) (0.042) (0.031)
Personal Service −221.2∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(7.81) (0.040) (0.030)
Sales −219.5∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
(7.87) (0.043) (0.034)
Operatives −233.0∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(8.74) (0.042) (0.037)
Unskilled −264.2∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(8.26) (0.036) (0.030)
Age
Age 18 - 19 −8.09 −0.088 −0.065
(12.7) (0.093) (0.077)
Age 20 - 21 10.4 −0.14 −0.11
(12.8) (0.094) (0.077)
Age 22 - 29 35.3∗∗∗ −0.15∗ −0.13∗
(11.8) (0.085) (0.067)
Age 30 - 39 94.9∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(11.5) (0.085) (0.067)
Age 40 - 49 106.6∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(11.9) (0.086) (0.068)
Age 50 - 59 102.4∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(11.9) (0.087) (0.067)
Age 60 - 64 72.7∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(13.1) (0.097) (0.075)
Age 64+ 16.2 −0.43∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗
(21.2) (0.13) (0.11)
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Tenure
Tenure 1 - 2 years 4.88 −0.091∗∗∗ −0.00073
(4.89) (0.032) (0.027)
Tenure 2 - 5 years 22.7∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗
(4.34) (0.029) (0.023)
Tenure 5 - 10 years 21.8∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(4.79) (0.032) (0.026)
Tenure > 10 years 43.3∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗
(5.23) (0.031) (0.025)
Gender −78.0∗∗∗ 0.0049 −0.041∗∗
(3.82) (0.019) (0.016)
Constant 160.0∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗
(16.4) (0.098) (0.078)
Employee Controls Y es Y es Y es
Observations 21506 21420 21428
R2 0.087 0.059
Notes: This table provides estimation results for interval regressions of income (column (1)) and linear
regression of discretion on employee observables. Predictions from these regressions are used to generate
estimated values for income and discretion for each employee.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.1.2 Competency Tests
Table C.3: Regression of Lab. Prod. on HRM-Cluster – Competency Tests
What Tasks How Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HRM Cluster
[0,0,0] −0.31∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13)
[1,0,0] −0.076 −0.39∗∗∗ 0.087 −0.25∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
[0,1,0] 0.097 −0.22 0.14 −0.19
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
[0,0,1] 0.092 −0.22∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
[1,1,0] 0.081 −0.23∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
[1,0,1] 0.034 −0.28∗∗ 0.15 −0.19
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
[0,1,1] −0.041 −0.36∗∗ 0.15 −0.19
(0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
[1,1,1] 0.31∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13)
Union −0.050 −0.050 −0.046 −0.046
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Pub. Sector −0.065 −0.065 −0.070 −0.070
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Constant 3.69∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1812 1812 1812 1812
R2 0.094 0.094 0.106 0.106
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
HRM cluster using competency tests as screening device and controls. The first panel (column (1) and
(2)) refers to answers on the question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (3) and (4) use
“How to Work”. Columns (1) and (3) use cluster [0,0,0] as base category; column (2) and (4) omit cluster
[1,1,1].
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.4: Regressions of Lab. Prod. on HRM Complementarities – Competency Tests
What Tasks How Work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Income (I) 0.11 0.097 0.19 0.14
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
High Discretion (D) 0.13 0.092 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)
Comp. Test (C) −0.083 −0.076 0.076 0.087
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
I × D −0.17 −0.23 −0.36∗ −0.35∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
I × C 0.097 0.061 0.038 0.14
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
D × C 0.045 0.018 −0.26 −0.29∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
I × D × C 0.18 0.35 0.32 0.25
(0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
Union −0.050 −0.046
(0.085) (0.084)
Pub. Sector −0.065 −0.070
(0.12) (0.11)
Foreign 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15)
Constant 3.46∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗ 3.52∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.20) (0.095) (0.19)
Firm Controls No Y es No Y es
Subpop. Observations 1815 1812 1815 1812
R2 0.017 0.094 0.035 0.106
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
binary variables of income, discretion, competency tests and its interactions. The first panel (column (1)
and (2)) refers to answers on the question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (3) and (4) use
“How to Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.1.3 Robustness
Table C.5: Labour Productivity on HRM-Cluster: Robustness I
Raw Categorical Log Income
“What” “How” “What” “How” “What” “How”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HRM Cluster
[0,0,0] −0.37∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.53∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
[1,0,0] −0.27 −0.26 −0.31 −0.38∗∗ −0.39∗ −0.41∗∗
(0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
[0,1,0] −0.36∗∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.22 −0.33∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.35∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
[0,0,1] −0.22 −0.23 −0.30∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.35∗∗ −0.32∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
[1,1,0] −0.66∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗∗ −0.43∗ −0.61∗∗ −0.43∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.22)
[1,0,1] −0.054 −0.10 −0.14 −0.24 −0.24 −0.29
(0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.18)
[0,1,1] −0.23 −0.30∗∗ −0.19 −0.28∗ −0.27∗ −0.32∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
Union −0.048 −0.048 −0.053 −0.062 −0.058 −0.048
(0.086) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083)
Pub. Sector −0.073 −0.063 −0.085 −0.070 −0.086 −0.058
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign 0.58∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 3.97∗∗∗ 4.00∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1498 1498 1495 1495 1494 1494
R2 0.100 0.099 0.091 0.103 0.088 0.095
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
HRM cluster and controls for different control specifications. Uneven columns refer to answers on the
question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (2), (4) and (6) use “How to Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.6: Labour Productivity on HRM Cluster: Robustness II
Aggregation Only Pers. Tests Only Comp. Tests
“What” “How” “What” “How” “What” “How”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HRM Cluster
[0,0,0] −0.41∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13)
[1,0,0] −0.29 −0.31∗ −0.40∗∗ −0.36∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗
(0.19) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12)
[0,1,0] −0.30∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗ −0.20 −0.22 −0.19
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
[0,0,1] −0.33∗∗ −0.40∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.24 −0.22∗ 0.015
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12)
[1,1,0] −0.56∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗ −0.48∗ −0.23∗ 0.035
(0.24) (0.22) (0.26) (0.28) (0.14) (0.15)
[1,0,1] −0.23 −0.34∗ −0.29∗ −0.17 −0.28∗∗ −0.19
(0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14)
[0,1,1] −0.31∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.19
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
Union −0.068 −0.061 −0.064 −0.042 −0.050 −0.046
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084)
Pub. Sector −0.078 −0.074 −0.068 −0.060 −0.065 −0.070
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Foreign 0.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
Constant 4.07∗∗∗ 4.12∗∗∗ 4.11∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494
R2 0.089 0.091 0.093 0.103 0.094 0.106
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
HRM cluster and controls for different control specifications. Uneven columns refer to answers on the
question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (2), (4) and (6) use “How to Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.7: Labour Productivity on HRM Complementarities: Robustness I
Raw Categorical Log Income
“What” “How” “What” “How” “What” “How”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Income (Inc.) 0.015 0.11 0.16 0.20∗ 0.025 0.15
(0.11) (0.10) (0.099) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
High Discretion (Disc.) 0.16 0.17∗ 0.081 0.20∗∗ 0.029 0.18∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.099) (0.094) (0.11) (0.095)
Pers. Test (PT) 0.11 0.15 0.073 0.14 −0.0065 0.091
(0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.18) (0.17)
Inc. × Disc. −0.027 −0.18 −0.053 −0.15 0.064 −0.15
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Inc. × PT −0.41 −0.49∗ −0.28 −0.43 −0.068 −0.27
(0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26)
Disc. × PT 0.057 −0.021 0.090 −0.049 0.12 −0.064
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Inc. × Disc. × PT 0.47 0.67∗∗ 0.31 0.61∗ 0.22 0.57∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Union −0.048 −0.048 −0.053 −0.062 −0.058 −0.048
(0.086) (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083)
Pub. Sector −0.073 −0.063 −0.085 −0.070 −0.086 −0.058
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Foreign 0.58∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant 3.60∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 3.58∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1498 1498 1495 1495 1494 1494
R2 0.100 0.099 0.091 0.103 0.088 0.095
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
binary variables of income, discretion, personality tests and its interactions. Uneven columns refer to
answers on the question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion, columns (2), (4) and (6) use “How to
Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table C.8: Labour Productivity on HRM Complementarities: Robustness II
Aggregation Only Pers. Tests Only Comp. Tests
“What” “How” “What” “How” “What” “How”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Income (Inc.) 0.10 0.037 0.21∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.095 0.14
(0.10) (0.090) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.15)
High Discretion (Disc.) 0.082 0.035 0.13 0.25∗∗∗ 0.096 0.34∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.092) (0.14) (0.11)
Pers. Test (PT) 0.12 0.12 0.032 0.11
(0.14) (0.14) (0.31) (0.28)
Comp. Test (CT) −0.13 0.064
(0.13) (0.12)
Inc. × Disc. −0.092 0.030 −0.21 −0.38∗∗∗ −0.23 −0.34∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19)
Inc. × PT −0.38 −0.38 −0.34 −0.42
(0.26) (0.25) (0.46) (0.44)
Inc. × CT 0.17 0.21
(0.20) (0.20)
Disc. × PT −0.027 −0.065 0.18 0.073
(0.22) (0.22) (0.38) (0.36)
Disc. × CT 0.073 −0.29
(0.20) (0.20)
Inc. × Disc. × PT 0.59∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.75 0.84
(0.34) (0.33) (0.54) (0.53)
Inc. × Disc. × CT 0.27 0.22
(0.29) (0.29)
Union −0.068 −0.061 −0.066 −0.047 −0.044 −0.041
(0.084) (0.084) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091)
Pub. Sector −0.078 −0.074 −0.088 −0.083 −0.087 −0.097
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Foreign 0.57∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16)
Constant 3.66∗∗∗ 3.69∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗ 3.53∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Firm Controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Subpop. Observations 1494 1494 1108 1108 1108 1108
R2 0.089 0.091 0.099 0.109 0.098 0.110
Notes: This table provides linear regression coefficients and standard errors of labour productivity on
binary variables of income, discretion, personality tests (competency tests for columns (5) and (6)) and
its interactions. Uneven columns refer to answers on the question “What Tasks” as proxy for discretion,
columns (2), (4) and (6) use “How to Work”.
Level of Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.2 Figures
Figure C.1: Distribution of Employee Questionnaires per Firm
This figure provides relative frequencies of returned questionnaires per firm. Only firms with a minimum
of one questionnaires are included.
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Figure C.2: Distribution of HRM Clusters
This figure provides relative frequencies of HRM clusters, which were used in Section 3.4. Panel (a)
refers to "What Tasks" as measure of discretion, panel (b) to "How to Work".
(a) Discretion: “What Tasks” (b) Discretion: “How to Work”
Figure C.2 depicts relative frequencies of each of the eight HRM clusters for two measures
of discretion. The notation for each cluster is described as follows: [personality tests,
high income, high discretion]. Each position is either 0 or 1 depending on whether firms
require personality tests for job candidates, pays high income or allows for discretion.
Hence on the very left of the figure cluster [0,0,0] describes firms which do not screen for
personality, pay low income and do not grant high discretion and on the other extreme
(cluster [1,1,1]) describes firms with personality tests, high income and discretion. Both
panels exhibit similar frequency distributions. About 18 percent of firms belong to cluster
[0,0,1], implying that these establishments do not screen job candidates for personality,
do not pay higher than expected wages but provide substantial discretion. Approximately
10 percent of firms offer “good” jobs and screen for personality.
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